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Great Philosophical Problems

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BY

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'A PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM OF THEISTIC IDEALISM,
AND OTHER WORKS

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PREFACE.

THIS volume of Philosophical Essays is an independent work, and may be read as such. But it has, at the same time, an ulterior and higher value than that of a volume of detached essays. For, in its choice of subjects, it has been designed and purposed to serve as a supplementary volume to my recent large work, entitled 'A Philosophical System of Theistic Idealism.' All the subjects dealt with in the present volume were touched upon in that work, but, because I could not, without serious disproportion, give them in that work, "elaborate" as it was said to be, the extended treatment which I desired, I have provided this in the present volume. This enhances the value of the present work, by placing the contents of its chapters in a systematic relation and connection. It, at the same time, extends the range and widens the usefulness of the larger work, which it so supplements. This to me is important, for, however some philosophers may choose to entertain indifference as to the value of system, that appears to me no high or satisfying philosophic plane in which the mind is content to be the abode of merely individual, sporadic, and unrelated problems.

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There is no lack of philosophical variety in the work. Epistemology, Ontology and Metaphysics, and Ethics, are all represented in its chapters, in whose discussions Psychology and Logic also find frequent place.

The chapters on "The Character of Cognitive Acts," "Philosophy and Faith," and "The Phenomenology of Pain" appear for the first time. My best thanks are tendered to Mrs Paul Carus for cordial permission to republish the chapters on "The Greatest Problem in Value," and on "Rationalism and Voluntarism," which appeared in 'The Monist'; to Dr Silas M'Bee, editor of 'The Constructive Quarterly,' New York, from which journal the chapters on "The Ontological Consciousness" and "The Unity of God and Man" are reprinted; and to Professor James H. Tufts, University of Chicago, editor of 'The International Journal of Ethics,' from which the chapter on "The Ethical Value of Individuality" is taken. The chapter on "The Ethics of some Modern World-Theories" appeared in the 'Bibliotheca Sacra' while my dear and distinguished friend, the late Professor G. F. Wright, D.D., LL.D., was editor. All these papers have been revised, and minor alterations and additions made, but without substantially affecting the character of the papers as they originally appeared. In their present form they will, I hope, find a new circle of readers.

JAMES LINDSAY.

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Great Philosophical Problems.

CHAPTER I.

THE GREATEST PROBLEM IN VALUE.

THE greatest problem in value I take to be the truth-value. Truth is not itself value. Eternally valid truths must be held to exist without reference to the judging individual. Such universal truths or principles are known in rational intuition; they are the norms or standards of all thinking; and they are, as truths of reason, to be distinguished from facts or the knowledge of particular realities. These *Wahrheiten* must be held to exist eternally, irrespective of their apprehension or not by the human species. They do not exist simply as having a place in the stream of practical development, but are universal, necessary, objective. The truth about a fact does not come after the fact, nor the truth about a reality come after the reality: without truth, neither fact nor reality would be. Truth, however, as truth, is to be distinguished from fact and from reality. Truth is that which is true in itself, and is not mere appear-

ance, as Kant wrongly supposed. When an American philosophical writer says he "cannot conceive by what right a human philosophy has ever announced that the Eternal Order" is "true," I answer, by the best of rights, that of rational intuition. Truth is the most universal presupposition of all thought. But there are ways in which we have come to speak of the truth-value. If we say, "this rose is red," we express only a truth-value or a truth-judgment. Truth-value, if we do use the word value here, is absolute. Truth is the only value that cannot be denied without contradiction; it is the only value that is really absolute. Goodness, for example, carries universal validity for every subject; but it is not valid for every object; in a sense, therefore, it is not absolute. But there is no object to which the truth test cannot be applied. The validity of truth is absolute, and without condition of any sort. Truth is independent of our knowing, but yet dominates our thought. Truth is thus the central determining power or value of our conscious reflective life. Truth, in objective significance, is not what James absurdly called an "inert static relation": that cannot be rightly termed "inert" which is in itself the most potent principle and factor in the world, effecting by its very being or presence the cleavage between the worlds of the true and the false. Even the good presupposes the true, truth being the supreme rational good. Of course, all this is without prejudice to the accepted fact that theoretic or truth-values, as apprehended by us, are never untinged by emotional colour.

But there is the large class of judgments that go

beyond the truth-value ; judgments, I mean, concerning what is good, which express not only the objective value-principle of truth, but the subordinate value-principle of morality. Now, the problem of value, as it has appeared in recent German philosophies of the more extreme value-character, has been seen capable of presentation—if it is to rest upon any theory of knowledge—only on the presupposition that truth itself could be treated as value, in the same way and sense as the other values—goodness and beauty. Hence the post-Kantian “philosophy of spirit” has been replaced in the Windelband-Rickertian representations, by a “philosophy of value,” of fundamentally Romantic character and tendency. But it has not been consistently or successfully done. Windelband has attempted it in ways or modes which, without justification, subordinate truth-values to the other universally valid values, instead of co-ordinating these last properly, and subordinating them to the truth-values, which may be regarded as, *par excellence*, philosophy. If it must be allowed that Windelband seeks a theory of knowledge, it must be said that he does so only in a peculiar sense of the term. Knowledge for him is apt to consist in realising an ideal, rather than in an intellectual fact. For his idealism is of a very abstract character. He deals not really with the question wherein truth consists, but only with the way in which man reaches it. His task is thus not one as to theoretic truth, nor yet a psychological one, but one as to theory of knowledge, or theoretic knowing, in the peculiar sense in which that is meant by him. “Peculiar,” I say, because he treats laws and categories which are usually taken

for truth, as mere means thereto. He holds to the doctrine that judgment is an act of the will *par excellence*, emphasising our spontaneity in the outgoing of this will-moment in knowledge. In this way he hopes to found a primacy of the practical reason in logic. Windelband fails to realise that the truth-value is a higher inquiry than that after any of the other universally valid values, and so he unwarrantably inclines to co-ordinate it with them in an untenable way.

There are many defects and inconsistencies in Rickert's value-attempts also, although I am not now called on to detail them. His attempt, however, to equalise the logical and the ethical conscience is, it must be said, a very strained and unsatisfactory affair. He expressly says that the *Sollen*, as object to the judging subject, is not something to be understood, or to be thought, but a *Sollen* which is transcendent, does not exist as fact, but is timelessly valid. He sharply opposes it to being. The *Sollen* is not pure value, he says: value belongs to the *Sollen* only as it is related to a recognising subject. Truth, to Rickert, is nothing else than recognition of the *Sollen*. Now, an unknown logical *Sollen* interpreted through an unknown ethical *Sollen* seems to me a case of *obscurum per obscurius*; the logical conscience, we are told, is only a particular form of the ethical conscience in general. The theoretic function is, on Rickert's philosophy of values, erroneously reduced to a practical one, by the object of knowledge being taken, not as that which is, but as that which ought to be. Rickert's is no more satisfactory than was Fichte's attempt to condition all

theoretic knowledge on moral law, in crass neglect of the natural order and experience. The fundamental concept of ethics, it is said, becomes in Rickert's way raised to the dignity of the true! How *can* that be, when, on his own showing, the true only reaches its own dignity as drawn from duty-fulfilment? The dignity of the true he has already destroyed by his reduction of the logical conscience—a procedure which leaves the knowledge-problem quite unsolved. A transcendent *Sollen* will not satisfy the metaphysical view of things and their profound unity, which certainly cannot be subsumed under our moral experience. This would make the human spirit, with the values Rickert provides for it, a simple monstrosity in such a world as that we have on our hands. Duty does not call us to transcend consciousness in the absolute fashion projected by Rickert; such an *ought-to-be*, detached from all thought, feeling, and will, belonging to an absolutely transcendent order, is neither necessary to knowledge nor consonant with it. Knowledge belongs to the real order of things, in which the object exists independently of the cognitive act. It is not the case, as Rickert pretends, that knowledge has to do only with the ideal, not with the real: knowledge is a thing of individual experience, and not referable to an abstract and fictional *Bewusstsein überhaupt*, correspondent to nothing in reality. Such knowledge of the world of reality gives truth or existential judgments, not judgments of value. Rickert fails to do any manner of justice to the world of natural reality. Objectivity does not for him exist in being, but is found in what ought-to-be. Obviously, the entire

procedure of Rickert would make the truth-value an ethical value, as one finds already suggested, long before, in Ulrici.¹ Although Ulrici makes truth an ethical idea, he does not mean to deny that the universal logical categories are truth in the form of concept; but he chooses to concern himself too exclusively with truth as it comes to consciousness in us; and he makes it an ethical idea, as desired by us as beings of an ethical character and determination. Whether in this he does justice to the place and functions of reason and intellect in the apprehension of truth is another matter, and one on which I am inclined to think he lays a rather one-sided ethical stress. But such a stress was rather unusual in 1873. In the strange fashion already described does Rickert try to carry out his idea of making the theory of knowledge the base of all philosophy. The object of knowledge is a transcendent "Ought." His theory of knowledge is, of course, ethically swamped. His conclusion, unsatisfactory enough, is that our knowing rests upon a resolution of the will. Surely a not very theoretic *finale*. The perception of truth is, in my judgment, far too completely an act of the intellect, not directly dependent on the will, to belong, in any primary fashion, to ethical character or choice: one believes on evidence, and has no choice in the matter. Rickert actually takes the position that for the man who wills not truth, its validity is not to be grounded. That is true only where consent of the will is called for, in respect of ethical truth, that there may be harmony of the will with truth already known by

¹ 'Gott und der Mensch,' vol. ii. pp. 131-136.

the reason. The sphere of ethics ought to be distinguished from that of correct thinking. Instead of which, Rickert reduces the truth to the good. Rickert is thus found, in his whole position, badly confounding the psychologically real grounds of judgment with the logical grounds of the truth of judgment. But the logician does not admit that subjective desires and prepossessions have to do with truth. The truth of a logical concept is, to him, independent of experience; a concept may be a true concept, apart from whether anything real corresponds to it. Eternal truths, he holds, have nothing to do with the subjectivity of the individual. Rickert fails to recognise knowledge of being, because he does not fully distinguish pure logic, or theory of truth, from theory of knowledge, or noëtics. Not psychology, but logic, has to do with absolute, unconditioned truth.

Truth, so taken, is no factual affair, and does not belong to space and time. Truth is eternal and independent of the judging individual. Husserl not only contends that truth is above all temporality, but holds the absolute truth and validity of logical laws, concepts, and judgments, though with his positions *in extenso* I am not here concerned. Volkelt has urged that it is reference for proof "to a somewhat, separate from us, and not possessed by us, which gives their peculiar significance to the expressions of certainty and logical compulsion." Bradley, whose discussion is valuable albeit he does not at all points express himself quite consistently, says "truths must exist in a mind"; "but the truth itself does not consist in its existence in me"; yet he adds,

"truth may not be truth at all apart from its existence" in "finite subjects."¹ To the last expression, some exception may certainly be taken in the light of what has already been, and will later be, advanced. He does better when he says that though he "can find in truth the satisfaction of a want," in which case "its existence" in himself depends "at least very largely" on the will, yet he "cannot regard its nature as subject" to the will.² The step which Bradley rightly refuses to take was taken by Münsterberg's voluntarism, which takes truth to be won by willing, by our creative activities. Truth is thus created, not copied. The doer, or, it may be, the deed, not merely finds, but, on this theory, is, the truth. No satisfactory theory of the objectivity of truth is possible on such a basis. Even the voluntarism of Royce holds, in a very objectionable form, "that all truth is indeed relative to the expression of our will," although "the will inevitably determines for itself forms of activity which are objectively valid and absolute."³ It appears to me that to mix up the will in its action in this fashion is to make the truth question no longer a logical one at all. To that I shall return presently. Bradley, of whom I have spoken, goes on to maintain that truth, like beauty, is, from one side—the side of essence—independent of the will, although there is another and practical side in which truth involves need and desire.⁴ In this sense, truth is "the satisfaction of a want," but there is truth, for all that, which transcends indi-

¹ 'Essays in Truth and Reality,' p. 87.

² *Ibid.*, p. 87.

³ Paper at the Congress of Philosophy in Heidelberg, 1908.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 88.

vidual life.¹ The objective and transcendent character of such truth was already finely expressed by Augustine. The idea of truth is central in his philosophy : he reverts to it in the solution of all ultimate questions. It was well for Aquinas that this was so. Thus, from all now advanced, truth is "at once dependent and free." Says Mr Joachim, "independent truth itself" yet lives in "finite minds," but it does not so, in my view, simply and solely *as* my thought. All this amounts to what I prefer to designate as truth absolute and truth relative, and it is with the former aspect I am now mainly concerned. Truth in this absolute sense is, in its essence, eternal : truth is not made by us, as James and Dewey have maintained. I hold, like Bradley, their supposition to be absurd and untenable. I do not "make" truth save in the subjective sense that, but for my mind and truth's entering into it, truth would not exist for me at all. But truth itself I have not "made"; no more can I destroy it; and the objection that there is no objective or independent truth cannot be sustained. It is the nature of truth, not its supposed "making," that concerns us. Plato would have said, οὐδέποτε ἐγένετο ἡ ἀλήθεια, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἔστιν.

Essential truth is not man-made; there is inherent absurdity in the supposition, as Bradley has sufficiently shown. Schopenhauer held that truth is the reference of a judgment to something outside itself, as its sufficient ground, and that intrinsic truth is a contradiction in terms. But that is a narrow view of truth, which, in the full latitude of its signification, cannot be so confined to concepts

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 87.

or formal judgments, but extends to beings or things. Hence Augustine had already, and rightly, said that "the true is that which *is*." Hegel thought that by truth was chiefly to be understood that I *know* how something *is*; this is truth only in relation to consciousness. Kant, Hegel, and Kuno Fischer regard truth as consisting in the agreement of the concept with its object, as did J. E. Erdmann, to whom "that is true which is known as it is." Aquinas had said, "according to that which it is." But, for all the talk concerning the *adaequatio intellectus cum re*, it will be found, I believe, that we are more indebted to Aquinas in this aspect of the matter than to any subsequent philosopher whatsoever. But, critically, we are still faced with the relativity of this agreement. And in all these cases, the "object," I contend, must be far wider than actual reality, as we shall see. Truth is intrinsic—as Schopenhauer failed to see—being a transcendental attribute of Being. I do not agree with Lotze that truths exist only in the thought of a thinker, for there is truth that is before him, and waits for his finding or discovery. It is this objectivity of truth that has impelled to truth's quest at all times. Lotze, however, thinks the mind "only recognises truth in as far as it belongs to its own nature from all eternity," a somewhat far-fetched connection; "truth that was originally unconnected with it," it could not "comprehend"; "it cannot be external to him, who is to recognise it"; "its recognition is only thinkable as cognition of our own being in it."¹ But the externality of truth need surely not be such as to keep us from knowing it,

¹ 'Mikrokosmos,' vol. ii. p. 698.

any more than the externality of nature prevents our recognition of it: in both cases the mind is destined to knowledge; in the case of truth, it is made a real and inward possession. But I should beg to be excused from taking Bradley's "I have now a toothache" as a sample of the eternality of truth, because both it, and the reasons supporting it, appear to me absurdly inadequate.¹ I hold truth to be one, and reality one, but the unity of truth—the congruous and harmonious character of all truth—is not to me the unity of a whole made up, by treating truth as an existent, of partial truths, all of which, as parts of a whole, are only partially true. There are many concentric circles within the orb of truth. But, in the view which I am critically speaking of, "the true" is said to be "the Whole," short of which no isolated truth can be completely true. This whole, however, is supposed to be an organic unity or significant whole, "all its constituent elements reciprocally" involving one another or determining one another's being. Such is the supposed whole of truth, short of which no truths are perfectly true. Certain thinkers have therefore said that no single judgment is absolutely true; but, in that case, this judgment itself cannot be absolutely true. This whole theory of truth has too many difficulties, some of which I am now pointing out, while some have been dealt with by Mr Bertrand Russell,² and some by Dr Aveling,³ for it to be satisfactory. There are

¹ 'Essays in Truth and Reality,' p. 340. Bradley might, like Pascal, have cured his toothache with mathematics, and found in the latter a better example of the eternality of truth.

² 'Proc. Arist. Soc.,' 1907.

³ Ibid., 1915.

many isolated judgments or single propositions which, as Russell remarks, must be held "true in a sense in which their contradictories are not true." Those propositions I take for true, which are in character universal, and not particular; the particular is immediately experienced, and neither asks to be, nor can be, proved. No particular truth, indeed, is true, except through universal truth. But then, only in the particular can the universal be real. However, the general truth is not derived from the particular truth; such is seen to be the case in such a general truth as that all the diameters of the same circle are equal. Bradley makes truth ideal, yet practically treats it as an existent, and merges it in reality. But even when truth is taken as value, such value is valid, but not existent. But truth is to Bradley in a sense a failure, since it comes short, in view of his 'Appearance and Reality,' of being "quite identical with reality," in which latter it may even be "swallowed up." But this cannot be, since truth is about reality, with which it is not to be thus identified or confounded. Truth is not to be, as Dewey has said of Bradley, "a sort of transcendent essence on its own account,"¹ as we shall presently see.

Truth is not merged or transformed into reality; completed truth must still be truth, and not a merging in the concrete whole, termed the Absolute. There are primary and self-evident truths or principles which are recalcitrant to such a mode of treatment, as connected only with concrete reality. It is said that "truth is a word which has no meaning

¹ 'Mind,' July 1907, p. 334.

without the implicate of reality.”¹ Now, when it is said that truth and reality are correlative, or that truth is the intellectual equivalent of reality, though the range of the correctness of the statement may be obvious, yet it is not to me wholly satisfying, since it involves reality being taken in a sense so unusual as to seem unreal. To make it satisfactory, we should need to extend the sphere of being or reality so as to include truths that seem unreal in a merely factual sense. The figures of geometry, for example, must be held real, as being the true ones of conception, a point which Mill failed to appreciate. Erdmann is therefore found saying that a so-called actual parabola is none, while a true one is that which is found in its formula. Locke strongly held mathematical truths—of figures and their properties—true and real apart from all “real existence in matter.” The universal thought-forms, as in logic and mathematics, severed from all determinate content, can be object of thought and inquiry, and are then neither unreal nor untrue. Their objective truth and validity cannot properly be denied. They are no hypotheses, framed to explain determinate appearances. Such thought is still a fact of mental life, valid and indispensable. The question is one of theory of knowledge, not of metaphysics. We may say their objective validity is *sui generis*, but the judgments belong to the sphere of truth all the same, and no theory or system of truth but must take full account of them. Factual truth means that the quality of the facts is such that they are true. But truth cannot be confined to brute fact; there is also propositional truth, to

¹ G. T. Ladd, ‘Theory of Knowledge,’ p. 58.

which being cannot without stultification be denied, if any comprehensive view of truth is to be taken. This seems necessary to remember, when we are told that all truth "must be referred to the test of reality."¹ Of course, I admit, in what has been said, that being real imports more than simply being, which latter is the widest and most fundamental category.² So wide that it is taken by Suarez, Tongiorgi, and other Scholastic thinkers to include those entities of reason which have objective being solely in the intellect. They do not, however, exactly rank them, ontologically, with actual being, a fact not always carefully kept in mind by Continental writers on the subject. They are still ideal being. Rosmini held that, in the last analysis, the truth of a thing is just its being. Truth and being were to him equivalent. The truth of knowledge was, to him, known being. What was conformable to ideal being was, for him, true. But such a complete identification of truth with being, as Rosmini made, cannot be held admissible or correct, since truth is not being, but only a quality, property, or attribute of being. We see, then, that there is objective truth in itself as well as truth for us.

Again, when it is contended that truth means such a judgment as corresponds to the being of the really existent, we may again feel that this reference to existents, however we may have to accept it, does not seem satisfyingly to cover the whole conceivable range and extent of truth. Of course, a truth is not truth, if it be not real, and so we are haunted by

¹ G. T. Ladd, 'Theory of Knowledge,' p. 454.

² Cf. my Discussion of "The Logic of the New Realism" in 'The Philosophical Review,' September 1920.

the shadow of reality again, and yet the truth may be so ideal that the thought of the really existent is repellent in such a connection. Yet there are important thinkers to-day who allow only those judgments to be true, of which the objective fact is really existent. Surely there are evident judgments, where no concrete actuality of the objectives are concerned, that cannot be false. Mathematics and formal logic are examples in their remoteness from ordinary reality: truth, in their purest results, springs up in independence—it might even be said, because of the independence—of real existents, since they both belong to the sphere of things not seen. Why, then, can it be quite satisfactory for philosophers to keep on binding all truth to association with the really existent? These truths—I mean, of pure mathematics and formal logic—may be pure abstractions, but you do not deny them the name of truth, because they are abstract and independent of reality, even though they may not be incapable of being brought into some sort of relation to, and bearing upon, reality. I am, of course, well aware of those philosophical quarters in which it is blankly denied that there is any abstract truth, or truth in itself, but I do not think such denial is conformable to true reason. The truths of pure mathematics and formal logic, of which I have been speaking, are completely and unconditionally true, independently of their place in this or that particular mind. So absolute are the truths of pure logic that to deny them is simply to reassert them in new form. Royce seems to me right in claiming that recent thought and discovery in respect of the system of geometrical truth, and the sphere of

logical analysis, tend to a more rigid and objective conception of truth, to fundamental thinking. There was no occasion to mar this statement by tacking his absurd absolute voluntarism on to it. The truth-relations seem, in such cases, to be, in a sense, absolute; one may at least say, free of contingency and of caprice. Yet the Absolute seems to me a conception that goes beyond mathematics as concerned with the quantitative, which, however indefinitely expanded, is no more than one form of the infinite.

But the independence of truth is to be seen in the world of concrete reality also. Professor Lloyd Morgan, in an able and interesting paper, concludes to the presence of extra-mental "truth in the structure of the knowable world," which, he says, "may not yet be known—perhaps may never be known by us," but which "is there all the same"; also, "truth in the structure of the sphere of knowledge," marked by consistency; and finally, "truth as correspondence" of the two spheres—knowledge and the knowable—just spoken of.¹ He does not mean anything "static" by truth-structure, since the knowable world is in the making, under development and evolution. This line of thought does not necessarily help us greatly, as it stands, toward the determination of absolute and eternal truth. I mean, individual phenomena in the empiric world, simply taken, do not enable you to reach absolute truth, only super-sensible law being the really true. But it is of interest and value over against the contention of James that "theoretic truth" dwells "*within* the mind." It

¹ 'Proc. Arist. Soc.,' 1917.

militates in certain ways against the pragmatism and instrumentalism that make all truth instrumental and relative, and reduce truth to a biological and psychological value. Truth, in such a view, grows with our growth, and changes with our needs. Truth is, on this theory, just our control of the objects of experience, and that is the use of scientific hypotheses. The truth of ideas lies in their empirical value, in how far they "work." This is made the sole criterion of truth. Truth is a mere social product, to this view. A useful enough aspect of truth, so far as it goes, but inadequate, as a theory of truth, since it is too individualistic, and never gets so far as to become objective, and supra-temporal in significant import ; it is one which was not wholly absent from Socrates, the Sophists, the Stoics, and the Epicureans, though developed and set in novel forms in our time. But the true in itself is not sought, nor believed in ; what is true is true only for the subject ; individual instinct figures too largely in pragmatist knowledge, instead of the theoretic knowledge which seeks after universal rules. But will does not make a knowledge-content for truth ; truth in its objectivity is independent of the knowing subject's acknowledgment of it. Akin to the pragmatist view is that of Höffding when, in his ' Problems of Philosophy,' he makes truth a dynamic concept, as representing the application of mental energy ; but this is only one side of the truth, and is defective in respect of the other aspect, on which I am insisting. It is mere gratuitous dogmatism when Höffding says every static aspect of truth must be given up in favour of practicality and working-value. His view, true so far as it goes,

remains unconvincing, subjective, and lacking in grasp of truth- or reality-values. Lloyd Morgan's view, which I have touched upon, is objective over against such subjectivity, but his view is also evolutionary, and, in some senses at least, relativistic. Says he, "Ask the physicist, the chemist, the physiologist—ask any representative man of science—where truth lives and has its home awaiting discovery, and he will say it is out there in that which it is his special business to interpret." So little does the scientist "make" truth, or even empirical truths, and the scientific conscience will remain refractory to being subsumed under Rickert's ethical conscience.

It may be noted that in Dr Schiller's rhetorical declamations against "The Rationalistic Conception of Truth," he is really concerning himself with how truth is in the subject; he is simply speaking in a different tongue from those who contend that truth is objective and independent, and signifies agreement with transcendent reality.¹ Refutation can obviously not be effected by him in such a way. The truth is, that in our knowledge of the objectively real world, taking reality in its widest sense, as in our knowledge of the ethical world, we run up against standards of truth that are absolute, and try in vain to rid ourselves of truth which is absolute and eternal. In these realms we come upon truths, axioms, principles, laws, and ideals of reason which are universally valid and eternal. These carry for us objective validity as principles and laws of things, and as norms that regulate all thinking and all knowing, because in them reason is realised. Logical laws, like

¹ 'Proc. Arist. Soc.,' 1909.

the law of identity and the law of contradiction, suggest themselves as examples. Logical axioms are universal, because true, not true because universal. In these, as in the case of absolute truths in pure mathematics, I believe, with Russell as against Royce, that we must hold the truths quite independent—in their absolute truth-aspect—of our constructive processes. The relations of numbers, or such a statement as that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, are examples of a condition of things not to be altered without contradiction, by any will-determination of ours whatsoever. As truths of reason, their contradictories are impossible. Of course, the objectivity of number carries no spatial signification, as Dr A. T. Shearman properly notes.¹ Besides, the truths of number are independent of all time and circumstance, and are not of the nature of real existents: their reality consists in their validity. These are the positions maintained by Bolzano, by Lotze, consistently or not, in his 'Logic,' and by Husserl. Again, if we make truth consist in the agreement of the subject with the object, we see the difficulty of this in the ethical sphere, where the object is no real or concrete affair. It is another proof that object or reality must, as I have contended, be taken in a far wider sense than philosophers have done—must be taken to mean an object physical or mental, apart from the perceiving mind. Whatever the nature of the object, our thought is true because the object is as we think it. So far well; but I do not think we have sufficiently probed the true when we have, in current philosophical fashion, made it the

¹ 'The Scope of Formal Logic,' p. 139.

mere reflection of being, and have not regarded it as something which has itself being.

There has in recent years been a quickened interest in the nature of truth, which is good to see; but I am by no means sure that any great or satisfying philosophical advance has been made. There is still need, as Leibniz pointed out, not to be content to consider truth "from the outside and merely to call it by its name, but penetrate into its recesses and perceive distinctly the logic and harmony contained in it." But the current conception of truth as agreement with reality does not seem to partake greatly of this inward character, for it regards thought and thing as two very isolated terms, and makes truth consist in the mere agreement of the former with the latter. But knowledge or thought is thus a mere pendant of things, and deeper or anterior aspects of the true do not seem to me to be reached in this way. I mean, there is truth of being—ontological, or if you will, transcendental truth—not reached by such posterior descriptive knowledge. But, although truth is invoked in being, the concept of truth is not to be thought of as involved in the concept of being: the distinctiveness of each is to be maintained. When truth is said to be an attribute of Being, that does not mean that it is something over and above Being: it is just Being as related to mind or intellect. Truth is a universal and transcendental predicate of all Being. It was in this sense that Augustine validly defined the true,—"*Verum est id, quod est,*" although Tongiorgi thinks it determines rather the subject of the truth than the reason of the truth itself.¹

¹ '*Institutiones Philosophicæ,*' vol. ii. p. 53.

Truth is essentially inclusive of being; the form of the true calls, by its very nature, for being. These remarks are corrective of Rosmini's view, already referred to.

Not much has been done by pragmatism toward a coherent theory of truth, and the efforts of Bradley and others toward a monistic theory of truth—a logical monism resting, in a certain way, on an ontological monism—is by no means in all respects satisfying, as I have shown. Unity of truth, no doubt, we must have, but whether it is to be such a simple unity—organic in the sense meant in that theory—or whether it may not be, as I think it is, the unity of harmony, mutual consistency or agreement between different grades or circles or levels of truth, is the question. Bergson also, it should be noted, is fundamentally preoccupied with existence, to the neglect of pure thought, as in logic and mathematics, so that I conceive his theory of knowledge and of truth to be defective. I am by no means sure that the modern attempts at simplicity and unification, in respect of truth, are improvements upon the forgotten efforts of the older philosophers. They saw the difficulty of arriving at a single definition of truth, its significance being so wide at the fullest, and the forms of truth so diverse and variant. But they viewed truth, in whichever of its many forms found, as always expressive of some sort of equation or correspondence, although I do not think even this covered the whole case for truth, as I shall presently show. They distinguished between the different kinds of truth, however, and surely philosophy is still concerned with definition, distinction, and differ-

ence, through which alone satisfactory ultimate unity can be reached. Some of them enumerated logical truth, or the correspondence between thought and its laws; conceptual truth, or the correspondence between thought and object; ontological—sometimes termed transcendental—truth, or the correspondence of thought with being; and moral truth. But the true was practically regarded as matter of posterior knowledge or aspect only. Others spoke of *veritas entis*, *veritas cognitionis*, and *veritas signi*, while yet others made the distinctions of “entitative,” “objective,” and “formal” truth, the last including signs. They all recognised the importance of the fundamental category of being, as the ground of all truth—that truth “by which a thing is what it is”; and we have need to recognise the manifold senses in which we still speak of being or reality.

Truth may be the simple equivalent of reality, so long as you are only speaking of things, but there is wider reality than that of things, and to this wider reality truth or thought is related. Indeed, Schelling preferred to understand truth as agreement of a thought-content with itself, rather than agreement of thought with an object. But this latter has its truth and value, and it does not seem that it can be set aside in this way. But it is not enough to say that that which is, has truth of being. If we say the object of my thought is always reality, then reality must be more widely taken than concrete reality. Would the logician think of denying, in respect of thoughts or of feelings, that they exist—have truth of being? The reality of thought lies, of course, in its being thought, the reality of feeling in its being

felt. In like manner, we say a law or a relation exists or is real, but its being or reality is not that of things. But would the older procedure be sustained to-day when it said that a concept, which had admittedly truth of being in it, was not a true concept, because no reality existed corresponding to it? Conceptual truth only, if you will, but still truth after its kind. If the logician thinks a truth, which is necessary to thought, but has no outward reality existing corresponding to it, is his truth to be held, as in the older view, not true? Must we not recognise that there is a truth or logic of consistency, as well as a truth or logic of factual experience? In which case, the accordance of the notions—whose laws of reality are derived from reason—is the criterion of truth. This is knowledge through judgment or reflection, into which error may enter through default of reason, while the other case—that of the object in perception—is knowledge by intuition. But not even experience, properly conceived, is tied down to truths or judgments that relate to reality, in the ordinary sense of that term. Reality should therefore stand for anything that may affect consciousness, whether it be a fact of nature, or a mental fact, standing apart from the perceiving mind. Surely if truth is to be taken as correlative of reality, reality must be construed in a very wide sense indeed, if there is to be a thoroughly consistent procedure in dealing with supposed being or reality. At any rate, what many-faceted terms being and reality are, must be more taken account of in truth discussions. Something more is required than merely to talk of “the thorough-going unity of reality,” when it is evident that reality

is being restricted to one particular sense, that of outer reality. But the fact is that truth is really that to which reality should, in essence and character, conform or correspond, rather than something that, less satisfactorily, must conform to reality. For there cannot be reality—whatever appearance there may be—unless the true has anteriorly gone to the making of it. It is the losing sight of this inner aspect of the case that has made truth remain the outside affair—defective, as Bradley admits, because it is merely “about” reality—it has been so much allowed to be. But truth is that transcendental quality of being which relates it to intellect. We have no right to neglect the other side of the shield, the *adaequatio rei cum intellectu*, as is almost invariably done. For there is the important sense in which truth has its place first in the intellect, and only later in things. The theory of truth as correspondence with fact or reality utterly breaks down in the sphere of religious truth, for there truth is itself fact and reality, freeing—as thought of God—what is bound, and quickening what is dead. Things are true through a first or primal truth which made them what they are, and that primal truth any adequate or thorough theory of truth must seek to win, or at least to recognise. The truth of first principles belongs to such primal truth.

Now, in the case of such divisions of truth as have been considered, it has been said that they are unified in God who, as the supreme or transcendent truth, is each of them without limit. But that is scarcely a satisfactory procedure, since what we are seeking is a coherent system or view of truth to human appre-

hension. There are inherently good reasons for not now wishing to consider thus truth in God, where it is all-embracing and infinitely complete, but as we may systematically apprehend it. That view has, however, the advantage, it seems to me, that it lends itself more readily to an organic view of truth than does any mere sum or aggregate. But I do not think thought is advanced when Aquinas tries to prove that God is truth.¹ It is not satisfactory to say with Lotze, in his 'Logic,' that "truth and the knowledge of truth consist only in the laws of interconnection which are found to obtain universally within a given set of ideas." This is characteristically a too subjective mode of putting the case, in which ideas figure too much as divorced from reality and experience. I mean, it seems to me too conceptual, too little ontological, in its mode of representation. This task, though it is not now my main concern, must involve taking account of the vast connection of all knowledges, and the linking up and binding together of individual truths, into a perfectly harmonious system or synoptic view of truth. I have already spoken of the unity of truth, and unity spells such connection. In this systematic whole or universe of truth, each individual truth, having truth and value in itself independently of its significance for the whole, has still its place and its worth; for there it ministers to the highest end or purpose of the whole, but it does so as being already truth. But the whole is no mere aggregate or sum. For such an aggregate would not be an organic view of truth. For my own part, I reject the position that

¹ "Contra Gent.," I. c. LX.

"the true is the Whole," because it offers me a quantitative conception—that of mere totality—when I want truth as something qualitative—having the quality of being true. Truth and totality are two different conceptions. As if because I have the whole of a thing, it must be true! I am speaking of what may be eventually regarded as a metaphysical conception or view of truth when I speak of the unity of truth as a system which has being. But totality is a concept of relation: truth is intrinsic fact.

We now see what kind of value, if value it should be called, truth may be taken to be, namely, a real spiritual appearance, pure, untroubled, objective to, and independent of us, and ideally reached or apprehended by us. Truth is in this sense absolute. This is, no doubt, truth in the abstract, but it is truth with which I have chosen to concern myself, in maintaining that it is not value, in the sense in which we commonly speak of goodness and beauty as values. We may call it truth- or reason-value, no doubt, meaning that it simply is. It is truth which is not affected by the influence of feeling upon our actual thinking. It is truth whose validity is self-evident, or if you will, self-existent. It is somewhat incorrect to say of such truth, as Dr Schiller does, that "there is no *knowing* without *valuing*."¹ Such truth as I have been speaking of remains truth, did we neither know it nor value it. It rests, however, on the presupposition of a real intellect, without which such objective truth could not, in an important sense, be. But still, the search for truth presupposes the existence of truth. As value exists only for a conscious

¹ 'Humanism,' p. 10.

subject, truth in this sense should not be called value, and our knowing it is not necessarily valuing it, in any proper sense of the term. It awaits no consent of our will to its being true, but demands acceptance *volens volens*. All truth is logical, so far as it is truth, though logic is, of course, concerned only with the formal aspect of truth. It is not a source of material truth, which is found in experience. But there is a relative aspect, in which truth has a relation to us—in a subjective sense. In this sense, truth may be viewed as a species of value, as it becomes the satisfaction of a want in us. But that is a very subjective and defective view, when it is put forward as the whole theory of truth. In this connection I am, of course, not concerned to deny the pragmatist contention as to the part played by feeling upon our thought, when forming our subjective conceptions of truth in practical life and action. But even there, the transcendent element in knowing should not be lost sight of. Nor is the objectivity of truth or knowledge to be sacrificed, even as was done by Lotze, when he admitted “the completely human subjectivity of all our knowledge,” and held that “this universal character of subjectivity, belonging to all knowledge, can settle nothing as to its truth or untruth.”¹ The world of reality is not so lost to us that “the changing world of ideas” is all we have to work upon.

But I return to the primacy of the truth-value, with which I started. That primacy cannot be surrendered to those who would reduce the true to the good, or subordinate it thereto. The truth-value is,

¹ ‘Metaphysics,’ vol. i. p. 220.

in my view, to be ranked as conceptually prior, and superior in quality or excellence, to the values of goodness and beauty. The priority of truth is seen in the fact that, in expressing what simply is, it states the ontologically true; it is in closer relation, so to speak, to being than is goodness, which latter waits on desire, which is absent from the concept of being; and in its appeal to reason or intellect, the true is apprehended by the highest, divinest faculty in man. Goodness comes naturally and necessarily after truth, because, in its appeal to feeling, will, and desire, it is constituted by what is of the nature of addition to the true. This is so, because the good is appreciated by the reason or intellect also, seeing that a good, to be desired, must be known and recognised or understood. In other words, more than being or existence is involved in the idea of the good, as the object of desire. Truth has to do with being simply; it is more simple, more abstract, more absolute, than the good; goodness is, in some sort, a desirable accompaniment of being. That is to say, there is a connotation in goodness not present in truth as concerned with pure being. Yet the true is a good, and the good is something true. That moral goodness must itself be a process of the real is a not very satisfactory form of expression found in certain Neo-Hegelian presentations, and it only too readily lends countenance to the long-standing objection that this mode of thought too easily merges ethical interests in those of ontology. Moral goodness is ethically good over against the whole existent real; that is its ethical quality. Lotze's metaphysical position, that truth is not the *prius*, but dependent

on the realm of the good, is one which, in my view, cannot be sustained, because it imports very imperfect appreciation of the primal and absolute Reason, which is at the base and bottom of things. He thinks it is impossible there should be "an absolute *prius*" of forms of any necessary sort, but with glaring inconsistency makes metaphysical truth depend upon a world that rests on the principle of the good, so making the form of the good a pre-existent affair after all.¹ As if the ascription of good would endow truth with an objective character which did not belong to it in itself! Lotze's whole denial of absolute truth is to be decisively rejected, as ill-supported and untenable: it is part of the relativity and subjectivity of his whole position. Truth, relative and empirical, is all Lotze has to give us. It is satisfactory to find Ulrici, to whom I have already referred, making the concept of the good rest upon that of the true, despite his treatment of the true as an ethical idea. Better, at any rate, than Dr Schiller's absurd attempt to subsume the true under the good, which only a defective metaphysical sense could be content to do.² For the good, as resting upon the true, is our rational end.

Dr Schiller is by no means alone in the mistaken notion that the good is such an ultimate and unanalysable notion; but it is quite delusive to suppose that the good is unaffected by any truth about what is real. An excellent example of this untenable position is afforded by R. L. Nettleship's view of the good, as held by Plato, as "the condition of the logical *prius*" of being, truth, and order, and not to be

¹ 'Metaphysics,' vol. i. p. 207.

² 'Humanism,' p. 11.

“identified” with any one of them. Whether the *ensemble* of Plato’s teaching held such a rigid, clear-cut theory of the good, as is here represented, need not now be inquired into, as Plato has at least given grounds for it. But such a claim, by whomsoever made, cannot be sustained, such a priority of good being non-existent and due to misconception of the nature of the good. A good so anterior and unrelated to anything, and so undefined in character, cannot be satisfactory.¹ I have already spoken of it in connection with Lotze. I may add that Windelband, in his recent work on Plato, says that the good-in-itself of Plato merely meant the concept of the absolute purpose—world-purpose—an essentially formal determination (p. 100). It was only in this sense, he thinks, that Plato made the good the cause of all being and knowing. We must not, in any case, overlook the criterion of the good, as “something that must,” as I have said elsewhere, “be determined by the laws and ideals of reason.”² The good “presupposes the true, and the knowledge of it is founded on being.”³ We have no right to give an irrational cast to ethical good, or to be led by bad psychology into grounding moral distinctions in feeling rather than in reason. The good desired must be ideal good, desired for its own intrinsic worth and

¹ What I have said here, and more fully in my Article on “Le Système de Proclus” in the ‘Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale,’ Sept. 1921, pp. 501-502, in criticism of Plato, has since found some support in the remarks of Höffding in his ‘Bemerkungen über den platonischen Dialog Parmenides,’ p. 52. He finds the mystical and the rational elements in Plato on occasion in sharp opposition to each other.

² ‘Studies in European Philosophy,’ p. 339.

³ Ibid., p. 339.

value. Such good may be, and indeed is, universally valid, but there is nothing, in the nature of the good, that detracts from the primary character of the truth-value, as applicable test of all objects as well as all subjects. We may say, with Aquinas, that there is a sense in which every entity is true, but it is manifestly absurd to try to confine true and false to mere propositions. In plain fact and actual usage, the true is often taken, broadly, as equivalent to the real. If we speak of true gold, it is because there intelligibly is false gold; if we speak of true hair, it is because there is, in a significant sense, false hair; into the character of these and similar falsities, I am not now concerned to inquire; it is enough to note that there are intelligible and important senses in which the truth test can be applied to objects, and is not confined to propositions. True as an entity in one sense may be, it may be false as related to our thought.

I turn from goodness to another value, that of beauty. Beauty may not be a transcendental quality of being, but the concept of the beautiful follows certain transcendental concepts. Beauty is very closely connected with the true and the good, both of which it presupposes. Through it a clearer concept of the true and the good may be reached. But the beautiful is not synonymous with the true, since there are many true things that are ugly. Neither the true nor the good is necessarily pleasing, as is the case with beauty. Not Keats alone has identified truth and beauty, but many philosophers also. This, I do not wish to do, but to maintain a distinctiveness for beauty, as was done by Kant and Schiller. Kant stood for "free"

beauty. We cannot say, "beauty is truth, truth beauty," making a blank identity of them ; we must explicate the senses in which both terms are to be understood in making such a statement. Not only must we avoid the mistake of making truth and beauty identical, but shun still more the folly of those who would rank beauty above truth. Even Hegel was too much inclined to treat truth and beauty as one and the same, the beautiful being but the shining manifestation of the idea—a true but incomplete account of beauty, though his theory is of high value. The close connection of beauty with the true is seen in the appeal of beauty to reason or intellect in aesthetic contemplation, where even Schopenhauer proclaimed the absence of will, as in the case of the good. Ultimately one must hold beauty to be a revelation of reason, reason in a sensuous form, for it conveys truth or thought of reason. This is not to be wondered at when we consider such elements as completeness or perfection of parts, order or proportion, &c., which engage reason—elements of appreciation. We may rest in the beauty of a great picture, but it is, at the same time, expression and token of truth. But desire is not here active, as in the case of the good, though Baumgarten did postulate excitation of desire ; our delight in beauty springs from contemplation, apart from possession ; in such apprehension of beauty, the powers employed are very largely those that belong to reason or the cognitive order, although Kant thought there was also present a harmony with striving and purposeful endeavour. Aesthetic feeling is consequent on the primary intellectual apprehen-

sion, so that there is a reason-feeling in the perceiving subject. But that does not mean that beauty is not to be loved for its own sake or intrinsic worth. While beauty has its relative aspect or truth, yet objectivity and universality can be claimed for the beautiful. Beauty is thus what Bradley called "the self-existent pleasant." But the appreciation of the beautiful is not self-grounded, but rests on truth of being. It is appreciation of an ideal—an ideal of perfection perceived in the object. Kant ruled out even the idea of perfection from his "free" beauty.

Already in Plato it was seen what beauty alone could do for our knowledge of the good. Yet Plato would rend the bond between the beautiful and the good, when, in his mystical moods, he sets the idea of the Good so high above all our knowing. And he is sometimes, for lack of explication, or careful distinction between the logical and the metaphysical, unsatisfactory, as when, for example, he says in the 'Phaedo' (100 C) that a thing is beautiful "for no other reason than that it partakes of the Beautiful." But beauty is not synonymous with the good, for there are good things which are not beautiful. We do not apply beautiful to the objects of taste, smell, and touch, all good in their way. Goethe ranked the beautiful higher than the good, as being inclusive of the good. The beautiful and the good have sometimes been taken to be identical, the beautiful being regarded as the more ultimate in its freedom from the striving which marks the good. It does not seem to me either a very critical or happy attempt at identification. The emotion of beauty is to be distinguished from the sentiment of the good

in quite a number of respects. We cannot, as some philosophers do, subordinate beauty to the good, of which it is said to be one form. It has been properly pointed out that when men speak of the beauty of the good, they are not speaking of beauty "in the specific sense." Its distinctiveness must be maintained, close as their kinship or connection may be. It does not seem to me that we have any right so to merge natural beauty in the morally good. The ideal of beauty and the ideal of the good are not to be so merged or lost the one in the other. Feeling, in the case of the good, is of more reasoned character: feeling, in the case of beauty, assumes a more sensuous form. Lotze placed beauty midway between the true and the good, but thought it neither solves the theoretic problem of the true, nor the practical problem of the good. A rather obvious reflection, it must be said. But he thinks its mid-position may point to a possible reconciliation of existing contradictions, which does not seem to me to carry us very far, as merely thus stated. But more meaning attaches to the suggestion if and when analysis yields, as features or characters of aesthetic emotion, such points as unity in variety, proportion, symmetry, harmony, individuality, and so forth, and if and when the part played by perception, feeling, and imagination in the pleasurable and disinterested contemplation of the beautiful, is considered. In such wise it grows more apparent how the aesthetical problem can assume aspects psychological, epistemological, and ontological, which relate it more nearly to the problems of the true and the good than might at first sight appear. To go into that

fully would require a discussion by itself. At any rate, being is the seat of value, and not even beauty can be considered without account being taken of the metaphysic of aesthetics. Beauty must always have truth of being. But what here concerns me is to say that there is nothing in the problem of beauty that impugns the primacy of the truth-value.

I have held the truth-value to be primary, but I have not meant to suggest that goodness and beauty are merely values to be deduced from the truth-value as fundamental. Central in importance as I take the truth-value to be, to which the other two values are, in a sense, subordinate, yet I think all the three values should be co-ordinated with each other, and their relations and the character of their absoluteness, marked out. In other words, a reasoned *Wertgliederung* is our main need. But our leading philosophers speak of values without attempting any such articulation of the values, which they uncritically assume as common sense or mere face values. There is no such thing as an isolated value, every value standing in a system of higher and lower. Objectivity we may claim for all the values, truth, goodness, and beauty, but, in doing so, must remember what a unique and irreducible form of objectivity value is. We must beware of the folly of predicating value of value, as sometimes happens, without any being or reality to which value belongs. Reality is the support of value, and all these values must be grounded in a supreme objective Reality. Value does not hang in the air, although religious writers on value sometimes notably offend in this way, and occasionally philosophical writers who set an over-

weening value on value. Even if we hold value to exist before the entrance of desire, yet value is only given for an existing consciousness; without this possibility, a value would be nothing. Nor should we forget that the objectivity of truth is one thing, not to be confounded with the objectivity of either goodness or beauty. If we are to confine ourselves to the truth of experience, it must be experience in the widest sense, as experience of, or in relation to, the transcendent, or what is above mere experience, if any speculative results are to be at all possible to philosophy. For "the concept of experience is itself transcendent of experience, and, in the nature of the case, could admit of no empirical verification." Philosophy is not mere crude empiricism, even if christened "radical," and the question of ultimate truths and principles we have found to be far from an idle or unanswerable one. We have seen that value is always for a subject, but the strange fact remains—one difficult of reconciliation—that value does not yet come and go with the subject that experiences value. Hence some speak of potential values. Of course, there are over-individual values, though they cannot be for us so metaphysically real as those the subject strikes for himself. There is no satisfactory formal logical or metaphysical principle for the grounding and unification of cosmical values, outside the unity of the subject. You can, no doubt, make value ultimate, more ultimate than existence, but your doing so can never convert a value-judgment into a truth-judgment. When it is thought that values are objective, if they are posited in true value-judgments, the position is an untenable one, because

all subjective values, just because they are subjective, must find expression in what are really, *sensu stricto*, false value-judgments. There is no value, properly speaking, outside the world of desire and inclination. Ehrenfels regarded the value of things as due to our desire of them, while Meinong has taken value to be prior, since desire relates to what is not yet present. If value, however, stands or falls with desire, then is value purely relative. Because this is unsatisfactory, the objectivity or absoluteness of the values has been postulated, with variously estimated satisfactoriness. I am inclined to regard the truth-value or existential judgment as the only really absolute one, with what Rickert calls "its category of givenness," and to regard the other values as non-absolute value-judgments. But that does not mean that the values of goodness and of beauty are not absolute in the sense that they are universally valid. If the good be severed from the true, then the objectivity of the good falls away; but the objective truth of the good cannot be so dispensed with; the good has an absolute value, because there is objective good, good that we can isolate in thought as existing in and of itself, and which forms the absolute norm for our will. But this objectivity could not be, if the good were severed from the true, as objectively existent. And so it comes that the values of goodness and of beauty are sustained and illuminated by the truth- or reality-values, since they must be conformable to the truth of things, if they are to be conserved at all. This, because the content of the practical reason is still an object of inquiry and knowledge to the theoretic

reason, even if you say that will- and feeling-values cannot be fully absorbed by this latter reason. When Professor C. D. Broad says of the theoretic and the practical reason that "there is clearly no question of priority between them,"¹ that is an incorrect or defective view; for, in setting up the practical reason, it, with its contents, is, in that very fact, constituted an object of knowledge and investigation to the theoretic reason. It is not necessary that reason should absorb will- and feeling-values, or rob them of their distinctiveness. But it is absurd to suppose that it has not relation to them, or bearing upon them. The theoretic reason is not so divorced from the practical reason, however frequently this Kantian absurdity may have been allowed to permeate modern philosophy. Valuing, by means of the truth-value, and knowing, are loosely called one and the same; but the absolute value is truth, not our knowledge of it. Truth is the last presupposition of every absolutely valid valuation. But it is the first of all preferences, for truth is the most absolute of all things; it is the thought of God, as Kepler found, when he thought God's thoughts after him. Even Hegel could say, when away from his system (in his 'Vermischte Schriften'), that in both philosophy and religion, "the object is truth in that supreme sense in which God, and God only, is truth." But that does not help us to a human apprehension of the truth, save as we think of absolute truth as the attribute of the Absolute Being. The unity of truth is such that truths are but different aspects or applications of one and the same truth. Truth itself is not mul-

¹ 'Mind,' April 1918, p. 242.

tiple ; but multiple are the aspects, degrees, and circumstances of its manifestation. Truth, entering the human mind, suffers the weakness of its position there ; there is then diversity in the unity of truth. But truth, as it is in itself, is still one. The whole search of man has been for the unity hid behind these diversities. Truth presupposes unity. I do not merely say that truth is one, because God is one ; but also, that truth is one, since man is one, and still seeks the unity of truth in its apparent diversities. Theory of truth is not to be lightly esteemed, for theory is truth itself, and not less rigid and inflexible than truth. It is scarcely possible, in view of what has been said of truth as one, to sustain the position of those philosophers who think there is nothing which can be called the truth, but only an infinite number of truths. For truths do not finally remain isolated and unrelated in the one system of truth. A wholeness of truth we must maintain, whether we can accept any of the proposed systems of truth in whole or not. We have seen that we may not say that a statement, which corresponds to no outer reality, is no truth ; that there may be transcendental concepts of truth which we are not entitled to pronounce false ; and that there may be statements which we find it quite impossible to doubt, and may have to take for true, though their truth we may never with full certainty be able to pronounce, since they really rest upon our thought. The contention of some philosophers that truth, without a subject that thinks it, is a mere abstraction, is scarcely justifiable, in view of some considerations already advanced. Nor is truth a subjective product, a creation of indi-

vidual mind, though truth as thought, of course, requires a subject. Truth, as I am here concerned with it, would cease to be truth if it were begotten merely by a psychic act of thought. Truth is a necessity independently of every psychological compulsion. Truth is the highest objective principle of speculative activity, for the concern of philosophy is with intrinsic truth before all else. The value of truth lies precisely in the fact it is not value; that it is, as truth, objective, irresponsive to desire, and unmoulded by will; and that it is corrective of the terribly and detrimentally characteristic subjectivity of modern thought, which makes so much of the objectivity of value, and so little of the objectivity of truth. This, of course, while I have admitted the uncritical conventional sense in which truth is often regarded by philosophers as value, which it certainly is not, in the strict and proper sense. For there are truths which are necessarily taken for true; you cannot say that a triangle is a circle, nor a circle a polygon; doubt in such cases is impossible. Such truths are not value, in any proper sense. The opposite of any value can be affirmed; but the opposite of such truths could not be affirmed.

We have seen that there are leading philosophers who have contributed no more toward the discussion of truth than the idle repetition of Hegel's phrase that "the true" is "the Whole." So the finite has no truth. As well tell men that truth is a hopeless quest. That is to remove truth as far as possible from being the central determining power, which I have shown it to be, in human life. "The Whole" is a vast and meaningless abstraction, inaccessible

to men. But truth is not inaccessible. It is grotesquely absurd to say that no particular truth is true, because it is not "the Whole." "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God" is truth, like hundreds of other formulations, none of which wait for the fanciful seal and signature of "the Whole" to their becoming true. If there is to be a whole of truth, one might have supposed it to come through the harmonisation and unification of different truths, or levels, or spheres, of truth. Thus out of truths might spring a whole of truth. But if nothing is true short of "the whole," if there are only untruths—truths not completely true—short of this goal, is our whole of truth to be reached by piling up this aggregate of untruths? This whole-and-part theory of truth—as a mere arithmetical sum—is mainly true of the world in its physical aspect, but it utterly breaks down in the moral sphere. It strangely overlooks the converse truth, that the whole is made for the parts. Not without the whole could the part be what it is. It strangely overlooks that, in the moral sphere, it can with profound truth be said to a man—"Whether the world, or life, or death, or present, or future—all are yours," as the whole subserves his higher development. Also, that "all things" are working together for his good. Even Plato, who on occasion recognises the other side of the argument in the physical aspect—for both sides are true—yet, in the moral sphere, is able to say "that all things which come from the gods come in the best possible shape to the man whom they love," and that, "whether poverty be his lot or sickness or any other reputed evil, all will work for his final

advantage" ('Rep.,' 613). But indeed it is true even in the scientific sphere, that some knowledge of the whole as a unity—not a mere arithmetical sum—is necessary to a real knowledge of the parts. Such a quantitative or whole-and-part mode of valuing truth is wholly incommensurable with ideal or moral truth. To identify unity—the unity of truth—with one, as the whole, is no better than loose thinking, for unity is deeper and richer than a numerical one. Kant is even more unsatisfactory than Hegel, even if we hardly follow Dr Hutchison Stirling in saying, "I know not that there is anywhere any truth accessible to Kant."¹ No more do Vaihinger and Lange offer us objective truth. Yet truth is not to be escaped. For, as said Aquinas, "He who denies that truth is, grants that truth is; for, if truth is not, it is still true that truth is not." For my own part, I prefer another method of reaching a satisfactory truth-conclusion than that of Hegel. If we take all the different forms, grades, orders, or levels, of truth—logical, conceptual, ontological, moral—and treat them as truth, it does not seem to me at all difficult to conceive their reduction to a final and fundamental unity—a unity of harmony, permanency, consistency, and completeness, subsisting for a mind capable of comprehending, or at least conceiving, them, in their *ensemble* and *rappports*, as convergent, in spite of all apparent divergences and dispersions, toward one central *fons et origo* of truth. In the inexhaustible richness and complexity of truth, as issuing from this common source or centre, is overtaken and included all that seems overlooked or im-

¹ 'What is Thought?' p. 39.

perfectly accounted for in the current talk of truth as concerned only with outer reality. If you say that such a knowledge or view of truth in its primal unity belongs to the universal order, and appertains in fulness to transcendental Being, I answer, So be it, but we are sufficiently universalised to be able to understand and appreciate the reality of such a view. After all, it should not be forgotten, when we speak of the unity of truth, that the idea of unity has no reality standing by itself, but is included in the idea of being, as that idea has, in range and amplitude, been here expounded.

CHAPTER II.

THE ETHICAL VALUE OF INDIVIDUALITY.

THE greatness of the problem of individuality lies in the fact that it is concerned with the form of ultimate experience and ultimate reality. The distinctive value, the peculiar worth, of man lies in individuality. His moral nature gives him intrinsic value. Every man is, in some sort, an individual, but he is not true individual until he has gotten individuality, of which, indeed, few men are fully possessed. Individuality is that which truly distinguishes a man from every other being of his kind. The individual is the last and irreducible element of reality. Few things defy analysis so completely as individuality, but at least it must comprise the notes of unity, incommunicableness, and, in a certain sense, impenetrability, as constitutive elements. There are those, of course, who object to "impenetrability" in this connection, and who urge that distinction merely, not separateness, is the sign of individuality; but those who are so fearful of "each in his separate star" generally end by doing less than justice to individuality, in any substantive or significant sense. The distinctness of all souls is that of being concrete

existents, and cannot be satisfactorily held for anything less. There is a clearly realised individuality of the soul which feels and loves; and an individuality of the mind which thinks and comprehends. But for individuality, as I now take it, there must be a synthesis of these two: their union or fusion is necessary to individuality, in true, full sense. For individuality is a true indivisible unity. By how much soever their union or fusion is imperfect, by so much is the individuality impaired. Such individuality is concrete and essential; it imports ethical being; it implies the possession of all our powers, thoughts, qualities, opinions, standards, values, so that we are determined by ourselves, not by society. It is because of the great difference which ethical individuality makes to the quality of personality that I am now dealing with the subject. Only by individuality can man attain his true, full stature. It is not implied, of course, that such individuality is sufficient unto itself, in the sense that it rejects the inheritance of the ages, or spurns the reciprocities of society.

Personality has been by Bradley and some other philosophers emphasised in its essentially individual or limited character or aspect, but personality is no such exclusive thing, but, though importing a being-for-self, carries the capacity for going beyond the self and entering into relations with others. But what marks such outgoings of personality is just the individuality—the characteristically individual features—of personal life, related, as such, to other persons. For it is essential to personality to recognise the value of other personalities. Individuality is due to

society, for it is so named in distinction to social fellows. Of social function and social consciousness the ideal individual cannot rid himself, even if he would. Not a very satisfactory definition of personality is that which Hegel has given in his 'Philosophy of Right,' when he describes it as "the free being in pure self-conscious isolation," since the "being" is not wholly "free," and the isolation is by no means so "pure" or complete. Individuality does not efface or immolate itself—its moral existence—for society or the state, even if we take these to be logically prior to the individual. In the order of history it may be the reverse, but that is not now the view of historical criticism, at any rate. Individuality, in any case, takes from society and the state what they can give, but it gives to them the best they hold—whatever they may have of savour, strength, reality, value, life. This it does most freely and naturally, for liberty is the vital breath, the native air, of individuality. The solidarity of mankind is without prejudice to this liberty. Man is made for society, for association; but the fact that society is essential to man does not make society greater than he, for society grows out of the individual, his needs and attributes. Its importance, it has been said, is only his importance under another name. He is master of himself—according to individuality, not according to the very different thing named individualism—in order that he may be able to give himself freely to the service of all. Without such individuality there can be neither real morality nor real religion. His consciousness of personal ends and values, and of the power to realise them, makes the

individual the original source and constituent of all real value. I say these things in full knowledge, of course, of those current theories which, contrariwise, make everything of society or the community, and treat the individual as of no inherent value, but dependent for all rights and value upon society—theories which I account ethically indefensible and undesirable. The individuality on which I am insisting involves that the conscious individual find himself an end in and for himself. As such, he has claims to consideration and respect, and not simply as a member of a group. His ends and choices, right and rational, are individually his own, else they lack all ethical value. That is the very meaning of his ethical consciousness. He is thus no mere product of the social order, as is often absurdly said of a being of ideas and purposes all his own. As a free, self-conscious being, he is no such mechanical product. He is, on the contrary, the corrector and transcender of society, the reviser and raiser of its values, in so far as he has individuality enough. Neither upon society nor the state nor any external authority whatever does he depend for the right to be a free, self-conscious being, capable of realising personal ends and values.

Wundt, of course, has been pleased to speak of organised communities as though they were psychological entities, ascribing to them *Gesamtbewusstsein* and *Gesamtwille*; and Royce, in what I cannot but think a too facile manner, seems disposed to accept Wundt's position that such communities are wholes or entities, and have, or are, minds. All the attempts of Royce and others to treat the com-

munity as an organism in any way comparable to the real being of the living individual—as possessed of true individuality—remain singularly futile and unconvincing. Individuals are self-conscious and self-determining, not mechanical parts of a quasi-physical organism. Yet Royce sets us the impossible task of regarding the “community” as a “person” superior to any human individual. What an immolation of the responsible human self! To the blessed, blundering community, staring at us out of all past history! There would be deeper truth in asking, with Emerson—“Is not a man better than a town?” Yes, any town, but not any and every man. Royce’s idealising has here no foothold on fact or reality. Dr Bosanquet says, in an Aristotelian Society paper, that “the conception of general will” involves the existence of an actual community “of such a nature as to share an identical mind and feeling.” If this somewhat loose mode of expression is meant to claim for the community something on the level of the unity of the self-identical mind of the individual, it is to be decisively rejected. The more so, as later in the same paper, he speaks of “the community” as “an individual in a far deeper sense than the citizen, being the nearest approach to a true individual that exists upon the earth”—an ethical treatment of human “individuality and value” that appears to be the result of his characteristically imperfect view of the nature of the individual. I hold, as does, I observe, Dr D’Arcy also, that the self is “the most definite unit which thought is able to conceive.” Lévy-Bruhl says that, “in fact, the ethical homogeneity of a human society at any moment is always only appa-

rent.”¹ It is of little avail for Dr Bosanquet to speak, at one moment, of man’s individuality as a “world,” and at another moment—as here—to treat it as a shrunken, dependent, insignificant “part of the communal will.” He is far too completely the victim of verbalism and doctrinaire notions of “group-life” and collectivism to be able to do justice to ethical individuality: he never sees the tree for the wood. One may well allow a certain use and interest to the facts and phenomena of the natural history of such collectivism, and yet feel that we should have to hoodwink our critical reason pretty thoroughly before we could ascribe to it any value of the character intended, and for which no epistemological and metaphysical proofs are offered. Moral individuality implies a personal worth and value not found in the members of a physical organism. The attempt to raise the organised community to the level of the real being of the personal entity utterly breaks down before the really individual character of all consciousness. Without such consciousness there is neither meaning nor value. The same injustice to man’s ethical individuality is seen in some other Neo-Hegelian writers, who tell us man cannot be centre, but must allow himself to be caught up in the careering universe. If man is only a physical organism furnished with a dialectical apparatus, such an abdication of individuality may be possible; but if he is endowed with an *ethical* individuality of any real strength, he will make such surrender—never.

Of course, our individuality is developed through the contacts of society. But, whatever we may allow

¹ ‘Ethics and Moral Science,’ p. 217.

to the so-called social consciousness, we cannot admit that it is at all comparable to, or to be confounded with, consciousness in the strict, proper, uniquely individual sense just spoken of. Even Royce has said that experience must be at least individual, and with that one entirely agrees, though whether he has really allowed it to be so is quite another matter. I cannot find that he has done justice either to individuality or to the liberty characteristic of it. Of course, an individualism, like that of the eighteenth century, which isolates man as though he were sovereign and a law to himself, is untenable and absurd, and liberty is curtailed, or it may be, by the laws of duty. But liberty is, for all that, a distinguishing characteristic of man, and marks him off from the animal kingdom. You cannot ask man to control the instincts and passions of the soul, unless you recognise the hegemony of the self in man. We have need to be very jealous of the tendencies of some philosophers to biologise human intelligence, liberty, and even the spiritual life itself, for deadly issues lie behind these positions. Fruitfulness in such directions belongs no more to the reasonable order of things than does the expectation of grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles, or roses from the salt, unchanging sea. The procedure is one of the confounding or obliterating of qualitative differences, and shearing off the edge of the distinctively ethical consciousness. "The question of value," Dr Bosanquet rightly remarks, "is really distinct from that of the nature of the causal connection between mind and body."¹ Elsewhere he says truly, "Individu-

¹ 'The Psychology of the Moral Self,' p. 124.

ality will shew itself as inwardness and spirituality, not by emptiness and abstraction, not even by blank intensity of incommunicable feeling, but, in a word, by the characteristics of 'a world.'"¹ Individuality is, to me, unique as the being one's self; it is positive in quality and content. I agree that "its essence lies in the richness and completeness of a self."² Nevertheless, the position is unsatisfactory when, later,³ individuality is taken by Bosanquet to mean "mind," "a mind," for this is easily capable of being taken, and is, in fact, taken in a too abstract and merely intellectualistic sense, so that the ethical side of individuality is far from having justice done to it. The finite individual is thus left to be a "part" of, or to "participation" in, a logical whole without any proper or adequate account of his union or fusion with the absolute through free, voluntary ethical union. The defect is radical, and inherent in all such abstractly intellectualistic systems or modes of thought. These have no other idea than of self-consciousness conceived in a purely intellective fashion, but that aspect is far enough removed from true individuality. The single self-consciousnesses are left so much of an equal value that the essential non-substitutional character of individuality is missed. There is more in us than the logical function of reason, though that is important enough; and reason itself craves something higher, more transcendental, than to be a "participant" in an impersonal, non-ethical whole. No one thinks of denying that the inherent capacity of the individual for self-fulfilment

¹ 'Individuality and Value,' p. 77.

² Ibid., p. 69.

³ Ibid., p. 286.

can be realised only in its relation to the Whole, but the relation must be ethically, and not merely metaphysically, conceived. The individual must itself be real centre of life and energy, not an illusory "part" of the Whole. Individuality is one and indivisible—a living unity. I do not, of course, deny the logical functioning of individuality, but only that such logical functioning exhausts it, is the whole of it. Ethical individuality insists on the unity of the mind or soul in its entirety being recognised. There has, however, been no adequate care to preserve in its integrity the character of individuality as "a world," in the ultimate dropping to a "part." But individuality is and remains a fact, whether recognised or resisted.

Individuality had little real place among the Stoics, for they asserted it only to efface or abolish it; Stoic individuality lay in the paradoxical suppression of individual interests and pleasures; there was too little distinctness of being for any real fostering of ethical individuality. But, indeed, "Stoic ethics are not based on the needs of the individual, but on the demands of the supreme law."¹ The Neo-Platonic view of individuality, also, was a despairing one, albeit it provided a certain goal for human striving in its theory of mystic contemplation. This, although in the "Enneads" of Plotinus, there is now a basis for individuality as representative of idea in the Divine Mind, and so participant of the Divine universality, and now a treatment of the individual as a mere constituent element of the Universal Soul, with whose unity a certain independence of the

¹ E. V. Arnold, 'Roman Stoicism,' p. 273.

individual is compatible. But there is little that can be said, in any real sense, to make for ethical individuality, and what there is makes for the purifying of thought rather than for ethical action. Individuality had no great measure of justice meted out to it in the Middle Ages. Albertus Magnus, for example, in common with the Arabian philosophers, was inclined to connect individuality with the body or matter, as representing existence in its divided state in the world. A defective view, of course, although I am not at all concerned to deny that the character of individuality is more or less determined by the physical organisation. Individuality fared no better at the hands of the Jewish mediæval philosophers, although they recognised a relative ethical superiority in certain thinkers over others, at least some of them did, as, *e.g.*, Gabirol, Halevi, Maimonides. I do not now dwell on the Thomist and Scotist theories of individuality, valuable as they were, since they are of metaphysical rather than ethical interest. Origen, long before, had, on the contrary, derived individuality from the mind itself—from its use of freedom—which, however, is not adequate to account for it. Leibniz treated *de principio individui*, and maintained every being to be individuated in its entirety (*totum ens in se toto individuatur*). Indeed, for Leibniz, individuality was, further, expressive of the place of individual things in a system. Only in a developing system of categories can realities of such an implied relational type be known. Hence the complementary character of Kant's teaching concerning the categories. But Kant and Hegel were too much inclined to regard individuality as only a limitation, and did not appre-

ciate it as the condition of the realisation of the ethical world. Schleiermacher, however, did better, albeit in a manner still too quantitative, rather than qualitative; he thought the soul sustained a peculiar modification through its connection with the body; he saw a reason for individuality in the relation of the ego to the non-ego; each individual had, for him, the psychical peculiarity predetermined or implanted within him so as to constitute him a peculiar soul: his spiritual individuality was seen in a somewhat too sentimental and romanticist—for so it must be said—"marriage in him of the Infinite with the finite"; and he thought the whole of humanity became individualised in each soul in a particular way. Schopenhauer missed the ethical value of individuality very completely when his system allowed the individual to be dissolved in the ceaseless movement of the world-will without goal. He also made the grave mistake of dethroning reason, and reducing it to the level of a mere temporary organ of the will. Individuality he tended to confound with spatial and temporal individuation. It is not to be overlooked that our individuality, whatever its uniqueness, is set in an infinitely larger whole, which you may call the social order if you will. But that does not keep it from being true that Hegel failed to do justice to ethical individuality—as his modern followers also do—the individual, in his system, being relegated to a secondary place in more aspects than one. All real individuality is, again and again, swamped in pure universality. Experience is divorced from reason, at demand of his so-called "reines Denken." There can be no justice to individuality in a system in which

I am never allowed to be a real individual, but only a mere relation—between universality and individuality. The individual is, in a true sense, in and for itself; it cannot be itself save as it is not anything or any one else; but it is yet not for itself alone, for only in and through its other can it fulfil itself—even for itself. Still, no *alter ego* can keep the individual from being himself: as a self-conscious ego, he remains—after every recognition of the whole in which he is set—the centre of his own universe. I have not meant to suggest that individuality is anything but beginning rather than end; it is for the larger social whole; but it is for it as free, self-possessed individuality, giving itself, dedicating itself, to the service of the whole in voluntary, unconstrained fashion. But in my service to the whole, I do not lose my individuality; it still remains true that I am I. Thus I preserve my freedom, so essential to ethical value. Yet, though I am I, consciously and intensely individual, there is no reason why, as Schleiermacher suggested, the whole of humankind should not, in a sense, pulsate through me. For though my individuality is real, I am not atomic and independent of the race. It is by sympathy individuality manifests itself. I realise myself only in and through the community of men, or the whole. But society, as organised whole, must immanently allow the fulfilment of my free individuality, if the whole is not to fail of its end. But if the community quenches my initiative, and freezes my impulse, it impoverishes itself, and falls short of adequate functioning. Far too little thought has been given to this aspect of community failure, which marks every sort of com-

munity, civic, academic, and ecclesiastical. Thought, it has been said, "does nothing to annul the fact of individuality as it is given in perception, and it is necessary that it should have no such power; because it is only individual human organisms that manifest the conditions on which universal thought should be possible."¹ And such thought must, before all things, be free, free even to rise above the externality of law, if need be. This is not to forget that every free, self-active being is under universal ethical law. And James, with his theistic-ethical instincts, was right in his insistences that our sense of moral obligation is set in relation to something more concrete than an over-arching abstract moral order. There has certainly (however necessarily) been in our time great loss of faith in freedom—a deplorable loss. This is true both of outer and of inner or ethical freedom. I am of those who think there has been an unhappy tendency on the part of the modern State—as a political engine or structure—to interfere unduly and harmfully at times with individuality and freedom. Nothing can compensate the loss of freedom and individuality, to conserve which should be primary aims of State control and governance. The words of Mill have lost none of their truth: "The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it"; "a state which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes, will find that with small men no great thing can be accomplished; and that the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything,

¹ C. Read, 'Natural and Social Morals,' Introd.

will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish." A not unneeded monition for all countries to-day. Mill might, however, have defended the freedom of the individual without a preposterous denial of the ethical value of self-development. Free self-development should in the individual be ethical, but it is not within the power of any State, Absolutist or Socialist, to determine the ethical and other needs and aims of the spirit, or to prescribe how, in their ever-shifting directions, these are to be satisfied. The harmonisation of private good with the good of the State is that which the State exists, in ways just and equal, to effect. This, without infringing man's essential liberty or inherent dignity. It is a primary need of the individual to be member of a stable social organism. But the savour of society must be found in true individuality, not in dead-level Socialism.

There can be no doubt of the need to cultivate what, by a bold metaphor, is called the State conscience. Butler said that if conscience "had might, as it has right, it would govern the world." But as it does not, the need is shown for growth in strength and delicacy of conscience. The State should govern, but States do not always do even that; and why then should they so often take upon themselves to crush individual initiative, and induce individual helplessness? To say that the individual has no interests apart from the State, none but what society confers upon him, is a soul-destroying and pernicious doctrine. This tendency to State absolutism is a real danger to-day, and in the absolutism of the State,

the soul—wherever it *is* a soul—cannot acquiesce. The soul cannot deny itself; that were to deny the God that made it. The soul, conscious of itself—its intrinsic worth or absolute value—can never rank itself below the State. That is its declared ethical position. Does that preclude its sacrifice of itself for the State? By no means. For it is precisely the soul that feels the call of a time wherein—

"Tis man's perdition to be safe,
When for the truth he ought to die."

But that is more than the call of a mere absolutist State. An absolutist State that recognises nothing higher than itself is an atheistic monster, to be loathed not loved. The State, as organ of conservation, is apt to be repressive of individuality, but cannot get rid of it. For the agents of its activity are yet personalities; even an oppressive State needs individuality in its instruments. If society, however, is organic, and everything organic is circular—Hegel said every part of philosophy is a circle—then there are reciprocities wherein State authority and individual independence should be properly guaranteed and adjusted. The State did not make me, nor give me my powers, and it does not merit my first allegiance; the State does not keep my conscience for me; behind all human authority, ultimate sovereignty belongs to God alone, to Whom I am primarily responsible. That is the prerogative of my individuality, which is not inconsistent with society, and does not make otherwise than for social evolution. The State may seek my improvement as a citizen, but it does not belong to the State to fashion me as a per-

sonality, or to shape my moral individuality. The inner citadel of my individuality or personal moral being is immune from State interference, and is a matter for God and myself alone. For I am a being whose essential principle is that I am responsible for my own destiny. The State is, however, to be recognised as, in some sort, a divinely ordained institution for certain righteous and specific purposes, but it is bound to recognise, and act under, ethical law. Royce rendered a valuable service in emphasising, as no one had ever done, the ethical value of the spirit of "loyalty," but that does not dispense with the need of sound individual judgment as to the objects and grades of our loyalty. If we have any power of sound judgment, we shall find in life many mistaken loyalties, even in notable persons. Not even respect for the "community" must suppress loyalty to our own individual consciences, judgments, convictions. A British philosopher has lately spoken of the State as "the guardian of moral values," while an American writer has declared that "government is the highest expression of the social conscience, and as such is a uniquely human institution." Such statements must be regarded largely as ideals to be realised, if they are not to become ironic nebulosities, more or less. The relations of man to God and to all spiritual truth are entirely outside the sphere of State interference or control. That does not keep the proper sovereignty of the State from being an ethical demand; and State morality consists in guaranteeing the possibility of the moral life. The moral demand of the State is that its power be always used in the service of the right, else it will be misused. The principle

of individuality, in its higher forms, is at once advantageous to, and corrective of, society, and is needfully preservative of liberty against the encroachments of all-absorbing power.

Individuality is the spring of all character, the source of all energy for the good, and does not leave us with merely pallid and passive virtues. But theories are by no means infrequent which invest the State—as a political organisation merely, though necessary—with claims to devotion and self-subordination, which are utterly unreserved and indiscriminating, and are a menace to the integrity of the human individuality, from ethical points of view. Fichte argued stoutly that no law or commandment whatsoever was obligatory save only as conscience confirmed it: the obligatoriness of ethical law was, for him, absolutely devoid of exterior foundation. Fichte was absurdly extreme in laying it down that conscience can never deceive us, as historical fanaticisms, self-deceptions, and aberrations of the moral sense, abundantly prove. He seems to me, in his assumed infallibility of conscience, to have overlooked the relativity of our moral judgments—I mean, judgments as to duty relative to ourselves, not as to duty in itself, even though it may be true that we have to act with such conscience as we have in the end. Not every conscience is of equal value; every conscience exhibits but a relative degree of perfection, and calls for enlightenment and increasing delicacy. This all the more because conscience or the moral nature is so complex—not the simple thing it was thought in pre-evolutional times to be. Free play for the exercise of spontaneous individuality is

of fundamental importance and value, with the freedom therein involved; and there is inherent guarantee in the true nature of individuality, as I have defined its relation to end, that it shall not fail of its service to the whole or humanity. For of all errors concerning individuality, the most vulgar is that which confounds it with egotism, or mere wilful and uncompromising self-assertion. In ethical individuality reason retains its sovereign greatness. I do not care to dogmatise on concrete matters or cases of ethical reconstruction; I am only concerned with the maintenance of ethical principles, which are often not so carefully preserved in reconstructive proposals as is dogmatically claimed or asserted. The precise application of ethical law in concrete cases does not at all appear to me to be always so easy or certain as some airy dogmatists suppose. At any rate, the abridgment of liberty, the impairment of individuality, are to be shunned to every extent and degree possible, since, so far as they exist, they reduce the man from person to thing. A finer ethical sense would lessen the disregard of this truth to be seen in all public relations, where the ethical worth of the individual always tends—under Dr Bosanquet's grotesquely overrated "communal" spirit—to be undervalued. It is curious to find a certain modern tendency run back to Fichte—the philosopher of *die Selbständigkeit* and *die Persönlichkeit*—who not very consistently viewed our duties to self as merely mediate or conditional, and our duties to others as immediate and unconditional. An illogical and not particularly ethical procedure, resulting in the treatment of our fellows merely as a means of perfecting

ourselves. Not to my own individuality, but to humanity in general, according to his representations, do I owe anything in the way of duty. As if I could give anything to others, being and having nothing in myself! As if I had no duties of self-preservation and self-development, and were not bound to increase my value as a person! What a parasitic absence of all proper self-dependence! But one cannot forget that Fichte had already sinned, in the metaphysical region, by his fatal exclusion of individuality from his notion of the pure "I." But, not content to have shorn the real individual of metaphysical significance, he must needs impoverish him in ethical content. Yet Fichte had an intensely ethical nature. If it had been only a question of what he says in 'The Destination of Man' concerning the interdependence of souls, it would have been all right,—“The individual finds and understands and loves himself only in another, and every spirit develops itself only in contact with other spirits.” If the one is to be essentially sacrificed, in the manner already indicated, to the many, rational theory of self-sacrifice is destroyed. But a rational judgment of obligation is required for ethical value. Fichte has, however, meritoriously caught up the idea of development, in advance of Kant, in his resolution of moral action into a striving towards the ideal, so unattained, and in his insistence on the moral fulfilment of destiny. Of course, I realise myself both in and through society, but I, as an individual self, am certainly not the abstraction which certain philosophical writers are pleased to assert in their overweighted stress on the doctrine of community. My self is for me, unique,

definite, concrete, and ultimate unit of experience. But this imports nothing of Rousseau's absurd tendency to treat man as a solitary individual; for the individual knows it is for society he is destined, and only claims full possession of himself in order that he may, in conscious voluntary self-dedication, give himself to the service of society or humanity. This means a vastly greater ethical value for his individuality than the mere intellectual recognition of his being, in quasi-naturalistic or mechanical fashion, "part" of an organic whole. There seems no need to forget, as is so often completely done, that in the very conception of an individual (*Individuum*), there is implied interconnection or *Zusammenhang*, a whole or wholeness from which, as thought-field, we set bounds, under specific marks, to the individual as a unity, and determine his essence. But the fixation is not a finality, since the individual, in his peculiar relation to the whole, tends to outrun or escape it, in the ethical manner or spirit just described. And thus it comes about that consciousness is not a mere existent in individualised centres, but "is a function that carries the individual beyond the limits of his particular mode of existence, and reveals to him his place as a member of an objective order."¹ Every person is thus a more or less universalised individual, and his individuality calls for the maximisation of his ethical value. For there is surely no more mischievous conception of individuality than that which regards it as closed, finished, stereotyped once and for all, instead of regarding it as a mere projection, susceptible of constant enlargement or development

¹ J. E. Creighton, 'The Philosophical Review,' March 1913.

in range, rationality, and moral power and interest. This enhancement of experience involves for the individuality an ascending scale of life-values, in which universal interests, standards, and ends, are the lure whereby it is drawn upwards and onwards in this advance. But the individuality retains its uniqueness, has a determinate form exclusively its own, and the issue is a life whose match has not been lived before. It does not find Münsterberg's "impersonal over-experience," "after eliminating all the characteristics of the individuality as such," necessary, justifiable, or inviting. Such an artificial depotentialization of our being "as the selfhood without individuality" suggested in his so-called "overself," may do for a fanciful world of values, but not for the real world of moral values, with which all men—and not merely web-spinning philosophers—have to do. If, as is sometimes (though none too discriminatingly) said, man does not make values any more than he makes reality, why should there be all this artificial construction of values that carry so great sense of unreality? Such a featureless unity as Münsterberg wishes for all souls of men is a very uninspiring residuum. We shall do better to abide by experience, our *Erlebtheit*, and find the ethical value of our individual being, in a more real way, as part of the ordered whole of reality, as spiritual. Of course, there must be no sacrifice of society to the individual, but there is something futile and absurd in the attempts we have been considering to make man attain the ideal by the artificial process of self-diremption just described. The same thing is true when Kant's duty to self is flouted, and the far from

new or original remark made that "from the very notion of duty, it is impossible that I could owe myself any thing."¹ The self is undoubtedly an end worthy to be developed for its own sake, but yet the paradoxical self is never for itself only, as I shall bring out presently. We should be easily satisfied if we allowed a mere etymological reference to settle for us a matter of this kind. The feeling of oughtness in respect of duty-ideal is in truth a much wider affair; it is a fact of human consciousness too deep to be so restricted to a purely social content. An ecclesiastical system may so absorb men as thus to eliminate their individuality, just as a philosophical system with an impersonal whole may effect the like unethical result, but the idea of duty in respect of the individual's own moral perfection and development is not thereby impugned or done away. There is only a failure in respect of these systems to do justice to ethical individuality. For if the ethical individual must treat the person of others as an end in itself, not merely as a means, why must he unethically treat his own person merely as a means? A man is clearly bound to treat his own person, equally with other persons, as an end in itself, and not merely as a means. Even Nietzsche saw and said that, if men would be great, their first duty is to respect themselves. It is for this reason that Höffding rightly insists that "there must be a thorough-going individualising of the ethical demand." Even one's self-preservation and self-development will often outrun duty to self as end, and prove beneficial to others, a fact which con-

¹ 'Mind,' July 1917, p. 294.

stitutes an enhancement of the personal duty, and widens its binding character. If I am to "love my neighbour as myself," and should love my neighbour greatly, I can do so only as I have learned to love or respect myself greatly or worthily. For, as Pascal said, "in a great soul, everything is great." This need not keep the duty and necessity of self-sacrifice from becoming so real to a man that, as Renan remarked, there is "no limit to the horizon which opens before him."

The great metaphysician need not be a great ethical individuality—that we have seen too well demonstrated; equally true it is that the distinguished ethicist may too often be greatly wanting on the metaphysical side; the great religious personality even may not be a strikingly ethical individuality; but the great ethical individuality may, by happy and fortunate combination, coincide with the great metaphysical thinker and the great religious personality. That is a rare type of greatness. But the social and moral evolution would be no virile process if it did not produce such rich and multiplex personalities. They are the necessary variations on the type. But the great ethical individuality—and that is what now concerns us—has a greatness of his own, a uniqueness, savour, distinctiveness, from every other type or blend of greatness. But an ethical greatness, that should stand alone and unsupported, is not without danger and peril; the fine gold is apt to become both thin and dim. That must not be, as we are here in the sphere of ethical achievement—of pure and achieved ethical values—which must always have an adequate metaphysical basis or sup-

port. There are life-situations which call for conscience, for responsibility, for duty-fulfilment, and in these we must seek the realisation of high and pure moral value—less as a matter of merit, more as a matter of course, because therein lies the fulfilment of our ethical being. But I am not saying that the soul is not conscious of herself in these ethical outgoings and advances, which are due, be it said, to the ethical “ought” within or behind us. In these experiences we have willed not only the particular deeds or doings involved, but in them have willed ourselves in the highest, achieving or realising new and higher values. And the process is carried through only and always under the ideal-positing of reason. We seek to realise them in freedom, with a will which is thus a strictly reasonable will. The true inwardness and unity of this whole ethical will-structure a great ethical individuality will be careful to maintain, for to him it would be intolerable to walk “with a tortured double self.” For he has an inward consciousness that morality is one, so that he may not snatch an ethical fragment, and be indifferent to the rest. To teach him that his ethical value lies thus in the quality of his will has been the abiding service of Kant in his stress on the good will—a stress anticipated, long before, by great schoolmen like Albertus Magnus and Pomponazzi, a fact too greatly overlooked. One of the finest features in Kant’s insistences (in the ‘Critique of the Practical Reason’) is, that in such a will there must be, as “supreme condition of the *summum bonum*,” nothing less than “the perfect accordance” of the mind with the moral law. He admits this is only an ideal, but rightly demands

that there shall be increasing approximation in "practical progress" towards this ideal. In all this one can appreciate the great ethical services of Kant, even if one does not—as I certainly do not—share in all respects his anti-intellectualism. I can never bring myself to believe that only in one particular way—the way of moral or practical reason—has God revealed Himself, and not also in the superb workings of theoretic reason and speculative insight. The sundering is pernicious, and far too complete, but, despite this divergence, the palm must be assigned to Kant among modern ethicists. The supreme worth of the moral life he has asserted for all time, and nowhere has his own individuality been more marked than here, where he lays on every man the duty to realise his value as an ethical individuality. For it is precisely the personal or individual character of moral life or action that determines ethical value. It is the free, voluntary ethical outgoing of the good will, in scorn of consequence, that commands, and always will command, our homage and admiration. However varied the manifestations of ethical individuality, they all spring from the ideal of duty—an ideal that reigns high above all earthly vicissitudes, and shapes personality and character. It is our consciousness of the ethical value of our ideal and end that constitutes the value of our ethical pursuit. But the quest must be of our sense of absolute duty. For the ethical value of our individuality must be positive in character, and rich in quality. Its primary concern is, as Kant rightly insisted, not with making ourselves happy, but "how we should become worthy of happiness." Amid much one-eyed altruistic talk,

we may still recall the words of Ruskin,—“The real sacrifice of all our strength, or life, or happiness to others (though it may be needed, and though all brave creatures hold their lives in their hand, to be given, when such need comes, as frankly as a soldier gives his life in battle) is yet always a mournful and momentary necessity, not the fulfilment of the continuous law of being.”¹

The reasonable character of ethical individuality, and its purpose-positing activity or teleological determination, must be clearly kept in view, as, with the consciousness of responsibility, marking it off from being a nature-product or constituting mere nature-life. Intelligence has its part to play in the culture or upbuilding of ethical individuality, since it is the duty of every man to find out concretely what is his peculiar life-task, and what are his responsible purposeful conceptions, which are to issue in his deeds. His world-view must not be allowed—not even if it be a supposedly religious one—to impede or contradict his ethical consciousness. With intelligence—as representing the universal or world-reason in us—must co-operate, in this upbuilding, the moral will, that that unified impulse of the “I,” which alone constitutes ethical individuality, may be realised. For the world of knowledge and the world of will are not two worlds, but two aspects of the one moral world. But I do not by this mean to deny the senses in which moral attitude may be one of valuing rather than of mere knowledge. What I am here concerned with is the fact that consciousness finds expression in the will. Questions of race, temperament, national

¹ “Ethics of the Dust,” Lect. VI.

and family type, all have place, of course, in determining the individuality of the single person. But these colourings or complexions are not differences of a kind to supersede or dispense with the worth and duty of studying the ethical upbuilding of individual character. The talk of Taine about race, environment, and time, as sufficient to account for individuality, is absurd in its neglect of the personal equation. In his hands, "the frame tends to take the place of the picture." The limits of environment are, on the ethical side, very clearly marked. Genius, no doubt, is rooted in a certain vast identity with common men ; but no flat identities can prevent the great, uprising, irreducible differences in genius or in ethical individuality. You do not get a Shakespeare, a Cromwell, a Beethoven, in such merely environmental ways. I have already spoken, both of the unique character, and of the developing character, of ethical individuality. It is in the enlarging consciousness of the ethical self, in the growing power and value of its ethical individuality, that the worth of the ethical spirit is seen and realised. In so treating the ethical type of individuality, we are dealing with something far other than that type of individuality which is all that certain leading philosophers of our time have given us, and which defines the individual merely in terms of its spatial characters and its physical exclusion of other things. It is the selfhood of the moral self with which we are here concerned, a self with freely chosen moral ideal. But it is as by nature social beings, not stark and isolated individuals, that we possess this moral ideal, for while we preserve our ethical individuality in its integrity,

it is yet in the life of organic humanity that we find our true life, and from the power or principle that underlies the whole that we derive our strength and inspiration. The ripeness and fulness of ethical individuality will be drawn from the ideal fulness which supports the whole—the one vast human organism. Social evolution is possible, just because the ethical individual is no abstract and isolated individual, but a *socius*, with capacities for service, sympathy, and fellowship, within the encircling sphere of the organic whole. He is such as under the sway of the moral “ought.” Obligation is imposed by this conscious possession of moral ideal. Royce talks much of the “attentively selected” ideal of the self, and of its “choosing” the ideal, and this is right, for it must be freely chosen. But it must not, for all that, be supposed that the ideal is what it is, simply because it is chosen. The ideal is not simply of the individual, neither is it furnished by society; its ideal source is behind and deeper than either the individual or the system of society. The ethical individual is constitutive of society, and not merely constituted by it; and his moral ideal, however much developed by interactions with society, does not come from society, does not spring from its relationships, but is of his own essence. But that does not keep his ideal from being also social, as he himself is by nature and destination. For the social side of the self is to be regarded as having a place that is fundamental; and not the individual aspect only. Individuality is thus transcended in our relations, but never annulled or abandoned. But to treat the moral ideal as not intrinsic or inherent in man, but mere fruit of develop-

ment, or result of environment, can never be a satisfactory account of man as man. As we have seen the sense in which the self is social, so must we recognise the sense in which society is essentially individual, and the man not a product, but an original and producing power. From this point of view, the community or social organism is significantly resolved into individualistic relations, in which ethical individuality is the thing of supreme significance and value, judging all things, and itself judged of none. For it alone carries within it the ideal as a universal particular. Self and society belong to one moral cosmos; and though we have, for the avoidance of what is confused and ill-defined, differentiated duty to self from duty to others, yet there is, of course, a certain sense in which every duty to self is, at the same time, fulfilment of a duty to others—to the moral whole. Our moral individuality will react beneficially on others, on the community, from direct and intense culture and development of our inmost nature. For no other can fulfil the duty of self-culture in me, any more than I can perform that duty in and for any other. It has already been made apparent, how every duty fulfilled to others makes for my own ethical good. If one's only end is seeking the good of others, one is somewhat dependent upon outer events, and there is much to be said for the contention¹ that man should have a moral end that depends upon himself alone, and that this should be found in the moral blessedness that attends the consciousness of right-doing, of doing one's moral best. Only, this must mean no slackening of his service to

¹ Of Gizycki and others.

mankind, while caring most for self-approval. All this play of individuality is necessary, for, if each individual were like every other, the community of individuals would cease to have any interest for us.

It is with conscious individuality we are now concerned, where the ethical individual is himself all the time, and here, as Prof. J. H. Tufts has said, "since the moral self is completely rational, completely social, it has a standard and motive and authority which are universal."¹ The free exercise of reason, the practical reason, is necessary throughout the whole process of the realisation of the ideal—a process of the self, and a process within the self. The "I" in its knowing activity, projects an ideal, which it seeks to realise by the action of the will, reasonable will, rightly understood, being central in our ethical activities. Thus it comes that, in the ethical self-positing of the "I," there is something creative. This "I" has relations to things other and larger than itself; there is no reason why the unity of the moral personality should fail to recognise its own organic and relational character. But relations are, of course, not entities, and it is not admissible, without cause shewn, to suppose relations to be of more significance than the things or beings themselves. It is through real moral action that ethical personality is developed, but such personality is itself the source and spring of moral productiveness. The unified character of ethical personality must be maintained against all tendencies to resolve it into a psycho-physical aggregation or conglomerate

¹ 'Studies in Philosophy and Psychology,' p. 19. (Garman Commem. vol.)

of particular willings and representations. For the essence of ethics is the being, and not merely the doing, of an autonomous self, whose "active energy," says Spencer, "wells up from the depths of consciousness." The final ground of all being, for that matter, is ethical, no less than rational. Eucken has a good deal to say of the "rightful claims" of the State over against the individual with his "threatened isolation" and "growing apathy," but is yet compelled to admit that a system "which places the individual above all else must undoubtedly prove superior to any other system in originality, mobility, and variety."¹ Nor should it be overlooked how often the "isolation" of the individual has induced, so far from "apathy," the highest spiritual energy and the greatest mental activity, with incalculable benefit and enrichment to the world. We could as little spare the great individuality of a Newman with his "isolation," as we could the powerful individuality of a Johnson with his endless socialities. There is no lack of truth in Nietzsche's word,—*"Away from the market-place and fame, all that is great betakes itself; away from the market-place and fame, the creators of new values have always dwelt."* Emphatically I assert, *"Bene qui latuit, bene vixit,"* as cases like Descartes and Spinoza, Petrarch and Bruno, Carlyle and Darwin, Milton and Jeremy Taylor shew. In any case, the freedom of the individual, in life and thought, cannot be filched away without serious loss. And as for the State, it is founded on the idea or principle of right, and its embodying this principle is a thing of moral value; the State must realise its

¹ Article "Individuality" in 'Hastings' Ency.,' vol. vii.

function as an independent ethical fabric for the administration of public justice. One can well agree with Spinoza that "the end of the State is liberty, that man should in security develop soul and body, and make free use of his reason." But, on the other hand, one must emphatically repudiate Spinoza's denial of individuality or self-determination to finite beings; his dissolution of all real being in the one indivisible substance was no happy affair. The individual does not exist to be treated even by the State only as a means. Ethical individuality stands for the wholeness of our nature, as permeated and suffused with ethical spirit, when fronting humanity in the wholeness of its ethical possibilities. It is as member of the one vast ethical system or body that the ethical individuality is inspired to yield its own peculiar and distinctive ethical contribution to the moral wealth of the whole, so far is it from being egoistically arrayed against that totality. This it does under the impulse of the moral ideal which, as a fact within our experience, is yet not a fact derived entirely from our experience. The moral ideal has always stood out to men as an unattained and unfulfilled ideal. Ulrici urges that we must go out beyond experience in forming the ideal concept of the highest possible perfection of the human being or essence; it is not without experience, he says, but certainly not through experience.¹ This accords with what I have already urged as to the moral ideal being deeper than either the individual or society. And one may surely say that the ethical individuality, in seeking fulfilment of the moral ideal, must be under the lead of reason,

¹ 'Gott und der Mensch,' vol. ii, pp. 84, 85.

dynamic and directive. Morality is not made by thought, but is "recognised by reason through a necessity which is antecedent to all subjective activity." But the ethical individual would, as we have seen, be unintelligible without relation to other selves. The true end of ethical individuality must be taken to be the perfection of self and others in the order of human life, as, for it, the thing of intrinsic and abiding value. In this reference to others, one may recall the remark of Wundt that such "altruism always belongs to the ethics of feeling." Green's end for man as the "abiding satisfaction of an abiding self" is, therefore, taken by him to imply man "as living in the successful pursuit of various interests which the order of society, taking the term in its widest sense, has determined for him." It is in such interactions of the self, in its devotement to the ideal, that ethical harmony and adjustment are to be realised. Thus thought is kept from circling too much around the self, a necessary precaution while maintaining the integrity of ethical individuality. A man's best or ideal self—which is to be realised—is his best for others as well as for himself. I agree with Höffding that the best development of the individual may not necessarily so serve society, but I think it will do so if it is an ethical development. But it is a long and toilsome road before some individualities, that of Goethe for example, understand and realise wherein their own peculiar power and individuality lie. When Goethe did make the discovery, he remained—although he could say, "where I cannot be moral, my power is gone"—predominantly an intellectual individuality, as compared, say, with

Carlyle, who was a nearer representative of the categorical imperative individualised, though no perfect one. Ethical individuality neither stands absolutely by itself, nor hangs uncertainly in the air, but is deep-set in the moral order. Of this order it was well said by Trendelenburg, in his 'Historical Contributions to Philosophy,' that "an ethical philosophy which would exclude pleasure would be contrary to nature; and one which would make a principle of it would be contrary to spirit." This realisation of one's true self in and for others can, of course, only be a gradual affair—implies, as Green says, "a progressive determination of the idea of the end itself." For the activity of reason is not finished and perfect; moral intelligence is a developing magnitude. The harmonisation of all the impulses and forces of life is not soon accomplished. But this progressive aspect must not obscure the duty to make the individuality a rounded affair, to form the personality into a totality. Such a microcosm it should certainly be. To make of itself and its manifold activities a relative whole, is precisely its life-work. And as for the society aspect, there is always the question whether the society realises the conditions that in it one is treated as end, and not merely as a means—a test too often and too easily overlooked. The subservience of the actual to the ideal must be our individual and steadfast aim. The greatest conditioned good that is possible can be actualised in no other way. A great love of the infinite ideal will raise us, and help us realise the ideal self. "*Rarum est enim, ut satis se quisque vereatur.*" It will enlarge the circle and widen the scope of our self-determining freedom, to embrace

the ideal so. Endless is the vista of vital and concrete moral progress opened by the possibilities and demands of the ethical ideal. As for the creative office of the ethical individuality, this belongs to him as participant in the social whole, taken in the largest sense, for he may find his *alter ego* in another continent than his own; the ideal community may, for him, be the community of all mankind. Not, I think, without large horizons and long views can the reciprocities and interdependence of self and the community or social whole be rendered satisfactory to some minds—a fact too rarely recognised. But this must be without the tendency towards sentimental dissolution of real selfhood in the mere idea of humanity. The ethical individual knows he cannot be a morally detached individual, but must create new value for himself as a person, by his life-task within and for the social whole. Ever straitened within himself he must be till this life-task, this ethical warfare, be accomplished. It is the nature, the very genius, of true life—life creative of new value—that it should be so. Such life has its ideal extensions, its moral extensions of the present, which must be kept in view. My ethical individuality is not merely an individual value, but a value that concerns the world; is not merely a present value, but endures through time. Such I take to be the conservation of value in the ethical realm—the realm of ends, where man is legislator as well as subject.

It must be evident what redemption from moral monotony, from ethical sameness and tameness, springs out of the diversities of ethical individuality. But, of course, the fact of individuality cannot be

so accentuated as to overlook the elements of sameness or likeness found in different individuals, for no antithetical aspects of sameness and individuality can be allowed to be such as to infringe or imperil the unity of the moral world, or to obscure the mutual and serviceable relations that must exist between these contrastive aspects. The value of my ethical individuality is realised in the ethical ends that stand out for me as individually mine—of supreme and unescapable value for me. For my moral responsibility is involved in this ethical choice of ends; no valuation by any other, or for any other, can for a moment take the place of the determinations of my own moral consciousness. That is my uniqueness as an ethical individual; it belongs to no other, is indefeasibly my own. The conception of the individual *per se* is doubtless an abstraction; the individuality must be that of the concrete self of consciousness, as *here*, and as *this* and not *that*. I have the power, not only to posit myself as an independent subject over against world objects, but to distinguish different sensations, feelings, impulses, in myself, from myself and from one another. This self-consciousness is the condition and the presupposition of my self-determination. Ethical self-determination is no chance product, nor arbitrary result: it is the issue of severe self-training in ethical principles and spirit. It is also true that the universal is present in the individual, but if you make the universal that which purely constitutes the individual, so that the individual is no longer known save in its universal guise or aspect, you destroy the individual altogether, and merge it in, or confound it with, the generic type of

selfhood. It is then no longer true that the individual is the real. But, in less formal modes of speech, it is as self-conscious that the individual is real, with interest as a concrete individual in the whole world of reality. This consciousness of moral personality becomes at length the sovereign fact in experience. In this consciousness of its own intrinsic value, the soul chooses ends and objects that have for it meaning or value. We exaggerate what ethical laws, codes, maxims, can do. Ethical individuality, when finely exemplified, does far more than these, for it takes up into itself, and embodies, the free creative spirit of virtue, whereby it makes for itself ethical discoveries and divinations, and translates them into action or practice in the most diverse circumstances and variegated forms, so that moral splendour, moral beauty, moral fitness, moral sublimity, result. The ethical value of such individualised life and action has immediate significance for others—and that of the finest character. It is because, in moral matters or duties, so much falls to be decided by individual judgment, that ethical individuality has such large scope and free play. Many of the greatest issues in life are thus involved : the pages of biography teem with proofs. This problematic character of many moral situations is not always properly recognised. There may be a conflict of ends or values in the ethical situation ; but there is also a logic in the situation which should not be overlooked, as it may have something to teach. Ethical study, so conceived, is far more impelling and inspiring than is ordinarily imagined. It is an unillumined view which regards ethics as an order of iron rule or leaden

uniformity, with no play of inventive genius or faculty. I have not at all, in saying these things, been forgetting that the sphere of ethical individuality is confined to moral obligation, but neither am I forgetting that the domain of moral obligation is always extending, a fact too often neglected or unperceived. The genuine inwardness of the whole moral process must be steadily kept in view, as consisting in the consent of the will to what forms its own good, under a sense of moral obligation which is inward, never imposed from without. All this under the command of, and in conformity with, reason, as mine. The invisible things of ethics—love, honour, justice, goodness, and the rest—are the values which, so far as they are mine, make my ethical individuality what it distinctively is. I do not make (save in the subjective or idealistic sense), nor can I alter, these ethical values; 'tis they that make me. This belongs to their absolute aspect, however relative they must always appear in me. My being is measured by my degree of relative perfection. My individuality is not mere defect, limitation, or hindrance, as it has sometimes been taken to be, but rather represents the nobility of the force which I am, in that I am so far from any mere congeries of atoms, or any sort of arithmetical sum. My individuality means that I am not a mere part or function of anything, nor a mere determinate appearance of a universal soul, nor a drop in the pantheistic ocean, but a born original, so far at least as to have properties or qualities that differentiate me from every other. This does not keep my individuality from being a developing whole, as various and discordant impulses are controlled and

organised into the more coherent and harmonious whole which I become. Nor does it keep me, as an ethical individual, from the needful task of more fully adjusting my individuality to the social system in which I am set. This should be natural, but is often painfully sacrificial ; as said George Eliot : “ We can have the highest happiness—such as goes along with being a great man—only by having wide thoughts and much feeling for the rest of the world as well as for ourselves ; and this sort of happiness often brings so much pain with it that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we choose before everything else, because our souls see it is good.”

The twofold progressive realisation which has just been spoken of moves towards unity and enlargement of the developing self. This unified and developed self finds its self-fulfilment in freely giving itself to the service of the race or the social whole. Such self-fulfilment may remain always more or less an ideal, an ideal of the ethical reason, but it is an ideal which the ethical self can never relinquish. For the free, conscious, active, purposive effort towards the realisation of the Ideal is what is deepest or most fundamental in ethics. Such free creativeness is fulfilment of the highest law of reason. Nor does the individuality become lost, or lose its distinctive colour, in the process ; nay, the distinctive quality or colouring remains, taking only richer hues, deeper tints, and finer shades, from the process. It has been said that Herder, for example, made everything he learned, whether as philosopher, historian, or poet, *Herder*. It has been said that “ the greatness of the individual is measured by the number of minds he can absorb

and signify": on that view of it, he includes within himself a world of ever-increasing greatness, which goes to form his individuality, and which he, by the *plus* and stamp of his individuality, goes, in his turn, to modify, or form, or create. But the developmental and interactive processes do not fix and predetermine me, Spencer-wise, as a mere "resultant," for it belongs to my unique individuality to prove and show what my individual initiative, personal projections, and particular achievement, shall be. This it does only by reaching out to an end beyond itself, even though we have seen it to be an end in itself; for the divine dignity of the individual spirit is unattainable save in the outreachings of thought, sympathy, love, and service. In the nature of the case, the individual must stand in relations, and needs the intercommunion of being, with the expansions, repulsions, and discipline, involved therein, for the attainment of the high ethical individuality which is his goal. But, as such an individuality, he will neither lose himself in society, nor merge himself in the State. As Royer-Collard remarked: "Human societies are born, live, and die upon the earth; there they accomplish their destinies. But they contain not the whole man." "We, individuals, each with a separate and distinct existence, with an identical person, we, truly beings endowed with immortality, have a higher destiny than that of States."

CHAPTER III.

THE CHARACTER OF COGNITIVE ACTS.

THE character of cognitive acts is an obscure and difficult subject, on which the last word is not likely to be said for many a day. A personal and independent view may therefore be expressed upon it. Knowledge at its simplest is of things or objects, through the senses ; and of mind's own states, through the inner sense. In sense-knowledge, the unsophisticated mind regards the scene or object beheld as one or singular, when it is really complex. In self-knowledge it in like manner regards its thought-states as states of thinking or of sentiency, in a kind of singularity, without distinguishing them in their really complex character. It does not realise that knowledge at its simplest calls for the activity of the subject. It has not learned the greatness of that moment in which, as a poet has said :—

“ Belief overmasters doubt, and I *know*
That I know.”

Such primitive knowledge is always concrete—that is, of objects with their qualities ; neither, that is to say, of objects apart from qualities, nor of qualities

apart from objects. But this uncritical frame of mind is soon overpassed.

In all cognition there is a real subject and a real object, and an actual and essential relation between them. Can that relation be treated as merely an abstraction? Can the cognitive act be regarded as itself a relation? Is the object a constituent of the cognitive act? Does the quality of the act determine that of the object? Or is the quality of the act determined by that of the object? These are among the bristling questions that surround the subject, and call for discussion. To begin with, the cognitive act arises or takes place whenever there is real agreement between a subject capable of knowing, and an object capable of being known. The cognitive act is in character a unifying act. But the object neither is, nor can be, identified with the subject, if cognition is to remain possible. Cognition may approximate to being or the object as nearly as you like, but, by its nature and its situation, it must fall short of being. Cognition is, on the one side, the peculiar action of of the subject, but is, on the other side, action which is directed and regulated by the object. This in its first part, does not mean, as is sometimes charged against idealism, that the cognition is any free or fantastic or arbitrary production or creation of the subject. It only means that the "I," in its unity and self-identity, is the condition of all knowledge. Nor does it signify, in the second part, that the cognition is the result of any mechanically determined influence of an external object. If objection be made to the object being regarded as a constituent of the cognitive act, the objection may, I think, be upheld ;

for it seems obvious that if the cognitive act be a unifying one, and the object one of the terms to be unified, the object cannot be a constituent of the cognising or unifying act. But that must not be allowed to obscure the fact that the objective reference is essential to the psychic being of any completed cognition. For the knowledge problem is certainly the knowledge-of-reality problem. You can consider the cognitive act, psychologically, by itself, and without the object as a constituent; you may have cognitive power or faculty without the object; such cognitive power is indifferent towards this or that object. But, cut off from the object, no real, definite, completed cognition is possible. That is an epistemological consideration; for epistemology deals with the objective or cognitive side. This power of knowing was already thought of by Aristotle, whose *intellectus agens*—or intellect originally and naturally in act—was meant to explain how cognitions first became possible. Leibniz, later, in his own way, made the understanding a mere power of knowing. The power or activity of knowing, however, isolated and with nothing given, cannot be for epistemology an object of knowledge. The object is as essential a factor in such cognition as is the subject, such is the correlation between them. But the constitutive essential of the cognitive act is always this: that it knows some thing or object to be or not to be, to be in one particular manner or in another. It is to the cognitive act that the thing, which so is, appears, and obviously not without the cognitive act can the thing so appear. If it did not appear it would be to me nothing at all. But an appearance,

in which no being did appear, would not be an appearance at all, but an illusion. Every cognitive act involves the mental representation that what appears and is known, is in some way a reality. Otherwise, interest and energy for knowing would be paralysed. True, our cognitive acts may often enough be concerned with the qualities or properties of things rather than with their existence, but the values we find in them have their final support in being or reality. Reality, therefore, is the presupposition of knowledge. It is the implicate, in fact, of our cognitive consciousness. And because of the ontological implicates of all knowledge I have devoted a separate chapter in this work to the discussion of the ontological consciousness. Things or objects exist before they enter into our individual experience. Experience is of the possible as well as of the actual, hence the continual advance of knowledge. But the cognitive act is individual in character, however universal its underlying presupposition may be. That is to say, the cognitive acts are peculiar to the individual subject, whose acts they are. For there is to every man a knowledge which is *his* knowledge, and belongs to him in a sense in which it does not to any other. Spontaneity is fundamentally necessary to the cognitive acts, if there is to be knowledge at all. But it is to be observed that, as a formula, subject and object are only an abstraction, which merely tells what is common to all cognitive acts, but says nothing about the nature of the thing or object. And things as knowable must be considered, as well as things as known, if we are to understand the nature of knowledge and its acts.

The cognitive act is relational in character, for to know a thing is to stand in a certain relation to it. But though we say our cognitive act of relating activity constitutes the relation of knowledge, that does not mean that the cognitive act is itself the relation, which we do not seem entitled to say. The relation subsists between the terms or entities, but is not itself any kind of entity. And the cognitive act, which is subjective, cannot itself be the relation, since the relation goes beyond it—is, in fact, trans-subjective, since the relation is directed to what might be called the extrinsic term, or the object. What we are now considering is, not cognitions, but the cognitive act, whose characters are opposed to those of the object. But not in such wise as to prevent the cognitive assimilation of the object by our consciousness. For, as the Scholastic philosophers insisted, there must be a certain similitude or resemblance between the knower and the known—in our exterior knowledge these similitudes drawn from the senses but not yet constituting thought—in order to the possibility of knowledge. “The knowledge of things,” said Edward Caird, “must mean that the mind finds itself in them, or, in some way, that the difference between them and mind is dissolved.” But what identity does result from their union is not of a kind that does away with difference; their oneness is not that of a numerical one. The knower and the related known are still different, since it is of the essence of relation that they should be so, however we may speak of the object becoming for, or turning over into, the mind. Even the logical transcendentalism of Husserl strongly emphasises

this fundamentally different character of the object from my act. The object is the object—for the existence of the object is to be distinguished from its existence *as* object—because it is susceptible of entering into a special *rappor*t, but that is without its thereby becoming part of consciousness itself. So the object cannot be considered a constituent of the act, though it is essential to the cognition. The known object remains transcendent to the act, and, though implying the cognitive act, is not identified with it. For it is not psychic experience. The object, besides being *per se*, is by the other—that is, by the psychic act, but yet the cognitive act and the object both remain what each of them is, and neither is transmuted into the other. The cognitive act remains in character subjective, as the act of the subject, but it is objective through its *intention*—in the philosophical usage of that term—as referring to an object transcending this subjective activity. This makes the character of the cognitive act a sufficiently striking—and, if you will, mysterious—one, since it is immanent, and yet *intentionaliter*—as the Scholastics say—transeunt or transitive, as tending to something outside the subject. Knowing is just the passing of the subject-activity to the cognitive embrace of the object. Knowing determines the object for us. This “intentional” direction to the object furnishes the matter or content of the act. The object, however, always remains outside the subject, and is really separate from it, and from the psychic act by which it is itself known. Though the object is thus not a constituent of the cognitive act, as distinguished from the completed cognition, that is not

to say it is not related to the cognitive awareness. And the object or reality is always essentially knowable, else epistemology were impossible. It is by these properties which render it knowable that the object mediates the cognitive act. And it is only as the object finds itself, if we may so speak, in the subject, that its own full reality, as object, is attained. But the object could not be so combined with the conscious self if it were not essentially related to it. The subject and the object are to me the two terms of the relation, and I should not call the cognitive act, as I have seen done, one of the terms of the relation. The cognitive act is an event or occurrence of consciousness; all knowledge is an activity of the knower or subject. That does not at all mean, as is sometimes wrongly supposed, that the "I," which is the bearer of the knowing activity, is something other than the cognitive acts. How could that be when the acts are the acts of the "I," which lives in—but not simply *as*—and expresses itself through the acts? It is this "I" which gives to the cognitive act its character and value. The cognitive acts do not float about in space, cut adrift from the knowing subject, as is sometimes represented, however advantageous we may find it to consider their characters by themselves. Nor does the cognitive act exist *per se*, but in a mental setting or matrix. The cognitive act may be only an abstraction, considered as a moment in the formation of abstract knowledge, but in actual life the cognitive act is as real and vital as the act of feeling or the act of willing. Only it is predominantly intellectual in character, while carrying will and feeling elements. I,

too, am real, even in my cognitive acts, and not less real than the object. The cognitive act is distinctive enough, but is motivated by interest and sustained by attention. Every relation calls for a foundation in the terms or objects between which it exists. A relation has in itself no reality other than that of its terms. But the relation is real if the terms are real ; and things do certainly exist in their relations. Hence in knowing real objects there is knowledge of objective relations. The terms are not the relation itself. But the relation has a ground, and, in cognitive experience, is determinate. There have been thinkers who made the relation the only real—not the terms, in which the ground-possibility of knowledge resides. An obviously absurd position, since, in all knowledge, the subject is fundamentally related to the object. If all knowledge were of relations, how could you know relations without being aware of the terms related ? That, of course, is not to say that properly-grounded relations may not themselves be compared. The relation, as I know it, subsists only in my thought, though not by my thought, in the case of real, not logical relations. Though I am conscious of the relation, yet the relation is not anything I can handle or see ; it but expresses the connectedness of the terms. But the question of cognitive relation goes deep, for the relation-terms are rooted in the cosmos, as grounded in thought, and woven together of parts, powers, and properties, all inter-connected in an infinite network of relations. So the cognitive-relation terms are not so easily disposed of when we abstract them in what is really an inter-related, inter-acting world, and try to con-

sider them merely by themselves. For the subject, too, is in the system, being only the last and highest term therein. The object can be thought only in relation to a consciousness, for objects apart from consciousness have no meaning, and in this way becomes a fact of consciousness, which is only to say that we know it. But that does not mean that the object is then only a fact of consciousness, or is only content of consciousness. It is not dependent on this consciousness, only its being known so depends. The twinkling of the stars, the pealing of the organ, the glowing crimson of the sunset—not one of these depends upon my consciousness of it as an object. The independence of the object is necessary to the very idea of relation. But the result is, that the cognitive act means conscious content in the knowing subject. That is not to say that the content of perception is identical with the object. The relation of the cognitive act to the object is, psychologically, a causal one, in the sense that not without our psychic causality could it be known. This, albeit it is sometimes, and I think rightly, said that the co-ordination is, epistemologically, non-causal. But the object is not deprived of its place of directive and regulative influence in what we know, so that in knowing there is a conformity of the mind to the object. The subject is thus an objectively determined subject in its turn. Yet the object can only be known according to the modes of the knowing subject, which exerts its centrifugal and projective psychological activity towards and upon the object. Hence the cognitive act is never a purely objective one, although it is truly objective. Though the object exists even when

not perceived by us, as epistemological realism holds, it does not follow that, when existing so unperceived, it has the same qualities as pertain to it when perceived by us, in our constitutive or constructive activity. That would be—so at least it seems to me—to deny that the mind is anything in and for itself; it would reduce mind to a mere transparent film—a mere cognitive awareness of objects. But the mind, as Activity, is not a mere form, but has its own active part to play. Though the knowledge which results from our cognitive acts may be discovery—of things in their positive characters—that is not to say that there have been no constructive acts in the erection of the fabric of knowledge. But that does not make it necessary to resolve, with Cohen, all cognition into construction, to make the object exclusively the product of the thinking activities of the subject, as though no reality existed independently of our thought. If, however, in the cognitive act, the subject were merely impressed by the object, the subject would not then be forming its own idea of the object; it would not be freely knowing and independently thinking. So I hold subject and object to be reciprocally determining, but the act of knowing is a perfection of the subject. In this reciprocal working, the object communicates itself to the subject, and the subject exerts its mental activity on the object.

The cognitive act or knowing may be taken as real and undoubted, but I can also, by an act of attention, observe the process of my own observing, or be conscious of my own consciousness. This self-attesting character of knowledge is in virtue of my

power of introspection, whose reality has been unconvincingly called in question. Whether such an introspective act is in every case necessary to our becoming aware of anything mental is another matter. Consciousness alone is immediately given, is concrete, and internal in structure. Knowledge is not only a function of this structure, but the knowing function is the most universal function of consciousness. Consciousness is active, is consciousness of an object. And knowledge of objects always means relation. If, in the cognitive act, the concept formed of the object were—as some extreme forms of idealism have held—wholly due to the subject, there would then really be no object. Yet many, since Kant, have placed the elements or constituents of knowledge, in this way, solely in the subject. Kant subjectivised the objects of thought. Knowledge is then independent, so to speak, of an object. But real knowledge, in such a way, is unthinkable. The position is epistemologically absurd, for, in knowledge, every subject is by an object, as every object is by a subject. The object and the cognition are distinct, but they are not separate. Subject and object both stand within one system of reality. Kant distinguished the objectivity of a mental act from the reality of the object, in the sphere of theoretic reason. But when, in the sphere of empiric reality, knowledge—which as positive knowledge cannot here be *à priori*—is supposed independent of an object, for it is only a modification of my sensibility, knowledge becomes knowledge only of our own ideas or representations. The elements of the object are only in us. Knowledge, intercepted by its own forms, never reaches reality. Of the real

—i.e., transcendental—object there can be no notion. There is then only a subjective seeming, but no knowledge of, or contact with, things real. How, further, could there be, when the subject is no real living subject, but a mere logical *cogito*? Kant says that while he surrendered “the power of *cognising*,” he still reserved “the power of *thinking*,” objects as things in themselves. But he has shorn the cognitive act of its power and value. So, too, since Lotze, with his fundamental agnosticism, many make the phenomenon something belonging exclusively to the subject, a product of the mind, occasioned indeed by things, but involving no real knowledge of things as they are. It is such knowledge as always misses or falls short of the object. How could it be otherwise, when Lotze made the irremediable blunder of making knowledge begin with the subjective in us—which he objectified—instead of with the object, which in consequence he never reached? But there is certainly nothing to prove that, in our consciousness-content, there is awareness of our mental states, and not of the things, as immediately known or perceived. The truth is, there is something given which, as *Anstoss* or opposition, as Fichte called it, stirs up and determines the cognitive activity. And yet, though the fact is generally overlooked, the true object is the object of search rather than something merely given. And the cognitive act is a far deeper, more genuine affair than any hide-and-seek play with reality. But all that does not keep the cognitive act from being an interior or immanent one. What the subject then does, in the exercise of its power or capacity to realise the object, is to fix the

form of its own cognitive product over against this object-activity. But knowledge is, in my view, the result of neither, but a permanent result, residue, or *souvenir* of their co-activity and correlation. This involves the cognitive act, which is in character always imperfect or incomplete, since it never exhausts the object in its wholeness. A complete seizure of it is precisely the eternal quest. Besides this invariable or universal character of imperfection or incompleteness in the cognitive act, there is also its variable character in virtue of the empirical contingency and particularity of cognition in individual experience, with its multitudinously variant forms. For the subject is a particular knower, with unlimited changes in the relations of fact and circumstance in his environment, albeit knowing is universal. That, however, does not keep the particular knower from becoming always more universalised. For the combining, self-active subject straightway proceeds to make all things—the whole objective world, in fact—his own, while his cognitive acts retain their character of real inwardness, objective in *intention* though they be. Though cognition may involve a duality of terms, the cognitive act itself must be regarded as one indivisible act of the mind. The elements of the indivisible synthesis are, no doubt, distinguishable, and both would disappear if either were removed, for, epistemologically, they are known only in synthesis. This synthesis of the two moments we may, I think, regard, with Schuppe, as original fact, not as a philosophical explication. Nor is there any *tertium quid*, in order to the object being directly cognised. In the cognitive acts the whole interpreta-

tive activity of thought falls within, not without ; it goes to form our consciousness-content. It is this unifying activity of the subject that makes his world. Hence the importance of the study of the subject to the theory of knowledge, but this in relation to the object.

I think the cognitive act should be regarded as in character progressive, not stationary or always the same, for it surely grows in power, grasp, and intensity, as the discriminating and unifying process of thought goes forward. The act may in character, no doubt, be always one of knowing, but the power to know may increase to the *n*th degree. It has been said, I am aware, that "there are no degrees of intensity in cognition," the intensity being set down to concomitant feeling. But the statement seems to me to fail of realising that feeling belongs to the senses, not to the understanding, and it is a very questionable one, even though the intellectual act is never unattended by feeling. Sense perceives by feeling, but understanding judges what is so perceived. There are surely degrees in approximation to perfection of knowing ; why must the "intensity" be credited only to the "feeling" element ? The position ill comports with the passive character of feeling as compared with the more active character of knowing. I do not wish to deny, however, that there is positive feeling which tends towards knowledge, nor that a certain cognitive value may attach to feeling, although it is only too easy to overestimate this value in very many cases. The *esse* of feeling is, of course, *sentire* ; pure sense feels, but it does nothing more, as Aristotle wrongly supposed ; but

in knowing, there is an object, or a *what* that is known ; and it seems a little absurd to place all "intensity" of knowing in the mere feeling accompaniment, which is variable and unstable. This is not to deny to feeling all character as a *continuum*. There seems no reason, however, why feeling, in many conceivable cases, should not reinforce, colour, and strengthen the intellectual power, and so help heighten the cognitive result. But feeling has not the strong objective reference of thought. So far as feeling affects the quality of knowledge, it must, I think, be held to depend more on the cognitive activity than the cognitive activity does upon it, though that is far from being properly understood in our time. Thought knows and transcends feeling, but not all feeling can think, if indeed any feeling can.¹ That man is wise who has learned to subordinate feeling, and the more so as feeling is deep and strong within him, to the perceptive and judging powers. One would like to know how, in the cognitive act, it is proposed so to isolate feeling as to find warrant for saying that, in the intellectual act, "there are no degrees of intensity." Feeling presupposes reason or intelligence, and is consequent on some idea, in noetic consciousness. Further, in cognitive acts there is always attention—a will element—and degrees of attention there certainly are. Attention, which is selective, is the activity of the mind concentrated upon the object, and it brings a higher degree of consciousness of the object. But the act of the mind in knowledge is one and indivisible, for the functioning of the mind is always

¹ This is said in reference to the position of certain psychologists who go far towards dissolving the antithesis of thought and feeling.

of the whole mind, and from the cognitive act viewed in its unity, how is this will-element to be segregated or extruded? We must take the cognitive act—in which will and feeling elements are present—as we find it, in its wholeness and integrity, as that of a complex knowing subject, and it does not appear that it can be justifiably claimed for it that it has “no degrees of intensity.” This synthetic activity of the mind is presupposed in all knowing. There are “degrees of intensity” in perception—the perceptive act can increase according to the energy of the subject, both in intensity and in comprehensiveness; and there are “degrees of intensity” in representation, which can become more profound in the subject. These degrees or variations depend upon the particular conditions, exterior and interior, organic and psychic, attaching to his case. Reflective activity also has its intensive advances, through deepening insight into the inner connection of things. Can thought or knowledge itself never become a passion, nor reflection ever be impassioned?

On the view which I have been suggesting, the whole truth would not be that the consciousness-content alone was being enriched and increased in the process. Surely the cognitive act or power shares in the internal development. No one will deny it, I think, who wishes to retain the high inspiration of the power and the process of knowing. For a flat rate of knowing, with no “varying degrees of intensity,” does not seem to me very congruous with the self-active and energetic powers of the mind. If I say I have now “more knowledge” of a thing, I may not be thinking of some quantitative gain, but

rather of this result in relation to the cognitive acts that led up to it, so that I have "more knowledge" in the qualitative sense that the thing is now better, or more deeply, known by me. There are degrees of knowledge in this sense, the object being *in statu nascendi* to my developing cognition or increasing acquaintance. There are endless gradations of distinctness and comprehension in the way things are cognised by us. Not without reason did Sir Isaac Newton ascribe his discoveries to always "intending" his mind. For knowledge, of any deep sort, must be intensive. Knowing is one form of the life of the spirit. But, with such degrees in knowledge, it is not easy to see how "degrees of intensity" in cognition can be denied. Nor does it readily appear how we can speak of cognitive values, if all "degrees of intensity" are excluded from these values, or at least from the framing of them. Sense-qualities are due to the psychical activity of the subject. The theory of cognition, as pure mirror of reality, has failed to realise the subjectivity of those psychical products, sense-qualities. I see no reason why sense-activity should not be deemed creative in respect of the secondary qualities of the object. Still less do I find any reason why thought-activity should not be creative in variant forms. Consciousness is an activity of the subject, not a mere diaphanous state. The cognitive acts are not only intense; they are creative in the double sense, that by them is our individual knowledge made, and by them also knowledge itself is in sum created, through methodic elaboration of the contents of consciousness. And I agree with Bosanquet that cognition "emphatically exhibits that

self-transcendent character of thought which constitutes its freedom and initiative." Cognition is of primary significance to thought, but is distinct from thought, as Chalybäus pointed out, and others since. It was Leibniz who, in the metaphysical connection, said: "Our soul has the power of representing to itself any form or nature, whenever the occasion comes for thinking about it, and I think that this activity of our soul is, so far as it expresses some nature, form, or essence, properly the idea of the thing. This is in us, and is always in us, whether we are thinking of it or no." But such a conception of the dynamic nature or activity of knowledge is hardly conceivable without "degrees of intensity" in the cognitive force. The cognitive acts must be conceived under this dynamic character or aspect. Such a thing as pure intellectual action, *sensu stricto*, does not exist. The conscious activity of the subject, however, must be thought as involving cognition, which is directive of such activity. Our lives, as rational, are, in fact, formed and fashioned by knowledge as dynamic. The cognitive act is a *prius* in our psychic life; it has characters which cannot be reduced to those of any other. But that does not mean that the cognitive act is one of pure, transparent knowing; if it had been such, with every tincture of will and feeling elements excluded, our task would have been greatly simplified. But as such pure cognitive experience does not exist, much of the talk of the "futile intellectualism" of the cognitive experience is itself perfectly futile. And if there is to be philosophical advance, it will not come through lagging behind the Scholastic philosophers in appreciation of the peculiar

and unique character of the cognitive relation, while avoiding any one-sided stress in their view. Very significant is the way in which, when it comes to the sphere of æsthetics, Schopenhauer, to whom "the subject of cognition is nothing in himself," rides roughshod over his own extreme voluntaristic theory of knowledge, and insists that the object can be known only by "pure cognition," by "will-less knowledge." Our cognitive acts, despite the intense modality of the knowing mind, must be directed towards the apprehension of things as they really are. For the cognitive function leads up to rich concrete knowledge. I have already shown the mind's dependence, in knowledge, upon the object, and from this initial dualism of subject and object, we pass to that immediate awareness which constitutes the basal cognitive relation of epistemological monism. If we are not to say that things are as they appear to us, no more is any one entitled to say that things are *not* as they appear. But this Kant dogmatically did. If there is incompetence in the knowing faculty, it is thus double-edged. But the *ratio cognoscendi* is founded, in the only true fashion, on the *ratio essendi*, for real being alone explains real knowing. It would be no tenable or satisfactory position to rest in the Lotzean attitude, which practically amounts to saying that—as it has been put—"we do not know that what we have is not knowledge." The primary activity of the cognitive act is to make us really cognisant of the being or nature of the object. The object of cognition does not exist *per se*, but as thing-for-us. Its prior existence is yet inferred. The object, it is said, remains, through all our knowledge, what it was,

its nature and existence independent of our knowing. But these we do not know save in relation to the subject. And so I think this knowing things as they *are* can only mean, as they are *known*. For it is as known, not as existent, that epistemology deals with the object. The concern of science, says Whitehead, is with nature as known.¹

Knowledge begins in simple apprehension of the object, but it implies and involves a great deal more, for simple apprehension furnishes rather material for knowledge than knowledge itself. Hence the cognitive activity of the mind goes on to cognitive acts and processes wherein discriminating and relating, comparing and judging, are involved; and acts analytical and synthetic are present. For knowledge is capable of high degrees of definiteness or distinctness. The cognitive acts assume a deepening and intensified character, and knowledge appears the really profound thing which it is. The cognitive act is not one which primarily negates, as Spinoza supposed, but one which separates, and groups, and includes. In perception, that most essential factor in knowledge, concepts or *Begriffe* arise or are contained, whether put into words or not. But a complete synthesis of perception and conception must be sought. Of these, it is the former that connects us with reality, and not without it would cognition be attained. Perceptive activity reaches its height when, as Plato's² "paraclete of thought," it stimulates the thought-activity of the subject to see an intimate and con-

¹ Cf. my Discussion on "Sextus Empiricus and the Modern Theory of Knowledge" in 'The Philosophical Review,' January 1922, p. 61.

² 'Rep.,' 523-524.

stant *rapport* in the parts, quality, energy, force, and function, of which the object is made up, and distinguishes, further, temporary or accidental conditions extrinsic to it, besides its relations to other objects and their serial relations. But all this involves attention to attributes or features common to different objects, and likewise comparison, and discernment of likenesses and differences in the objects. And the process of generalisation naturally follows. From all this, we see what a synthetic concept knowing is. Judgment is the type of perfect knowledge. But not abstract judgment, which is not cognition. The intellectual character of these cognitive acts is surely obvious enough, as compared with will and feeling influences. "Thought," says Kant, "is cognition by means of *conceptions*." But of knowledge itself, barring introspective processes, the most essential feature remains its objective bearing or import. The object is then the main thing, and of it there must be direct cognition, although we are now considering the cognitive acts. Hence epistemology deals with the material principles of knowledge, as logic does with its formal principles. But in considering the objective import of knowledge, one must not forget the indispensable knower, for such objective cognition does not resolve the whole problem. That is the mistake of Hegelian thought in this connection. It dealt with knowledge in a too wholesale fashion, and with too great disregard of psychological factors. Knowing mind is, no doubt, for it primal reality, and that reality is interpreted in terms of cognitive processes. But it is knowledge, simply as knowledge, that is emphasised; the knower is neglected; hence

his cognitive acts cannot have satisfactory treatment. Epistemology is swallowed up of ontology or metaphysics. Yet with what rare delicacy Hegel can on occasion do this, as when, for example, he says that "not the *breaking* of the beam of light, but *the beam of light itself*, by which truth touches us, is knowledge." But, after all, knowledge is an individual thing, among other individual things. The whole world-process consists of things passing into one another. Whether I feel a lump of ice, or see a walnut-tree, or construct a *Weltanschauung*, my knowledge is in each case an attribute of me as individual—a particular knower. You cannot, therefore, properly treat cognitive acts by simply taking knowledge as knowledge, without doing full justice to the knower, whose acts they are, distinct from those of all other individuals. But the subject is not exhausted in the cognitive *rapport* with the object, any more than the object is exhaustively known by the subject. Other thinkers there have been who have not done justice to the cognitive acts, but treated them as perfectly abstract moments in a purely phenomenal process. Avenarius is one of these; no acts are in general, for him, necessary to obtain contents and objects. The quality of the content is not for him determined by the quality of the act. This is in keeping with the epistemologico-biological tendency of his so-called "pure experience," with all associated ideas removed. Though he rendered good service in criticising what he termed the fallacy of introjection, this did not keep him from his own fallacious assumption that nothing exists save experience. Only through experience, he held, can we know that anything exists.

We have seen how the cognitive acts are directed towards objects that are knowable, and become known. It is the capacity for knowing, on the part of the subject, that effects the passage or transformation from the knowable to the known. Although there is a representation of the object to the subject, and a judgment by the subject, yet the cognition is distinct from the object, and the reality of the former is to be maintained. And we have seen that the object, in its externality and even opposition, is yet, as Hegel said, "an other which is not another," since subject and object are destined to be locked together in that union which is knowledge. In trying to explicate the character of the cognitive acts, there is always the difficulty that one feels what primitive, irreducible facts they appear to be. But they appear more natural and intelligible, I think, when it is considered how, in their intellectual character, they mediate that complex of agreements with reality which constitutes for us the immanent rationality of the world. We have seen that, among the alternatives, the subject may be swallowed up by the object ; or the object may disappear in the subject and its creative activity ; or, best unity of all, the subject and the object are each relative to the other, and only their unity is perfect. This unity is given in that full consciousness, wherein the object is one with the subject, who finds himself in the object. Among the things we have seen as to the character of the cognitive acts are : the senses in which they are unifying, active, immanent, intellective, individual, and inward ; the senses in which they are subjective in character, intentional or objective in reference, relational, causal,

constitutive, constructive, spontaneous ; and the senses in which they are objectively determined, imperfect or incomplete, distinctive, progressive, indivisible, intensive, creative, analytic, synthetic. This seems a tolerably diversified characterisation of them, and the unsatisfactory dealings with cognitive acts in great systems have been illustrated by references to Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Lotze, Schopenhauer, and Avenarius. It is not, in the cognitive acts, a question merely of *what* is taken up into consciousness, but of *how* it is taken up, for, as Husserl has remarked, there are real specific differences of the intentional relation ; and who, one may ask, could possibly make count and reckoning of all the variant modes and degrees in which we can think the object ? There are, in this connection, relations which are qualitative, extensive, intensive, and protensive, and this alone were enough to show the greatness of the problem of the character of the cognitive acts. And though it is with these great, significant acts in themselves we have been concerned, yet the epistemological discussion cannot hide from us their far-reaching results or consequences, since it is through them that the infinitely varied and self-manifesting world of reality is swept into the ken of our cognitive faculty and experience. The cognitive acts are the key that unlocks for us the hoards of the universe.

CHAPTER IV.

RATIONALISM AND VOLUNTARISM.

IT may be of interest to consider some of the relative claims of rationalism and voluntarism, that real and explicit antithesis of recent times, whether we regard either theory in full or extreme form as satisfactory or not. Neither of them is, in fact, satisfactory in any absolute or exclusive sense. Their consideration is the more necessary as extreme forms of voluntarism are by no means rare in the thought of to-day. There is no need in doing so, to forget that, in every psychosis, there will be elements or rudiments of feeling, willing, and thinking, though one of these may have a dominating influence. Rationalism stands for thinking, as the great form or mode of realising conscious content. That is to say, the essential activity of mental life is for it thought or ideation. Rationalism is concerned with logical priority rather than with the question of genesis, hence it here stands aside from psychology—though I do not mean to leave it untouched—which is concerned with genetic order. The logical priority of thought—thought-activity as the absolute *prius* of the world—is the maintenance of rationalism. For in no other way

can you get the world as a world of meaning. Neither blind feeling nor blind will can yield such. But thought, standing by itself, does not suffice to create a world.

Pure thought needs the supplementing of will. That is the defect of rationalism. Will is the peculiar mark of human movement. Of the two terms of voluntaristic activity, it is the internal term which alters the external one. This is contrastive to what happens in perceptive activity, where the external term takes precedence of the other, or internal one. Will is not moved by reason alone, thought Hume, for he subjects reason to the feelings, as some still do. His stress on passion fails of justice to reason. A further defect or mistake of rationalism has been to undervalue the senses. But experience is too exigent for the tendency to neglect or underrate the senses to be wise. The part played by sense in experience-processes is too important to be overlooked without impoverishment. Thought can come to its own without countenancing this mistaken tendency. Rationalism has, besides, too often been lacking in the historic sense, in religious inwardness, and in scientific strength. Thought, as we know it, never does exist severed or divorced from feeling and will. That is not to say that thought or reason may not have a dominance, a logical priority, a primacy of rank. That is quite another matter from time priority. The time primacy claimed for feeling by some psychologists is denied by rationalism in respect of any feeling-consciousness taken as pure or wholly without rudimentary representation, real however latent. Representation in some sort must be taken to precede

feeling—feeling, that is to say, as accompanying sensation.

But, if we distinguish these two, I should take feeling as purely subjective, and sensation as carrying an objective reference or element. This, although certain German philosophers hold all sensations of subjective origin. The unity of sensation, for Rosmini, was intelligence. Not much help is vouchsafed by Höffding's rather vague definition of feeling as "an inner illumination which falls on the stream of sensations and ideas." But I am not inclined to deny Höffding's position that primitive feeling is already given, before sensation and idea exert their influence. Feeling is often regarded or treated only as it springs from the stimuli in sensational experience. Thought supervenes on such sensation; and in this usage of feeling, my next remark holds good of it; feeling wholly without presentation or idea must be valueless for action. That is not to deny the dominance of feeling that may exist in certain cases or stages. But that is not the case where reflection is developed, for there the idea or the presentational element is supreme. "In tal modo," says an Italian writer, "l'attività del sentire progredisce dall' interno all' esterno."¹ For our knowledge of the external world, sensations are to be followed, not despised. And the "external" and the "internal" sensations—as Italian psychologists call them—should be carefully distinguished, and passive sensation, active sensation, and perception, should be taken as making up the first order of psychic activity. But reason is the organ for the supreme discovery of truth, as we shall presently see.

¹ N. R. D' Alfonso, 'Piccola Psicologia,' p. 30.

Voluntarism stands for the primacy of will or some form or mode of effort-consciousness. It takes will to be the source and the sustaining power of mental life. It may be blind will or impulse, as in Schopenhauer; it may take the form of impulse and idea in synthesis as exemplified in Lotze and in Wundt, although Lotze may be held to recognise too much more than one fundamental mind-function for a real voluntarist; or it may begin with the idea, but hold, as in Royce, that the idea appears in consciousness as an act of will. Touching what has just been said of Lotze, it is he who has said, for example, that all the acts of daily life never demand "a distinct impulse of the will," but are "adequately brought about by the pure flux of thought." Lotze veers, indeed, from a rationalistic mode of thought toward positivist tendency or direction. On genetic grounds, of course, voluntarism will have much to say for itself—hence Paulsen and Wundt have striven to set it upon a psychological basis—since, in the matter of time, early or rudimentary forms of consciousness will be largely blind or impulsive in nature. Paulsen accordingly makes impulse the basal function of the inner life. More generally, I may remark the very unscientific and unwarranted tendency of voluntaristic psychology to found itself on "conation" in ways whereby that term has been stretched far beyond anything consciousness can sanction as processes really volitional in character.

But the weakness of voluntarism lies in the fact that not even the earliest forms of *Trieb*, impulse, or feeling-will, can be admitted to be without germinal representation or rudimentary thought. We must

think of some undifferentiated whole, out of which the various mental powers, or characteristics, evolve, instead of assuming will as the base of a gradual intelligence. We must take account of the progressive embodiment of reason to be found in all sentient life. We must hold to internal structure in such wise that the psychosis is not the absolutely simple thing it is sometimes supposed to be. Binet has declared that psychic manifestations are much more complex than is supposed, even in the lowest scales of animal life. It is a weak and inconclusive argument that, because, in man's early development, knowledge had to be largely of the nature of virtual action, it cannot have overpassed this character in his developed stage. But that is just what it has done, and reason, calm, directive, disinterested, seeking knowledge for its own sake, has assumed the primacy in rank which by its nature belongs to it. Schopenhauer sets his world of feeling-will over against reason or thought, but his *Trieb* or impulse is not really will in any proper or developed sense, and is not exclusive of feeling. In fact, the ground of life, which Schopenhauer chose to call the will in all things, was in reality something psychologically so chaotic, that no world could have come of it that was not irrational and meaningless. Nietzsche made voluntarism the underlying moment of his psychology of religion. For a central experience of will is what he always seeks, as affording a measure in the direction of religious metaphysic.¹ But of the will-theories of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, it is to be said that the will, properly conceived, never acts

¹ On Nietzsche's varying notions of will, see W. M. Salter's 'Nietzsche the Thinker,' p. 498.

blindly or without reason, which latter is, in fact, the determining factor of mental life, since it enlightens and directs the activity of the will.

The world of appetitions, to which, since the time of Leibniz, the term will has, in inexact and even mythological fashion, been applied, does not constitute the realm of will at all. For, obviously, there can be no proper willing without an idea of something that is willed. The qualitative constancy which Wundt has sought in the will—as compared with ideas and with feeling—is too abstract and mythical an affair to be psychologically satisfactory. The fault of a radical voluntarism, like that of Fichte, is that in it pure will regards itself as an end, and wills merely for the sake of willing. It is, for it, not a case of objects, but of willing itself—absolute will, cloaked as a natural impulse to independence. “Jedes ist ein erstes und absolutes.” Clumsy and confused is the way in which Fichte tells us that “reason is reason,” and in the same breath insists that “the will is the living principle of reason—is itself reason.” The truth is, reason or thought is by him subordinated to will or our striving energies, in unwarrantable voluntaristic fashion: will is made antecedent to knowledge. But this idea of absolute will is unsatisfactory, in that it only too easily becomes a detached and unrealised ideal, arbitrarily viewing everything as a mere expression of its will. It is a case of the transcendentalism of will overleaping itself, and vaulting the heavens. The foregoing criticism applies equally to a recent philosopher who has said—“Will is not subsequent to, or consequent on, reason. It is itself root of reason. As Will, it wills Will.” This

writer, like Fichte, exalts reason in the finest manner, and then goes on, without any sense of absurdity, to reduce reason to the same abject subservience to will. This brings us to note the absurdity of voluntarism in taking, as the chief characteristic of life's mental powers, something which is found in complete abeyance as life reaches its highest. For in hours of pure thought, or in seasons of calm æsthetic contemplation, it cannot be ignored how disinterested is thought, nor can it be pretended that anything like actual or conscious willing is anything but absent, in both cases. This is all that is then evidenced of Royce's rather irrelevant saying that "our will is always dramatic in its expressions."¹ Yet voluntarism thinks it congruous to make this sleeping partner figure as the most distinctive, and indeed the all-devouring factor in our mental life. It is extreme, and straining experience, to say of such times, like Höffding, that "we must *will* to see, in order to see aright." That, of course, is not meant to imply that will is not present.

What Royce calls his "absolute voluntarism" begins with the idea, but immediately asserts that the idea appears in consciousness as an act of will. This seems a somewhat hasty and violent psychological treatment of the idea, almost reminding one of Condillac's, when he made the idea a sensation representative of something, in spite of their difference being one of kind: my ideas, *as* ideas, *are* ideas, and not just anything else you please. It might surely have sufficed to make ideas also aims and ideals: they are not yet acts of will. But that would

¹ 'The Problem of Christianity,' vol. ii. p. 297.

not satisfy Royce's mystical pan-egoistic epistemology, and so his rather chaotic voluntaristic psychology declares that "the idea is a will seeking its own determination." "Ideas are thinkable but absolutely unknowable," a writer has said, in the sense of knowledge as ordinarily understood. Rosmini, on the other hand, says that "idea, as such, is object, distinct from the thinking subject, and opposed to it." Erdmann also makes more of ideas, regarding the idea as "self-end," and speaking of "the immediacy or being of the idea." And "every idea," said Rosmini (in his work 'On the Origin of Ideas'), "is universal and necessary." In another connection, Royce has said, less objectionably, that "the motives of an idea are practical, and the constituents of an idea are either the data of perception, or the conceptual processes whereby we characterise or predict or pursue such data."¹ The ideas appear to me to be really, at most, "proposals for volition," as the case has been put, and the idea must be selected, as Bradley says, by something which is not an idea; they may thus become idea-forces, as Fouillée termed them; but the primacy of the idea is not to be obscured or lost sight of, even though its intellectual functioning is not to be disjoined from the volitional and emotional activities which it mediates and determines. The dominance of the idea in consciousness is the primary fact with which we are here concerned, and one which cannot be filched away by voluntaristic violence. This primacy can be maintained without giving the intellectual ideas or terms any too abstract air or character. The idea is something unique: it is in

¹ 'The Problem of Christianity,' vol. ii. pp. 181, 182.

and by the knowing mind ; it has a meaning of its own ; and it bears the character of self-reference. Yet the ideas are, in a careful and significant sense, " likenesses of things " (Aristotle). But let the idea vanish, and what will become of motive-feeling and volitional impulse ? The particularity of sensation, and the universality of the idea, need not be forgotten. Even in stages where, psychologists say, sensation dominates, it might be worthy of better remembrance that we become aware of the presence of a sensation only through thinking. Not sensations, but our thought of them, is what differentiates us from the animal creation. Sensation is concrete and particular, while thought always carries an element of universality. Where there are sensations, there, said Rosmini, the primitive synthesis is made by the mind in a spontaneous manner. And (in his work on ' Logic ') Rosmini differentiated intelligence from sensation in a meritorious manner. " No other faculty," said he, " except the understanding, has for its term an *object*." This last is intuited, but, to know this, he maintains, there must be an act of reflection upon the intuition. Therein the understanding is different from the feeling. For " the felt is not object but simple *term*, and the faculty of feeling has not the *essential property* of the faculty of understanding." Rosmini thus avoids the confusions as to sense which marked Aristotle, Kant, and others of more recent date. But, on the other hand, I think he does not always discriminate enough in his use of the terms feeling and sensation. Feeling, as Rosmini insists, is made up of that which feels and of that which is felt, and intellective perception is not to be con-

founded with feeling, since feeling in this sense must "precede *the act of thought* which observes it." It is not to be forgotten that, as Stout is pleased to put the matter, sensation is said to exist *in*, as well as *for*, the mind, although this requires some further explication to render it quite satisfactory.¹ We must at any rate remember what Rosmini emphasised, that sensation is in the strictest sense particular, and that to speak of a sensation being transformed into an idea would be quite absurd.

Reason remains a power perceptive, regulative, dynamical—the concrete unity of our organised mental energy. It is by virtue of this dynamic reason that we act in freedom. Freedom is a necessity of the purpose-positing activity of intelligence. That means the freedom of the reasonable will, not the blind voluntaristic will that treats reason as its bond-servant. The reasonable will rules the feeling-life and the impulse-life in the quest of its concrete ideal. We must hold reason to be the supreme power in spirit, and the ultimate ground of the world's order. Not even the appeal of Rousseau to inward feeling or sentiment was free of considerable elements of ratiocination. True, in his unsystematic way, he could say that ideas came from without, and that sentiments sprang up within the soul. But he did not completely disjoin them, there being, in his view, senses in which "ideas are sentiments, and sentiments are ideas." But he sometimes joined the sentiments to reason, treating them as its necessary completion. For, with all his insistence upon the "heart," he uses sentiment in a way which does not always

¹ 'Manual of Psychology,' p. 209.

exclude cognitive elements. Still, there is in Rousseau the tendency to make the sentimental outweigh the rational, although it cannot be said that the sentimental was, in him, void of reference to reason, or always destitute of theoretic thought. The importance of feeling, however, is not to be underestimated, since it reflects the ethical quality of the person or represents the personality in its immediate self-consciousness. Ribot has represented a revolt against intellectualist theory here, freeing feeling from dependence on presentation, and treating it as an original state, and it may be allowed that the intellectualist theory was often unduly pressed. At the same time Höffding is right in holding that cognitive elements are already present, and do not simply arise out of formless and primitive feeling, as is seen in the early calling forth of memory in connection with early pleasure and pain experiences.

Hume had already given high place to feeling or passion, for what was taken to be the determination of the will by reason, Hume regarded as really its determination by calmer or more tranquil feelings. His rejection of the primacy of will was, of course, unsatisfactory, being in favour of a species of impression: reason was by him made subject to the feelings. Dr Bradley does vastly better in rejecting "in any form the primacy of will."¹ He rightly contends that "bare will is no will," and that "will involves not only perception but also idea," which he finds "hard to reconcile with a secondary position of intelligence." But no one has laid it down more explicitly than Aquinas that there is no will without

¹ 'Essays on Truth and Reality,' p. 96.

reason or intellect—*intellectus* is necessary to *voluntas*. “Eminentior,” “altior,” and “nobilior,” are the terms in which he expresses the superiority of intellect to will. The act of will, in his view, is an inclination which follows the intellect: “actus voluntatis nihil aliud est, quam inclinatio quaedam consequens formam intellectam.”¹ Aquinas also holds that nothing can be willed *in actu* which is not known. I have myself not only opposed voluntarism and taken reasonable will to be the only true idea of will, but have shown the straits of voluntarism, and its baleful influences in recent philosophical thought and philosophy of religion.² In this I have ranged myself, but on independent grounds, with Meumann and other Continental thinkers who stand for the primacy of intelligence. An all-controlling will, at whose demand alone all reason, no less than all value, can have any being, in the manner there shown, can only yield a very bald and unsatisfying psychology, one which is utterly impotent to do any manner of justice to reason. In taking reasonable will—will enlightened by prevenient reason—to be the only true idea of will, I hold, like Bradley, idea to be essential to will. I take, equally with him, the notion of the idea being often the creature of a blind impulse to be quite inconclusive.³ For impulse without consciousness of end is not will in any proper sense. If there has been no suggestion of idea, there has been no real willing. Dr Bradley even speaks of the “monarchy” of the idea, and of the “single idea,”

¹ ‘Summa,’ I. 87, 4.

² See my ‘Philosophical System of Theistic Idealism,’ *in loco*.

³ ‘Mind,’ 1902, p. 462.

all other ideas present in the volitional process being, in his view, subordinate or contributory to the "total idea." I should prefer to think more of the primacy of reason than of idea, taking the process to be more concrete, as a unity of reason. Reason views all in the unity of the idea, and it effects the needful fusion of ideas. Bradley's stress on one idea seems to me apt to make the volitional process appear rather thin and bald for all the facts. Even if we take volition to be "the self-realisation of an idea with which the self is identified," such self-identification must be taken to imply that the volition is the act of my concrete self, in which the idea reigns. But it might be objected that ideas do not—in the modifying light of evolution—dominate and function in us in the detached and isolated manner which Bradley is apt to represent. They are set in the reason, which is a representative of the world-reason, and it is of a unity or totality of reason we have first of all to think. It is, however, desirable that the idea, as a psychological existent, should be as clear and distinct as possible. But stress on the willing must not be obscured. "In the end," says Bradley, "my union with the idea must remain essentially a felt union."¹ And again, "volition is the identification of my felt self with the idea."² But this seems to me rather artificial, and separates the idea too much from the self, for the idea is already my idea; reason in me is a unified force, which goes out from the unity of the idea, and forms the totality of the idea of which Bradley speaks. Reason is the "I" itself indeed, which proves itself reasonable in the process, as the idea is taken up as a

¹ 'Mind,' 1903, p. 152.

² Ibid., p. 161.

willing. Bradley denies that "desire and conation are to be found in all cases of will," and says that to make them the "bridge" in volition would be "absurdly deficient."¹ On both points I agree with him. Blind conations are not volition; mere desire is not will. He therefore abides by the view that will is not "original or ultimate," since the passage of an idea into existence is, for him, the essence of will. Varisco, too, holds it "essential to will" that it be "enlightened by cognition," and be "altogether one with cognition," but his attitude is less clear-cut and defined. There is, in my view, a lordship of reason in the entire process which leads to harmony, for the resultant whole is the unity of intelligence and will in the human consciousness. The impulse of reason towards unity is not satisfied until such unity is achieved. The content of reason is the ideal, the necessary, the universally valid. But the universality, Rosmini clearly laid down, is of the mind or the intelligence, and not in things or sensations; we may not even speak, *sensu stricto*, of a universal idea, for not in their content, but in their applicability, are ideas universal. Ideas are singulars; the qualities that belong to universality are given them by mind.

Thought has none of the particularisation of sensation: to think is to universalise. The idea is all-important to Rosmini, for it is the light of the mind, however impossible that it should be defined. It will be seen that I take reason or intelligence to precede and determine the will, and the psychical activity involved to be fundamentally real; the time relations connected therewith do not prevent or disturb me,

¹ 'Mind,' 1904, pp. 20, 21.

for though time in some aspects and relations is real, it is not ultimate, nor regnant in the realm of spirit. Thus I do not regard all inner psychic activity as in the end will-activity, for there are many psychic occurrences outside will-activity. I reject bare will, in all its arbitrariness, as the ultimate source, while not denying, of course, how will-activity sticks fast in all thought. I am, of course, aware how it has been attempted to justify the statement that all psychic activity is will-activity, by seeking to distinguish an empirical-psychological voluntarism from a metaphysical voluntarism, the latter partaking of the universal character of metaphysic. But I am here only incidentally concerned with empiric voluntarism, in which will is made to include or swallow up feelings and sensations, and impulses are taken as lower forms of will, and even made at times to figure as if they were pure will. But even when the distinction just made is observed, it does not follow that the empirical-psychological account of the development is never overweighted in its stress on will, when ideas or representations and feelings are all taken to be developed therefrom. I am myself sceptical of this account of the development, both as to its doing preludial justice to the representation or reason-elements in the process, and still more as to its being a satisfactory account of the relations found to exist between developed intelligence and developed will. It is only by abstraction that we can determine or fix upon the part played by all the individual psychic elements or factors in the process, and though the phenomena of will lend themselves most easily to observation, it does not follow that justice has always

been done to the potency of rational and feeling elements or moments likewise. I do not admit will, in its active efficiency, to be anything else than bound, in certain fundamental ways or principles, to representation and thought connections, and the question is, whether this, the more difficult and recondite part of the process, has been satisfactorily performed. I do not think it has. Will, of course, has had its development, just like every other psychic function, and besides will, there is at least always representation, if arbitrariness is to be shunned. For there is no pure activity, but only such as has been qualitatively determined by representation or content. The element of knowledge is an inseparable moment in consciousness, and it is not derivable from will. Not even the representations should be derived from will, when sensations and feelings are also present.

Wundt's theory of "idea-object," as original datum of thought, might surely have led to more satisfactory issue touching the ideating forces. It seems to me not without arbitrariness that Wundt makes the will a standing element in knowledge in the way he has done, and treats the representations as accidental or contingent. His qualitatively constant will is an untenable conception, and the standing thing is the self-identical subject, to whom the will belongs. Activity has no content save as belonging to such a concrete subject, of whom it is a manifestation. Talk of complexes and totalities of psychic elements is vain without this being recognised. Nor do I think it admissible—because arbitrary and not true to experience—to regard the manifoldness of the repre-

sentations found in experience, as bound into a unity only through will. This seems to me to indicate some failure to appreciate or realise the unifying force or activity in reason, which does not stand idly by will.

If will is never bare will, never mere activity, but always representing activity, there appears to me no adequate ground for blindly quenching or ignoring any rational elements involved—the unifying power or activity of reason—in order to hypostatise will alone. Intellectual elements are already present with the representations ; thought begins only with these last, not yet with concepts, which arise out of them ; in the original perceptions thought has already found the conditions for its exercise. But I had not meant to do more than make passing reference to empirical-psychological aspects. We must not forget that hypothetical metaphysical conceptions or ground principles must not be applied to, or exchanged with, empirical-psychological abstractions, in the treatment of reality.

But empirical-psychological treatment is not therefore final, or above the need of criticism. For the present it must suffice to remark that the empirical is only a segment, and therefore cannot give us adequate metaphysical knowledge. Metaphysical voluntarism, however, is my main present concern. Analysis of the concepts of the understanding and inquiry into the transcendent ideas, are a special care of metaphysics, whose fundamental principles are immanent in the impulse of human reason to knowledge. Pure will is to Wundt the end of the psychological regress, but pure will is merely an abstraction of metaphysical value in bringing into clear view the

essence of absolute being. To make, in the Wundtian style, the "inner impulses" the source of all need for thought is no satisfactory theory of our mental life or personality; nor do we recognise as will what acts blindly, without reason, or motives, or reflection.

On the other hand, the rationalism which we oppose to one-sided voluntarism is not one in which there is a mere *ens rationis*, but a subject with the characters of concreteness and individuality. The subject must have a content, original and individual, and not independently of external relations, the external world being its necessary correlative; as Wundt says, "a consciousness without objects is an empty abstraction." When the voluntarist tells us the many mighty things wrought by will, he is apt to forget that will essentially implies co-operation of the individual and concrete subject, whereas reason can be conceived without such subjective reference, as capable of being embodied, objectively and universally, in laws or in relational systems standing by themselves.¹ It is not surprising that Mr A. F. Shand should say that "the profoundest introspection will not show us the universal character of will."² But the varied and different types of will need not keep us, for all that, from saying with Ladd that "willing is of essentially one kind."³

To treat of synthesis without an individuality, of spontaneity without an individual subject, in Wundt's fashion, can never be satisfactory in result. The psychic elements and functions owe their efficacy and

¹ Cf. F. de Sarlo, 'Il Concetto dell' Anima nella Psicologia Contemporanea,' pp. 33-34.

² 'Mind,' 1897, p. 325.

³ 'Phil. of Knowledge,' p. 190.

worth to their seat in the real subject, however we may try to abstract them for supposedly scientific purposes. There is no very convincing reason why the treatment should deprive itself of concreteness and lucidity, by trying to dispense with, or ignore, a real subject. Of course, the procedure is intelligible enough, in its desire to avoid older modes of thought in which the soul or subject was viewed too substantially rather than potentially, too much as something given rather than something formed, but the avoidance of wrong ways of regarding the subject does not necessitate vain attempts to eliminate an abiding, self-identical subject as persisting through experience. The facts of unity, coherence, continuity, identity, and evolution, in mental life or personality, are, otherwise, not adequately covered or dealt with. The psychic acts or facts by which we live are not so sufficient unto themselves as Wundt would make it appear, and the reduction of everything to will-activity is far from satisfying.

Dr Stout has made the significant admission that it is "the cognitive side of our character which gives determinate character to the conative." But what we have already seen of the attempt to set out the psychological origin, nature, and growth, of this cognitive side, has been by no means promising or satisfactory, for it has been mainly in terms of that which is not cognition. In the end we are driven pretty much to let cognition certify itself. Not even Wundt's position that the active mental representation or *Vorstellung* is originally identical with the object can be sustained. Cognition would be defeated by the object being so identified with the representing subject.

Wundt says thinking is willing, and so distinguished a thinker as Ladd remarks that this is "admirably" said. But is it so admirable? If the thinking is not a willing *per se*, it seems to me only a needless confusion. One does not deny the presence of a will-element in thinking, but the thinking is still thinking, and is not, so far as it is thought, to be called willing without a misuse of language. At least I am rationalist enough to think so. I am not unmindful, in saying this, that Bradley has said, properly enough, that will and thought are implicated the one with the other;¹ but he has also said, less desirably, that "the same psychical state is indifferently will or thought, according to the side from which you view it."² Surely the facts can have justice done to them without countenancing so many terminological inexactitudes of this sort in psychology as a "science." In no other "science" are clearness and distinction at such a discount. Some exception may even be taken to Hegel's position that will is only thought or intelligence translating itself into existence, on the ground that it overlooks the fact that knowledge is an act, and must be willed. If his theory were true, the entrance of the irrational would not be easily accounted for.

The dependence of will on thought or idea, and the dependence of thought on will, can surely be recognised without blindly identifying them. It is only "to a certain extent," says Bradley, they are essentially one, but they are "not two clear functions in unity," which may be granted; but, granting this partial fusion or identity, their divergence is the thing

¹ 'Appearance and Reality,' p. 474.

² Ibid., p. 468.

that waits for explanation. This Dr Bradley does not attempt, but is content to urge that neither thought nor will is primary and ultimate. What he fails to bring out is the unity of human personality, the unity of consciousness, in which feeling, thinking, and willing are three sufficiently fundamental modes of expression. Ideation may be a process given to consciousness, and thinking a more self-conscious and selective affair, but, though there may be a teleology of thinking, and though will may enter as a moment in the thinking process, yet thinking is still distinctively of the nature of thinking, and not willing or anything else.

There need be no failure to appreciate the part played by the will-element in thinking, which is a discriminating and relating activity, in so maintaining the distinctively rational character of the thinking process, even when it is the "sinewy thought" of stressful life. I reject, in like manner, the position of those who, like Bradley, treat thought as unreal, and make it consist of feeling transformed. Hegel, Leibniz, and certain Neo-Hegelians, all treat feeling as a form of obscure knowledge, but a more discriminating treatment is required. I think they all, and some other writers besides, could have learned something from the fine way in which Augustine distinguished feeling from judging; and from closer study of the conditions of knowledge. Thought is still thought, and not feeling, though they are, of course, inseparably joined in the unity of consciousness or knowledge.

Willing, too, is unique, and not resolvable into thought or feeling. I have declined to run the whole

primary consciousness back into pure will-activity, but in that early stage, though presentation or the knowledge-term was present, intelligence may very well have been so far under the dominating influence of will and feeling elements as not to have attained any real independence. The presentative faculty may well have needed growth and development before cognition came to anything like independence and mastery. The process was a complex one, and must not be too abstractly conceived in the cognitive interest, without due consideration of feeling and volitional factors. But when the distinctively cognitive supremacy was at length gained, the idea or the presentational element took the place of clear control, which rationalism claims for it, over all else. Then is the word of Locke realised,—“The love of knowledge for its own sake is the principal part of human perfection, and the seed-plot of all the virtues.” For this there must, of course, be the will to know. Will-activity I have not taken to be the ultimate thing, for that activity appears to be only a mode of realising some condition of consciousness which is not of the nature of will.

It is in the developed subject that knowing and feeling and willing find their deepest point of unity, or the final ground of their hanging together, however one or the other may have at one time been found predominating. This is the *Gesammt-Ich* or total-ego, a personal unity. There is in such a subject an identity of knowing and willing—I mean, in the unity of consciousness or the personality. And it is, as I have already pointed out, not with the genetic point of view we are really concerned, but with the meta-

physics of consciousness as here and now developed. In this consciousness relation, the voluntarist cannot be allowed to hypostatise the will-element alone, while the rationalist claims to do so for the knowledge-element also, and the primacy indeed of the idea, the perception, is the contention of the latter. For there is certainly something absurd in the idea of volition without any idea on the part of the willer of the end or thing to be willed.

A voluntary act includes, among other things, a volition or determination to bring about a particular result. Even Münsterberg holds an idea of the result to be brought about an essential factor in voluntary action. In volition there is always an idea seeking realisation. Volition is sufficiently complex to require both presentation and feeling. But the transition from idea to realisation is not effected so simply as might be supposed, or without extraneous considerations and connections. And, again, in the case of cognition, no combination of ideating-processes and no theory of ideas, will suffice to yield cognition. The processes are, as I have insisted, all bound up, both in the case of thought and in that of will, in the personal unity of individual life or consciousness. But in the complex called consciousness, the primacy of the idea is, to rationalism, to be maintained, for to it belongs the power of initiative, but this primacy of intelligence is not exercised without mediation of the feeling and willing factors. For a purely thinking consciousness would be an utter unreality and abstraction.

The relations of thinking and willing with which I have just been dealing belong to consciousness itself,

which latter admits of no explanation that does not presuppose that very consciousness. The inner connection of the various contents of consciousness is indubitable. But the synthesis of elements which goes to form consciousness or personality is one which has never yet been explained. This conception of personality is of central importance for psychology, and calls for more explicit recognition than Bradley has given to it. For what we plainly are called to do is to give more rational character to the relation of the single elements—even the non-intellectual ones—whereof it is composed. And to the thought or knowledge element this task of imparting greater rationality is difficult enough, for it is involved in being itself, which is also in process of becoming. Cognition is not the passive thing which it is sometimes represented to be, in the interest of the conative-affective states; consciousness is an activity, and a producing one too, so far at least as the sense-qualities of objects are concerned.

As Höffding, in dealing with the "Problems of Philosophy," has said, "it is a strange contradiction in the grand rationalistic systems, that, although they may be able to explain everything else, yet they are powerless to explain the striving labouring nature of the thought which produces them." And should it be, as he remarks later, that "the empire of Being may be much vaster than the possibilities of our experience," the limitations to our complete rationality of view come into sight. For all that, it is the business of reason or the speculative activity to follow on to the furthest limits possible, so that thought and being may grow always more approximately one. In doing

so, thought must not be regarded as a purely subjective activity, or isolated from its objects and their relations. For, as Riehl has observed, in these objective relations "there must be something analogous to the activity of thought, something corresponding to the form of this activity, else this activity could not arise."¹

I am an ideating self and a willing self, but I am a willing self because, and after, I am an ideating self: the connection, however, may be as swift and intimate as you please. But my ideas are certainly present, as rationalism contends, before they are actualised by will. They do not wait on will demand, as voluntarism contends. Nor is their actualisation a pure matter of idea and accordant volition, for being, other than the idea or the volition, is involved in the actualisation, as Ladd has clearly shown.² From all which it will be seen that for me cognition, and not conation, is the central, or most distinctive, feature of mind. Conation is not fundamental to cognition.

In the light of all I have advanced, the view of Wundt—adopted by Külpe—which regards apperception and will as ultimately one and the same function, is not at all satisfying. Needlessly complicated, it is too emotional, the feelings being the spring of action and not the representation, and all the processes which are made up of feelings being taken to arise from volition as fundamental fact. Wundt says it is impossible to find out how a volition proceeds in any other way than by following it exactly as it is presented to us in immediate experience. I

¹ 'Science and Metaphysics,' ed. by A. Fairbanks, p. 306.

² 'Theory of Reality,' pp. 482, 483.

entirely agree, and it is on this precise ground that I reject his theory of it.

It is not surprising that Rehmke should have felt dissatisfied with the uses made of the term *Vorstellung* in voluntaristic discussions. At one time you may find it stand for something given; at another time it means an inner activity or event; in another instance it will serve for an image in us; it does duty for the represented, but again for the representing; now it is superfluously styled conscious, and now it is, in self-contradictory fashion, termed unconscious. And the apparently simple and easy theory of a blind, dull, senseless will which is supposed in voluntarism to have first borne sway, and worked its way in the world up to self-consciousness, is by no means either easy or accountable, for how this unconscious comes to consciousness is never satisfactorily explained, at least in the higher spheres of spirit, even when we allow for unconscious occurrences in nature. It has been vainly attempted to explain consciousness as only the passive product of unconscious actions, without taking any proper account of the reason immanent in the process.

There is no sure footing for our deepest experience in feeling; we need valid ideas—ideas not dissociate from reality. Feeling has need of idea, which, however, must not get divorced from feeling, of which it is meant to be the guide. But reason is not the mere adventitious thing which voluntarists like Schopenhauer would make it, waiting on the bidding of will. Reason is to be regarded as intellectual rather than conative; it is concerned with axiomatic truths or the fundamental ideas, principles, norms, or laws

of reason. Reason, emancipating itself from the toils of the imperfection of the empirical, finds the reason immanent in all the world; discovers universally valid principles and measures for its metaphysical constructions; and, in its splendid native impulse to unity, builds up, out of necessity itself, an absolute unity—a unity of reality and idea. Reason is utterly underestimated or misconceived when it is reduced by such voluntarism to a merely pragmatist attendance on will and practical needs. Will, when divested by Schopenhauer's voluntarism of the element of knowledge, is utterly abstract and unreal.

But, of course, rationalism by itself does not suffice to give a rounded whole in our view of reality, and, in claiming primacy for intelligence, it is not meant that due consideration is not also to be given to will and feeling factors. Man is not reason alone, however disinterested, any more than he is will alone or feeling alone. But in freeing reason from non-rational factors, we must take an organic conception of man in his truth-seeking capacities and powers, and give will and feeling values their due place. This can be done, without forgetting that these values are stamped with relativity and subjectivity. This will keep us from falling into the modern snare of undervaluing the truth or reality values so dear to reason. Nothing will be exempt from the sway and scrutiny of reason, but truth will be sought with the whole man, feeling and will co-operating toward the vital and concrete results of the quest.

But this reckoning with the non-intellectual factors does not suffice, in our view of the meaning or philosophy of life, for we must go on to a world-view,

infinite in its reaches beyond our own world of reason. And if the will and feeling facts and values import pluralistic tendency and direction as against the monistic tendency of reason, justice may yet be done these former elements or factors, in our system of thought, while the constructive power and activity of reason systematically builds up its final or ultimate monistic issue.

It can, of course, be said that under this monistic sway of reason, justice to facts and values may not be done, but it is just the task of infinitely patient constructive reason to see that justice is done. The thing is to see that reason remain living, concrete, and grow not rigid, abstract, and unreal. Such reason will advance the realisation of the normative ideals, but not in merely formal fashion, without comprehending the foundations of the empiric world. Facts and values must not be distorted or wrenched but properly articulated in the system, while not allowed, in recalcitrant fashion, to defeat or impede a final unity of reason or of system.

Although not primarily concerned with psychological developments, but rather with the experience of the developed consciousness, I have yet noticed some of the more extreme and insupportable contentions of psychological voluntarism. There are not only forms of pragmatic relativism, but those psychological theories that treat value as more fundamental than truth. And there is the religious voluntarism which says that it depends on the will, whether we can know the truth. Of course, in knowing, we must have the will to know. But the truth does not depend on our will, only our knowledge of it does, and this

latter must fulfil the conditions of all knowing. I shall add yet another example of the somewhat overdone emphasis and over-dogmatic tone of such presentations, as exemplified by Prof. J. H. Leuba.¹ He says, "Aristotle characterised man as *thinking-desire*." What Aristotle did was to make the exercise of reason the chief good, with desire as moving power towards it. But the fine things uttered by Aristotle touching intellect and reason—reason in its rule of desire and passion—apparently do not exist for the voluntarist. "Will without intelligence may be possible," Leuba says; rationalists deny it is anything of the sort. It would not then properly be will. And the converse is much more conceivable—if that were of any consequence—as Meumann and others have contended.

Leuba takes the usual voluntaristic pleasure in minimising thought, reason, and intellect. "The function of intelligence" is reduced by Leuba to the "gratifying" of "desires, needs, cravings," a not very exalted rôle. All spontaneity of thought, all finely disinterested reason, are swept away in this crude subservience to desire. "Thought does not exist for itself; it is the instrument of desire." "We think because we will." It is scarcely to be wondered at that the rationalist finds little satisfaction in these modes of indulging in the humiliation or degradation of reason, the highest, divinest thing in man. But it reacts in lowering the psychological system itself, which seeks to effect such reduction. To-day is the day of feeling, striving, impulse, passion, but under the serener light of a new day, the due balance of

¹ In 'The American Journal of Religious Psychology,' 1907, p. 309.

reason, and logic, and conceptual thought, will be recovered.

I have run intelligence and will back into unity or harmony within the human consciousness—into the unity of personality. And from this, and what we have seen of the impulse of reason for unity, we may say that the constitution of the mind “predisposes man for monism.”¹ My own results lead me finally to a spiritual monism, in which spiritual reason is for me the ultimate principle. One finds a correlation of subject and object, of “I” and “not-I,” of soul and body, of consciousness and existence, of nature and spirit, of God and the world, but we cannot rest in the end without running these back, under causal points of view where necessary, into some principle or power that embraces them all, and inwardly binds them all together. For though we may have a relative dualism and individualism—which, though relative, does not contemplate anything of the nature of blank absorption—yet is the impulse of reason for unity never satisfied short of an all-unity such as I find in the Absolute and Eternal Reason. For monism is the last word in philosophy, and such a spiritual monistic principle is for me *fons et origo* of the universe, with dualisms and correlations finally grounded in it as fundamental principle. But that World-Reason has effectiveness, for it is also World-Will, and is indeed the unity of the Ideal and the Real.

¹ P. Carus, ‘Fundamental Problems,’ p. 21.

CHAPTER V.

THE ONTOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS.

THE ontological consciousness is an intangible reality, yet one on whose needs and activities both philosophy and religion very largely depend. The ontological sense has been very richly but varyingly displayed, alike in the history of philosophy and of religion. The ontological truth of things is one and indivisible, is necessary and eternal. The ontological truth of reality is not made by the mind, but only apprehended by it. "That which the intellect conceives as most known," said Aquinas, "and into which it resolves all its concepts, is Being." That is so for the reason, to put the matter somewhat differently, that in the analysis of our concepts, the most universal idea at which we arrive, is that of Being. Being and its modes are ultimate in philosophy. Being is the *prius* of all things, even of our perceiving. Nothing exists outside Being, but Being itself cannot but be. Yet the study of being, out of knowing, would be vain. Whatever is real must be held as being ontologically true. Ontological truth must thus be held as one with real being. Ontologically, reality is not a thing of degrees : a thing, a person, an outer

world, exists, or it does not exist. There is no *tertium* in the matter. But there are degrees in our apprehension of it, though not of its objective reality. With philosophic doctrine about degrees of reality, on other grounds, or from other points of view, such as degrees of perfection in reality, I am not here concerned.

May we not say that the ontological consciousness is the feeling for reality, as divined by, and intuitively present to, the mind? It applies to all reality, even that which is highest and most intangible. Everywhere we meet reality—reality not ourselves, reality living and concrete. *Non scholæ sed vitæ discimus*, is a saying of Seneca which may be applied to this great matter. Just as there is this being-consciousness, so, I remark in passing, there is truth-consciousness—a feeling of projection not to be interpreted in terms of subjective feeling. When we hold something for true, truth-consciousness there must be. It is a demand of thought. Being, as universal, is before us, and is not simply abstracted by us. Neither mere historicism, nor mere psychologism, will here suffice. If history is a development of spirit, clearly history alone is insufficient. And the metaphysical side of psychology also has been left in stark neglect. When we ask what lies at the base of religion, we are at last compelled to admit that it is a relation to a transcendent power or reality behind all appearances or phenomena. This super-reality constitutes a conditioning metaphysical kernel or essence for religion, and cannot be safely or wisely ignored by religious thought or experience. The knowledge of it is not a psychological but a speculative matter, as pertaining

to the question of a metaphysical relation. In virtue of his religious consciousness, man knows God to be in himself, and himself in God. This represents in consciousness a metaphysical relation between God and the "I." Thus the metaphysical value of the religious consciousness must be recognised. It is, of course, not at all implied that the essence of religion consists in knowledge alone, but only that the involved metaphysical relation is matter of speculative knowledge and insight. The subject is, however, of religious importance no less than philosophical. "A non-metaphysical religious being," it has been truly said, "is an absurdity, a contradiction in terms." For, "without the metaphysical instinct, and the conclusions and postulated truths at which the mind of man arrives by impulsion from this instinct, there could be no form of religion whatever."¹ The reality of the self or ego is one of the metaphysical pre-suppositions of religion. Without such a relatively independent self or ego, religion is a futility.

Metaphysics, ontology, is concerned with what *is* : with what lies behind experienceable reality ; because God *is*, our moral and religious obligations exist towards Him. Ontology makes Being ultimate ; it makes Being first, and last, and midst, and without end ; it makes Being base and bottom of all thought and of all existence. Being, Absolute and Unconditioned, is the ground of all possible experience. It is the most fundamental thing in human experience. The soul that lives and moves and has its conscious being in God has an ontological consciousness all its own. In our consciousness of self and of objective

¹ G. T. Ladd, 'Phil. of Religion,' vol. i. p. 47.

nature, we have a knowledge, an ontological sense, of being or real existence. Nothing is more natural, and nothing more spontaneous, than such ontological consciousness. And there is no more universal knowledge than such metaphysical knowledge, for in the whole range of experience we are always in contact with metaphysical reality. All our knowledge is shot through with ontological inference and ontological judgment, whether we heed the amazingly interesting fact or not. Our necessary rational thought rises at last to the ontological necessity of self-existent and eternal Being. The knowledge of God is given to, or in, consciousness by means of our spiritual perceptions. What is fundamental to any consciousness we may have of God is the consciousness of His absolute Being. Our consciousness of Him must be allowed ontological significance, and not treated as a mere consciousness of our own state. Our consciousness of God is not simply our own self-consciousness, any more than our consciousness of a crystal or a cucumber or a coolie is merely our own self-consciousness. Our consciousness of God is no more merely subjective, than our knowledge of Nature is a mere subjective certainty. The God Whom we know is prior to, and independent of, our apprehension of Him. There is objective truth in our consciousness of God—a unity of being and consciousness—not less truly than in these other cases. For though we hold God to be supremely immanent in man, He is yet distinct from man, posits His own difference from man, so that an indistinguishable sameness is no feature of the case. The objective existence of God, therefore, ought to be as real to us as the objective

existence of the human beings that surround us. It is the consciousness of Him, as of all real objective existence, that now concerns us. That consciousness constitutes for us here the "ontological consciousness," a quality of singularly variant strength in different persons over broad tracts of history and experience. In whatever ways we come to know God, we have a metaphysical value of conviction as to His Being, as real. For, in the endeavour to perfect our personality in God, "it is the metaphysic, herein implied, of Absolute Personality, which directly, or indirectly, permeates our whole world, and gives to the thought of freedom, of personality, of the autonomous self, a metaphysical background, which has its influence even when it is contested or denied."¹ It seems to me good and needful to emphasise, in the manner already exemplified, metaphysical or ontological aspects so generally overlooked by Protestant thinkers in particular.

All this is much more natural in the religious sphere than might at first sight appear. There have been great writers on æsthetics (J. Volkelt, for example) who have found the fundamental principle of æsthetics in an immediate and intuitive certainty of something trans-subjective, over-experienceable, metaphysical, and who have claimed a metaphysic of æsthetics as expressly as a metaphysic of religion. Æsthetics, with its ideals of unity and of wholeness, must, equally

¹ E. Troeltsch, 'Protestantism and Progress,' p. 36. Not here alone, but in other works, has Troeltsch finely emphasised the metaphysical and ontological character of religion. This has also been effectively done in A. Dorner's very comprehensive work, 'Die Metaphysik des Christentums.'

with religion, have ontological grounding in the idea of absolute being. Bergson has spoken of such "metaphysical intuition" as may be supposed to be here involved, but he has left it imperfectly defined, and without setting out its metaphysical character. He tells us that "metaphysical intuition" deepens and amplifies perception, but without saying in what manner. Of course, Bergson thinks we shall know reality better if we enter into it, or better still, coincide with it, or *be* it, but that would mean the destruction of ontological knowledge, an issue which philosophy does not contemplate. For there can be no relation of knowledge in absolute identity. We may, however, so far become one with reality, as he desiderates, as to know "what constitutes its essence," by a kind of "intellectual sympathy." In the religious sphere, this metaphysical intuition is concerned with the transcendent actuality which we call God or the Absolute, Who, as absolute Spirit or self-conscious personal Being, is the demand of the religious consciousness. The religious consciousness does not stand by itself. It is consciousness of Something other and higher than itself. The soul itself is, in its unity, a developing real, but, as such, it is still a potency that finds, as a partaker of the Divine nature, its infinite actuality in God. As Rosmini said (in his 'Teodicea'), "the essence of being, fully realised, is God."

In a subject so largely undeveloped as the present, it seems eminently desirable to illustrate the presence and working of the ontological sense or consciousness by means of historical examples, after which we shall be in a better position to discuss the worth and value

of such ontological consciousness. The examples can only be illustrative, not exhaustive, for I cannot here overtake many ontologies of interest, such as those of Wolff and others, including those of Tongiorgi and other Scholastic philosophers, before and after. But not many of them yield anything helpful towards the doctrine of the ontological consciousness. Its rise was slow. "Plato," we are told, "brought the idea of God into philosophy for the first time." Plato himself says that "to find the Maker and Father of this universe is a hard task" ('Tim.' 28 c.). But it is significant, for my present purpose, that in the 'Parmenides' all consciousness is taken to have a positive content, to have Being of some kind as its object.¹ Plato's ontological sense is evidenced in his rating ontology as the highest kind of knowledge; in his finding the One in the Many; and in his ever-present consciousness of immortality.

The ontological sense of Aristotle is evidenced in the place which he gives to ontology in his discussions in the 'Metaphysics.' There is for him a science of Being as Being, in a sense from which Locke and Dugald Stewart might have learned more than they did. Existence is, for him, never separate from knowledge; that is to say, things in actual existence are identical with the knowledge of them. He is able to speak of the "constructive reason" in us which "creates all things" ('De Anima,' III. 5-7). God is to him eternal, perfect Being, but His relations are too purely deistic.

In Augustine, the ontological consciousness is finely developed. The timeless and spaceless character of

¹ Cf. S. H. Hodgson, 'Some Cardinal Points in Knowledge,' p. 57.

God, and the soul's relations to Him, are expressively brought out. In the 'Confessions,' Augustine asks: "What place is there within me, whither my God can come?" (I. 2). "I would not exist at all, unless Thou wert already within me" (I. 2). "Thou wast never a place, and yet we have receded from Thee; we have drawn near to Thee, and yet Thou wast never a place" (X. 26). And so in the question of time likewise. "Thou predest all past times by the height of Thine ever-present eternity; and Thou exceedest all future times, since these are future, and, once they have come, will be past times" (XI. 13. 2). "Thy to-day is eternity," he continues. In the 'City of God' (XI.), the fine ontological consciousness of Augustine is seen when he says: "For we both are, and know that we are, and delight in our being, and our knowledge of it." But what a deep ontology of knowledge there is in Augustine is not revealed except to careful study. The validity of our knowledge he runs back ultimately to God Himself, but not without careful explication of the part played by our own mental activity. And, on the existence of the self, he says in his work 'On the Trinity': "For it is eternal to the soul to live; it is eternal to know that it lives." His ontological consciousness is again seen, when he argues from the existence of doubt to the existence of the doubter. "Seeing that even if he doubts, he lives; if he doubts, he remembers why he doubts; if he doubts, he understands that he doubts; if he doubts, he wishes to be certain; if he doubts, he thinks; if he doubts, he knows that he does not know; if he doubts, he judges that he ought not to assent rashly.

Whosoever, therefore, doubts about anything else, ought not to doubt of all these things; which, if they were not, he would not be able to doubt of anything.”¹ In keeping with all this, he can say that “in Christ, immortality is no longer a hope but a fact” (*res*).

The ontological sense was highly developed in Plotinus, especially in respect of the Being of God as transcendent, spaceless, timeless. He is Absolute Being raised above all oppositions. There is lack of emphasis on those qualities or attributes that lead to the movement of God or the One towards man. But the soul's true self was to be found in the ever-present God. That primal One is everywhere and nowhere ('Enn.' III. 9, 3). It is infinite and self-sufficing, and all beings are from it ('Enn.' VI.). Its reality is unique, and predicates are not permissible concerning it, save to indicate its unique power to dispense with predicates, even those of being and goodness and freedom. The ontological consciousness of Plotinus was marked to the end, for he died striving, so he said, to bring the Divine within him into harmony with the Divine in the universe. The same ontological sense is seen in Proclus, whose thought places the First One above or “on the other side” of Being. Proclus deals strongly, in his ‘Theological Elements,’ with the ontology of intellect. His is a very ontological idea of the Good.² In Pseudo-Dionysius, “the super-essential” Deity is raised above all things essential, and His unity is set “above

¹ ‘De Trinitate,’ X.

² Cf. my Article on “Le Système de Proclus” in the ‘Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale,’ September 1921, pp. 500-504.

the minds," in the same highly abstractive fashion as in Proclus. "The theologians say, that God, the Being Who is very being, the Being above all, is like to no one. But He gives likeness to them who turn with all their power to Him Who is above all definition and reason" ('De Div. Nom.' c. IX). The influence of Proclus is everywhere marked on Pseudo-Dionysius, though he has elements beyond the former. To Boëthius we owe the most elaborate exposition of the doctrine of Eternity, as "the complete and perfect possession of unlimited life all at once"; and this, he thinks, "will reveal to us the Divine Nature and the Divine knowledge at the same time."

The strong ontological consciousness of Anselm is seen in the 'Proslogion' itself, without speaking of the ontological argument, associated primarily with his name, as having given the first, but inadequate, formulation of it. In the 'Proslogion' (c. 14) he says: "Thou wast seeking God, thou hast found Him to be something supreme over all, than which nothing more excellent can be conceived; that this is life itself, light, wisdom, goodness, eternal blessedness and blessed eternity; and that this is everywhere and always." This was in close connection with the ontological argument itself, a fact too often forgotten. Again (c. 15), he says: "Not only art Thou that than which no greater can be conceived, but Thy greatness transcends all conception." Aquinas, in his 'Summa,' held that "God is man's beatitude" (I. 2. 1). God is the "Principle and Cause" of the creature, and in Him "the perfections of all things pre-exist" in excellent manner. Therefore, we must seek to know *what* He is. For, "there is the appetite

to know and love God, that is formed in our nature" ('Summa,' I. 93, 1). God is the necessary Being ('Contra Gent.' I. c. 15, c. 22). His is a bold ontology, dealing with the Divine attributes and relations in full and unshrinking manner, it seems but fair to say.

Eckhart gives fuller expression to much that was characteristic of Neo-Platonism. But he got beyond its unity that was above being. For Eckhart, God and Being are one and the same. But in a rather audacious manner he made God the sole existence, and was apt to regard the creature's existence as being of God's own existence, with which the human soul was in most intimate union. Indeed, the interiority of the mystical life has never been more energetically affirmed than by Eckhart. He stood strongly for reason, which his ontological consciousness held to penetrate the Divine Being, prior to all considerations of the attributes of that Being. He held being and cognition to be one. His ontological consciousness led him to the position that man's blessedness is not because God *is* so near, but because man *knows* how near He is. Eckhart is, however, defective in historic sense.¹ The ontological sense of Descartes led him, like Augustine, to argue that even doubt and deception necessitate our existence. But Descartes is the more methodic and systematic. They both used the self, however, as their philosophic basis. Descartes, in the cardinal principle of his philosophy, put forward the immediate implication of self-knowing in self-consciousness. Thus did he recognise being

¹ The latest Article on the philosophy of Eckhart is by M. de Wulf in the 'Revue Néo-Scolastique,' November 1921.

as known, but he was more than inclined to rank being or *esse* after *cogitare*. In his second 'Meditation,' Descartes laid it down that the metaphysical existence of the soul is the first necessary truth, taking more care in the manner of his doing so than he has often got credit for. In his third and fifth 'Meditations,' he gave the God-concept metaphysical value, and made famous formulation of the ontological "proof" of the Being of God. Descartes once wrote that "truth consists in Being," but he was apt to lay greater emphasis on certitude than on truth.

The ontological sense cannot be denied to Malebranche, despite any pantheistic tendencies or errors. God was to him "*the Being*"—the source of all being: He contains in Himself all thoughts and all things. Says Malebranche: "His true name is, *He that is*; or, in other words, Being without restriction, All-Being, Being infinite and universal, and wellspring of the actual and possible." That is a form of the ontological consciousness which it is not difficult, I think, to develop; it calls for differentiation, as we shall see in Schelling also. "*Nous voyons toutes choses en Dieu*," says Malebranche—"we see all things in God." To know the truth is, in his view, to see God. Immediate objects are ideas in the one all-embracing Mind. A true doctrine of the ontological consciousness does not involve or sanction the ontologism or direct intuition of God advocated by Malebranche. For we must ontologise in the right place and way, and not claim the natural, direct, and effortless apprehension and consciousness of God which ontologism postulates. The ontological sense was not lacking in Montesquieu, who shows it especially in his warm

espousal of the immortality of the soul. Says he : " I delight in believing that I am immortal as God Himself. Independently of revelation, metaphysics gives me a very strong hope of my eternal happiness, which I would not willingly renounce." Metaphysics had apparently done more for him than it has for many modern writers on the idea of immortality. The ontological sense of Leibniz is seen in the fact that Being is central in his system. The materials for his system were drawn from the sciences of the real. True being was for him ontological : it was metaphysical being, in the sense of activity, force, substance. Being was realised in his monadistic system.¹

The ontological sense was strong in Fichte, but not without contradictoriness and subjectivist limitations. Being or *esse* was *willed*. In him, it depended at times on religion rather than philosophy, especially in his later period. For he came at length, as in the *Anweisung*, to set being before becoming, and to give God due place above the creatures in their striving. In it he says : " There are not many beings, but only One Being." Even the Moral Order is for him invested with objective significance. Fichte came to hold that " the metaphysical only, and not the historical, can give us blessedness." It is Fichte, also, who, in a remarkable passage, said : " From the beginning of the world down to the present day, religion, whatever form it may have assumed, has been essentially metaphysic ; and he who despises and derides metaphysic—that is, everything *à priori*—either knows not what he does, or else he despises

¹ See more fully my Article, " Leibniz on Truth and Being," in 'The Monist,' October 1921.

and derides religion." Fichte's ontological consciousness enabled him to say: "I comprehend Thee not, yet in Thee I comprehend myself and the world"; and again, that "the true life lives in the eternal. It is a whole in every instant, the highest life which is possible at all." Surprising is the ontological consciousness which in Schleiermacher ('Reden,' No. 2) asks—"What is all science if not the Being of things in you, in your reason? What is all art and culture if not your Being in the things to which you give measure, form, and order? And how can both come to life in you, except in so far as there lives immediately in you the eternal unity of Reason and Nature, the universal Being of all finite things in the Infinite?"

Ontological consciousness is as marked in Hegel, as is its grave lack in Kant, whose thought was subjective and sceptical. Hegel, however, poured contempt, in an unfortunate manner, on pure being, as he conceived it, and laid himself open to criticism. But a mere being, without further thought-content, is an impossible, *i.e.*, untenable, conception. But the beginning, for Hegel, lies in the Real. "The Real is the rational." The Ground of the Whole is, for him, base and bottom. I am not now concerned with defects in his outworking but only with the human approach to the Ultimate Reality and Absolute Truth through the ontological sense. "The character of positive religion is," he says, "that its truths *are*, without our knowing whence or how they have come," etc. His ontological sense was also evinced in his support of the ontological argument as against Kant, only he overdid the matter in one or two respects. But it cannot be said that his ontology was of so

complete a character, in all respects, as it might have been. To Schelling I shall refer later.

The ontological sense is displayed in Krause, who flees the abstractness of Hegel, and takes the Divine essence as living and personal World-Ground, from which all things are derivable. God is to him the First Being, the one infinite and unconditioned Reason, having a self-inwardness that is infinite and unconditioned, in the selfness and wholeness of His Being. Our thought of God is already based in Him, as prior to our thought of Him, in Whom our very ego is wholly grounded. Krause's philosophical doctrine of the Divine Being has been more significant for subsequent philosophical development in many countries than has been at all adequately realised.

Ontological consciousness is also undoubted in Rosmini, who derived all our ideas from the idea of being. He held that being is essentially determined, and, when undetermined, is so much the less being. Even indeterminate being, Rosmini held, is still something, for the reason that it is still being, is an object of thought, and has within it virtually all determinations. No one has so well as Rosmini insisted that being is by itself intelligible; that it is essential to the forming of all other ideas; to our power of thinking; and that from it other concepts borrow their intelligibility. Varisco, in our own time, evinces strong ontological consciousness, not without influences from Rosmini and Bonatelli.¹ To Varisco, being

¹ Bonatelli deals with the phenomena of consciousness in clear and precise form, and for him there is always a truth of some sort which is not the creation of the subject which affirms it. See his 'La Coscienza e il Meccanesimo Interiore,' pp. 26-81.

is, "in the truest sense of the word, and without any equivocation, God." ¹

The ontological sense is by no means confined to great metaphysicians and marked religionists, but is exemplified in poets like Coleridge, Wordsworth, Browning, Tennyson, Goethe, Hugo. The mountains, the valleys, and the resplendent rivers, they had in consciousness made their own; but more, the Being of God and of the soul stood out as real to their ontological consciousness. The last named had a philosophy of his own, and, while making himself responsible at times for pantheistic passages, maintained an unwavering faith in the personality of God. He strongly held to responsibility and immortality, and in connection with the latter belief showed his strong ontological sense when, in the '*Légende des Siècles*,' he said: "I want to be free here below, responsible elsewhere—I am more than a stalk of grass or a grain of sand—I feel I am, for all eternity, thinking, winged, living." The consciousness within himself of the future life as a certainty was very strong in Hugo, who believed his work was only begun, and who found in this craving for the infinite a demonstration that there is a real infinity. With all his contradictions and exaggerations, Hugo's belief in, and passionate quest of, God, begat in him the ontological consciousness of which I have spoken. The strength of the ontological consciousness in Goethe, and in all of them, was drawn direct from the breasts of reality.

Now, if the ontological consciousness is concerned with being or reality, its developed sense must surely

¹ See his '*I Massimi Problemi*' and '*Conosci Te Stesso*.'

be a precious and important possession, one that must greatly enhance our personal power and value. The feeling or instinct for being or reality is in some degree present in all men, and reality offers itself to the insight, knowledge, and consciousness of all men. Reality, as given, simply *is*, and our metaphysical function is not merely to think, but to know. To understand being is the function of knowledge. Our world-consciousness means that we have to do with the category of being at every turn. And our world-consciousness has an essential part to play in the highest life of man. It would be strange if we had no ontological consciousness of Nature, as she holds us ever locked in her clasp. I have not here been primarily concerned with the ontological sense in respect of nature reality, but of those higher reaches which concern the Divine Being and our own existence. I say, our own existence, for in all our modern talk of personality, we cannot escape the need to determine what spirit or what soul really is. But our prime concern here with the soul or self is, that it *is*. If we affirm being of the phenomenal, we must *à fortiori* affirm being of the self-identical, functioning ego which makes all knowledge possible, and is, as such, a unity. The one thing which it is impossible for normal man not to know is that he is a soul or self. That self-conscious, self-determining being or essence which we call the spirit or the personality—they need not be distinguished for the present—is matter of prime concern to the ontological consciousness. The soul's unity, as that of an unified concentrated power or magnitude, is one which is a living, active principle, rich in contentual activity. So rich

indeed that, small as the soul may seem to be, the universe yet reports itself to it, and reflects itself in it. Being the soul or self has, and how much more than bare being the philosophy of values is concerned to inquire. With its theory of values I am not here concerned, but only with the religious-metaphysical foundations which underlie it. But the soul is an active force, a unity of the manifold ; not something *fertig* or ready-made ; but rather raised or reared out of potential circumstance or condition by its own deed. But the soul cannot hold itself to be self-conscious reality save on the supposition of the Existence of God. In no other way can experience, *qua* religious experience, escape the suspicion of illusion, for the religious man does not hold, as some do, the soul to be a substance existing in its own right. The truth is, it is his God-consciousness which the religious man feels to be the last and truest ground and guarantee of his self-consciousness. And this God-consciousness may become a fuller, richer, vaster thing than is almost ever realised. The metaphysical grounding of religion lies primarily in the relation of the finite consciousness to this transcendent Other. He is the transcendent Real in relation to our actual consciousness. For the real is not simply our actual experience-content ; that is but a segment of reality in whole ; the real embraces also possible experience-content. There exists nothing which is not a possible object of experience, for everything can come within the range of consciousness, so far as its finite form extends. Our modes of consciousness are, in their complex unity, modes of the external world. Therein lies the infinite scope of the ontological consciousness.

For the empire of Being must surely be held to exceed in vastness the possibilities of our finite experience. Being is the first, and largest, and most sure of all facts, and one which every mind can conceive. "All consciousness reveals Being." Being is simply the universalised concept of existent facts or real concepts. The real is Being in manifestation, and, as such, its inner nature may be known. For Being is in its essence such that it is intelligible to us—a great significant fact. Experience is the correlate of such reality. And the real is, in the last result, spiritual.

It is not possible to evade the fact that a metaphysical knowledge of God and His relation to man and the world is involved in the Christian religion. In such knowledge God is revealed, and is the object of our knowledge. That knowledge has necessary, real, and living content, whereby the God-consciousness is developed in us. It is this hold of the reality of the object—the reality of God—that is the crowning concern of the ontological consciousness; and the ontological consciousness has been truly said to have "an important influence on the religious evolution of humanity." To say that the religious consciousness carries with or in it no metaphysical implications of the Being or reality of God, is entirely to fail to apprehend the facts of the case, which is one of fundamental importance for a real philosophy of religion. It would be absurd and intolerable that the religious consciousness should not be allowed to recognise, in its own development, those ontological implications and values which connect it with the most real Being in the universe. For the ontological

postulate or demand is even more essential to religion than it is to science. The related psychological analysis is, of course, to be duly recognised ; it has been so abundantly, and does not concern us *hic et nunc*. Psychological process is not metaphysical content, it is still necessary to point out. Religion, with all its aims and values for human life and action, already exists, and in nowise waits upon metaphysics. What the ontological consciousness concerns itself with is, the metaphysical foundations that underlie religion, and the ontological presuppositions, convictions, and values, involved in its apprehensions and conceptions of the supersensible Reality or Supreme Otherness. The ontological consciousness presumes the presence of a transcendent object, in the sense at least that there is an objective element given in consciousness. This objectivity is, in the highest instance, nothing but the Divine Being as transcendent object of our God-consciousness. It cannot be too plainly said that no religion, however ethical it may claim to be, is secured in any part of it—not even in its hope of immortality—against the illusory or merely provisory, so long as such metaphysical bases have not been found, and such an ontological scrutiny has not been made. Take the belief in immortality. It has been truly said that “ a recognition of the activity and validity of the ontological consciousness is indispensable, if the causes of this belief are to be converted into reasons or rational arguments in its defence. That objective and constitutive action of the mind of man which endows the self and things with their *real being* is at the base of the belief in the immortality of the

self as truly as it is at the base of all scientific and religious beliefs.”¹ And the truth is, that the metaphysical implications and values of immortality are every whit as real and necessary, albeit not so easily separated or stated by themselves, as the ethical implications and values. For every ethic stands rooted in, and supported by, metaphysics.² What respect does any ethics that is without metaphysics deserve?

Knowledge may in religion remain for ever incomplete, but it must always be of reality, as trans-subjectively real. The reality of the object is a primal presupposition or demand here, and this accords precisely with the demand of the ontological consciousness. This, although religion and metaphysics have their own separate interests. We have no right to rest content without the real in religion, any more than men are content without reaching the real in every other realm or sphere. All religion is penetrated with personality and individuality, and here again such a condition of things cannot be satisfactorily regarded save as rooted in metaphysic. I have shewn that metaphysic is, in its own manner and degree, of the essence of religion; for our ethical and religious values the metaphysical values and supports must be found. But that is not to say—and let the fact be carefully noted—that the metaphysical entities involved exist as such, or *per se*; they are not, be it observed, identical with the reality of factual existence; they are the *prius*, so to speak, in which are embedded the ethical and the religious, which, however, first greet us in their vital warmth.

¹ C. T. Ladd, *op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 182.

² Cf. my Article on “The Metaphysical Aspects of Immortality” in the ‘Holborn Review,’ April 1921.

But let there be no mistake. The ontological consciousness, too, in its relatedness to the realities of the Divine and human existences, is suffused with a warm enough glow—the glow of the whole soul's hold upon, and contact with, vital reality; and the ontological sense is surely not rare which feels at one with Wordsworth's sense sublime of something "far more deeply interfused," as the Ultimate Reality of nature and of human life. There is a certain developed ontological consciousness in Schelling's saying "that in God alone is being, and that, therefore, all being is only the Being of God—this thought neither reason nor feeling can take away; it is the supreme thought, in unison with which all hearts vibrate." But this monistic conception of being cannot here be for us a satisfying one; for if we are simply to say that God is all in all, there remains no more to be said, and thought is not advanced. But the call for differentiation of being is too insistent for that, and it is in the differentiated forms in which this Ultimate Being is manifested that the ontological consciousness has its vast scope and free play. A more critical monism must recognise the deeper aspects and multiplex possibilities of the problem of being. And indeed Schelling himself did much in that direction, making the Divine potencies arrive in result at relative independence and lordship of being, although in us running back to a higher unity. Hence we must have the real apprehension of being, not the mere *Begriff* or notion of being. It is an experience, not a mere conception or theory, and it involves more than the senses and the logical understanding. For, as Seneca said of God, "*tecum est, intus est.*" This God-consciousness belongs to the

historical God-consciousness, which has arisen out of aprioristic possibilities. The objective side of these—for Kant was wrong in thinking everything aprioristic is merely subjective—is in God, Who is Himself the objective principle of the consciousness. Being is thus borne into me, as basis of all actuality. The finite being sublates, but does not thereby cancel, his personality into the Universal Personality, which is God, in its consciousness of the Infinite and its relations thereto. That Primal and Infinite Being, which is the ground of all other being, ought to be, to my ontological consciousness, more real than the leaves that fall in autumn or the buds that burst in spring. I am far from alone in that conviction. Royce, for example, says “that while the whole finite world is full of dark problems for us, there is absolutely nothing, not even the immediate facts of our sense at this moment, so clear, so certain, as the existence and the unity of that infinite conscious Self, of Whom we have now heard so much.” “There is nothing in the Universe absolutely sure except the Infinite.”¹ “My reason for believing that there is one absolute World-Self,” he goes on to say, “is simply that the profoundest agnosticism which you can possibly state in any coherent fashion, the deepest doubt which you can in any way formulate about the world or the things that are therein, already presupposes, implies, demands, asserts, the existence of such a World-Self.”² Royce propounded, later, “four conceptions of Being,” that is, of being as real, but he ran all being into the mind of the Absolute

¹ J. Royce, ‘Spirit of Modern Philosophy,’ pp. 344, 345.

² Ibid., p. 349.

in such a way that our ontological consciousness is not helped in its grasp of being that is real and special or particular. Still, Royce finely exemplified the ontological consciousness. But the mind has many ways of reaching an ontological consciousness of the Absolute Being. Still, our ineradicable sense of, and longing for, Reality, prove the reality and growth of ontological consciousness in us. In that developed result there may often be a double strain—religious and metaphysical—but it is with the latter, the ontological, we are now concerned. Ontological consciousness may exist, or be developed, in certain forms, without the deepening and enriching influences of specifically religious experience. But such experience brings a stronger ontological consciousness. So deeply does religion involve metaphysical reality. It centres in the most real Being, and arrives at conscious metaphysical cognition of God. The deeps of feeling and apprehension lay hold, more generally, on Being, on the Real—I do not, of course, forget the sense, here immaterial, in which Being is sometimes held as wider than the Real—and I modestly claimed that our ontological consciousness, where strongly developed, is an enhancement of our personal power and value. But the claim was really a too modest one. For the feeling for Being is really our highest endowment—the highest gift of God to man. In this claim Greek speculator, Neo-Platonic thinker, Scholastic philosopher, and modern metaphysician, would all agree. It is, therefore, surely worth while scientifically and systematically to study—in a way that has never been done—the ontological consciousness, since its study has been all too crassly undervalued and neglected.

CHAPTER VI.

PHILOSOPHY AND FAITH.

THE relations of Philosophy and Faith are variously regarded. Sometimes philosophy is viewed as actually opposed to faith; sometimes as necessarily opposed to it; sometimes philosophy is taken to run up into, and really be, just faith; and at other times philosophy is viewed as distinct from faith but consonant with it, while functionally different from it. I am myself most in sympathy with this last view of their relations. If we run up philosophy into faith, as Prof. Campbell Fraser did, then, for a "philosophy" of theism, we have instead merely a "faith" of it. Philosophy is the fruit of our theoretic instincts, of that imperious obligation which is ours, to know. But our knowing is not divorced from life; it is for the guidance and illumination of life. Philosophy is only a mode of reflection which carries us to greater height, range, and power, than the reflection which guides common life. In philosophy, thought passes out to think of the universe in its deepest and most essential character, and to consider it in its totality, not simply in its parts. The instrument by which philosophy carries out these

great endeavours is reason. For, so long as we are content to do as most philosophy does, work with the mere understanding or discursive intellect, we shall never reach the highest insights or results in philosophy. These come through the higher reason, which yields a philosophy of insight. It is disappointing to find certain philosophers, from whom better things might have been expected, confessedly unable to realise a distinction so clear and important. For all that Kantians have said, there is still good reason to think that Kant never realised the full significance of reason, far on the way as he may have gone. Pascal had already, amid much that was beneficial in his teachings, done something more to undermine the authority of reason than was at all desirable.¹ Rosmini is right in saying that nothing gave Kant greater pleasure than to criticise reason. That has to be considered along with the fact that no one could, on occasion, write more finely on reason than Kant. It is the steadfast consistency of his attitude that is here questioned. It was a quite mistaken view of Kant to subjugate theoretical to practical reason. The cleft or dualism so introduced was in character quite untenable, and mischievous in result. Kant's treatment of rationally necessary ideas was so different in the two spheres as to constitute the most glaring inconsistency. Hegel rightly insisted on distinguishing truly rational thought from mere understanding, with all that this implied. Reason is, I must maintain, pre-eminently the philosophical faculty or organ; one which, determined by prin-

¹ Cf. J. D. Morell, 'Speculative Philosophy of Europe,' vol. i. p. 253.

ciples which inhere in itself, is able to recognise the idea of the Unconditioned as essentially different from all other concepts ; one, too, which enables us to grasp and affirm the reality of Unconditioned Being, since it perceives the possibility of experience to be conditioned by this very idea of the Unconditioned. Such is the insight of Reason into the Unconditioned Ground of phenomena, and its power to lay hold on the universal and ideal aspects of reality. From the Reason we distinguish, but do not entirely separate, the Understanding, which is wont to dwell in lower regions of intelligible proof, and to maintain intimate associations with sensational experience. Now the organ of reason has often in its working been supposed to conflict with faith. But it is the maintenance of this chapter that this great faculty of reason, in which intuition and concept are subtly blended, is never really at variance with any true and properly grounded faith. And I may here remark that, just as reason and faith are often set in needless and ill-grounded contrast or conflict, so are reason and feeling often set in ill-judged antithesis to each other. But very finely has Prof. J. E. Creighton shewn that feeling can have due and real place accorded to it, in the total functionings of mind, in a much more harmonious fashion than the commonly declared contrast would suggest.¹ And the reason is that in both cases—faith and feeling, for the two must never be confounded—reason is, to all its modern upholders, a rich, concrete, and living affair, never the abstract reason of the old

¹ See Prof. Creighton's Article on "Reason and Feeling," in 'The Philosophical Review,' September 1921.

effete rationalism. These reconcilements of reason and faith, and of reason and feeling, are essential parts of the business of philosophy.

Let us now turn for a moment to faith. The immense potentialities of faith loom out so largely before us that the principle may well seem to be—as is often urged—somewhat of a fundamental power in life. It is declared to be not only the justifying principle in religion, but the spring of all renovating and sanctifying influence. It has been presented as, in its necessity and power, a principle of all knowledge and of all achievement—at the base, indeed, of all psychic life. Emerson says: “It is not what we believe concerning the immortality of the soul or the like, but *the universal impulse to believe*, that is the material circumstance, and is the principal fact in the history of the globe.” So great is faith’s place of power within the circuit of man’s teleological activity, as influencing activity in every sphere of individual being, that it has sublimated and glorified humanity in its highest representatives. Even so sceptical a philosopher as Hume perceived very clearly the fatuity of a Pyrrhonist condition of mind, pointing out how all action, and all discourse, would perish and give way to total and destructive lethargy. So true is it that ideals, of every sort, depend, in their dynamogenic quality, upon belief or faith. “Faith of this sort,” said Thomas Hill Green, “is the salt of the earth.”

Faith, in the higher sense, that of trust or confidence, has moral elements in it, and is deeper than the act of the understanding alone. There is an element of commitment in this case which goes beyond what is

found in the other. But not in this case, any more than in the other, does faith act without grounds, for always and everywhere true faith is grounded in reason, is itself, one might almost say, the highest reason, since it is the crown and climax of our highest mental activity. True, the horizon of faith extends beyond the scope of our knowledge, but there is neither need nor warrant to oppose it to our knowledge. Not to knowledge, but to sight, is faith opposed; but, whereas sight is a generic act, faith is finely individual. Nevertheless, it is in sight that we have the ideal character of faith. In a correct psychological analysis, knowing will, I believe, be found an essential and pre-requisite of faith. It is the warrant of reason—with its knowledge elements—that faith needs and seeks, and not without the warrant of reason is faith valid or wise. The value of the act of faith lies not in the mere act itself, but depends upon the grounds on which it is based. Yet Faith is—

“ . . . an affirmation and an act
Which bids eternal Truth be present fact.”

The truth is, that reason and faith are so closely interwoven that they must never be too much dissociated, but rather regarded as reciprocal and complementary of each other. The claims of neither should be regarded as excluding the other, nor the activities of the one viewed as independent of, or separable from, those of the other. The *crede ut intelligas* principle, and the other principle, *intellige ut credas*, are both inadequate when either is taken by itself; both principles have place in the mutual

commerce of faith and reason. We can see how certain philosophers—Leibniz, Pascal, Jacobi, Fichte, &c.,—perceiving that reason is a limited monarch, for it does not absolutely comprehend either itself, or God, or the world, felt the need and room for faith, as we can also understand how many philosophers have felt the insufficiency, from the side of reason, of a mere faith philosophy. Jacobi—the William James of the eighteenth century—is an excellent example of such a faith-philosopher, because of his over-weighted stress on the faculty of faith, to the disparagement of reason in philosophy. But the true idea of his philosophy is not always remembered ; it was that all human knowledge whatsoever rests ultimately on faith or intuition. Jacobi was a finer spirit, and an abler and more critical philosopher than is always realised. His call was for faith in our direct intuition of all truth. His philosophising was, however, of personal and passional type ; his dislike of theoretic attitude prevented his realising anything like a logical system. But his service to philosophy is undoubted. Leibniz, on the other hand, expressly held that reason and faith were equally the gifts of God, and that any insoluble difference between them would be like setting God against himself. It was therefore not necessary, he wrote, to renounce reason in order to give ear to faith. The critical functions of reason, whereby it *follows* faith, to criticise, correct, and justify it, have been much more understood and appreciated, than those highly important functions of reason, whereby it *precedes* faith, finds grounds and warrant for its every step, and renders it rational as act or as process.

The reason of philosophy, and the faith of religion, are wholly compatible with each other. They have always been seen to be so. One of the early Fathers said that faith was "abbreviated knowledge, and knowledge was faith in intelligence-form." But the views then expressed were not always consistently adhered to, and knowledge was apt to be made the end. The Scholastic Doctors held that the use of reason was, the comprehension and demonstration of what was held to be the faith. No vital philosophy can be content to remain in the region of the formal, the abstract, the impersonal; if it did, it would be a mere *caput mortuum*. Pure reason in man has its own demands that crave to be satisfied, yet reason cannot effect its philosophic synthesis by the aid of mere concepts. Philosophy may sometimes call itself a science of concepts, but, for all such talk, it has need of beings, and of something higher than itself. Vision is not enough; there must be an horizon. Philosophy needs data, objects of knowledge. Philosophy needs the very things which religion can supply: it needs God in His reality, and in His relations to the world.¹ Philosophy and faith are at one in this demand, and religion is not in doubt on the matter. The day had to be lived, and its work done, before, as Hegel so finely said, philosophy, the owl of Minerva, set out upon her flight. Yet, though seen only in the deepening dusk, the divine bird, it has been truly said, was always present, and "gave divinity to the whole day."² Great was the service

¹ As to this in early Greek speculation, see F. M. Cornford's 'From Religion to Philosophy,' p. 126.

² G. A. Gordon, 'Ultimate Conceptions of Faith,' p. 350.

of religion, in her manner of replacing the oscillations of philosophic doubt by the repose of reason. Reason might else have wandered, rudderless and compassless, in pathetic impotence over the waste waters of speculative thought. But all things became possible to philosophic reason, with God as its primary Given—for, as Creative, He must to the finite subject be so given—and Real. For Reason does not claim independent power of her own, but only in organic dependence upon this Absolute Spirit. Under impulse from the positive sciences, philosophy developed her conception of the Absolute or World-Ground, with the attributes of power, eternity, and absoluteness. Philosophy, too, seizing on the idea of a Supreme Being, perfected its conceptions of that Being as the Absolute Reason and the Absolute Will, and continued, by its higher reflection, and in independence of theology, the good work which religion had begun. Reason—the Absolute Reason—thus became throned at the centre of the rational universe; and if you say God is more or other than this, you are stating something of which you have no data, wherefrom to make any affirmation whatsoever. If you conjure up a non-rational or an irrational Being, you instantly cease to have any rational hold upon such a Being. The Neo-Platonists held that God was Non-Being, that is, above all our notions of Being. But how could that help us? Far more sane and rational was the procedure of the Scholastic philosophers, who made Being their first or fundamental principle. Philosophy, no more than religion, is content with Deity inaccessible and transcendent; it finds God immanent in the world, wherein His king-

dom is being realised. Categories of the reason, no doubt, like those of causation, spontaneity, infinity, are transcendent, but they have their basis in experience: we may through them transcend experience, but not dispense with, or contradict experience. Reason has faith in itself, never impeaches itself. Reason is free within its own territory, which begins where psychological analysis ends. But it has a conformability to law of its own. Such is reason to philosophy, and philosophy itself is nothing apart from experience, which it but seeks to comprehend.

But reason is no more foreign to religion than it is to philosophy, for religion has Reason or Logos: its Logos is living, personal, spiritual—the principle of all intelligence and of all knowledge: its Logos is the Word, which is with God, and is God. “Without the Logos was not anything made that was made.” Philo therefore calls Him God’s “most ancient Logos.” In such ways religion has fecundity and strength for the human spirit, and indispensably furthers its philosophic essays and syntheses, distinctive as the work of philosophy may be. There is no subservience in these relations of philosophy: philosophy seeks truth—not system merely—and enlarges its insight from every region or quarter in which truth appears. The philosopher who is not open-eyed enough, or is not in his thought and experience deep enough, to do justice to the truths and realities of consciousness—the human consciousness, the moral consciousness, and the religious consciousness—and of the Divine self-revealings to, and in, man and the world, is on the high road to metaphysical failure. For only by doing full justice to all these patefactions can the full

harmony and coherence of truth, at all its levels, be attained. Philosophy, at its fullest, claims to relate all truths of human thought, all truths that are involved in, or rest upon, human experience.

Again, pre-Christian philosophy—Greek Philosophy—is sometimes pointed to as showing how imperfect an organ is reason, in that it was able to accomplish so little, in absence of the light of faith. Well, it goes without saying that philosophy has at all times been far enough from being able to dispense with revelation by a stroke of Occam's razor, but the case is often very imperfectly understood. Philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, could, of course, only deal with the ideal content of experience as pre-Christian, but what a wonderfully active function, for all that, reason was in them; and theirs was not a reason separated from the Divine Reason or Mind. Neither reason nor revelation allows any such complete and mechanical separation between these two as is sometimes supposed. Reason is always reason—everywhere one and the same. This reason itself demands. It demands its own participation in the Divine Reason, which is not only immanent in the world, but, above all, in us. This unity of our reason with the Divine Reason, in which we so participate, is real and fruitful in its results. For our reason is not only receptive of the Divine Reason, but responsive to it, and reproductive of it. Nor did such a view fail to hover before the vision of Plato and the Stoics. What the greatest of the Greek philosophers really show is, how much it meant that God had never left Himself without witness in the world. Plato, to whose great vision God was soul and not mere idea,

was able to say that "God ought to be to us the measure of all things." "And he who would be dear to God must, as far as possible, be like Him, and such as He is" ('Laws,' 716 C). Aristotle, in his vision of the perfect man, was able to think that our reason is one in character with reason in the Highest. Greek philosophy, says Zeller, was originally called forth, not so much by the desire for knowledge, as by the feeling of dependence on higher powers, and the wish to secure their favour. Greek philosophy was a propædæutic for Christian thought or theology, and it was so because the elements of spiritualistic idealism in it were such that Christian theology could make use of it, and be in some ways a higher continuation of it.

During the first Christian centuries men thus rose from grounds that had been laid by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, to the luxuriant Gnostic systems and the Alexandrian wisdom¹—to the conception of God, indeed, as not merely the Father, but as the "very Being, Substance, and Reason of the world of things and souls." The conceptions of the transcendence of God, which had existed in Philosophy, became transferred to Christianity. But indeed that is not the whole case, for Clement, *per contra*, anticipated Plotinus by conceiving God as "beyond the One and higher than the Monad itself," and as having no name that can rightly be applied to Him. Greek philosophy had its own conception of belief or faith: it was of the nature of rational belief, intellectual persuasion, or conviction, rather

¹ Both dealt with in chaps. v. and vi. of my 'Studies in European Philosophy.'

than of moral trust.¹ Evidences are not wanting of the influence of the Greek conception of faith on the later Jewish conception of it. Especially in Philo, who has been styled by a German scholar "the first great psychologist of religious faith," there is blended, says Hatch, "the sense in which it is found in the Old Testament with that which is found in Greek philosophy." But Philo not only did much for the conception of faith, he did much for the conception of God. This, although he made God a transcendent Being. He brought Hebrew conception of God into relation with Greek conception of Deity in a way that was to be a lasting influence. For faith was here higher than reason, and Hebrew faith in a living God—Creator of all things and Ruler of all men—set a new and higher goal for philosophic reason, since no such notion of Deity had ever entered into Greek conception. Greek deity was but a creation of mind—the last deduction of thought, abstract, and impersonal.² The doctrine of the Logos, with which the Fathers of the second century so greatly concerned themselves, had in it elements that were consonant with elements that had been present in the philosophical world-view. Essentially, the Logos doctrine was a mediation doctrine: it mediated between the absolute and transcendent Deity and the world. And the Logos principle had an important history in Greek philosophy before it was taken up

¹ Cf. E. Hatch, 'The Influence of Greek Ideas, &c.,' p. 311; also my Discussion on "Aristotle and the Criterion of Truth" in 'The Monist,' July 1921, pp. 470-473.

² Cf. my 'Studies in European Philosophy,' ch. iii., on Greek philosophy of religion.

into Christian thought. The ancestry of the Logos doctrine was thus not Jewish. Heraclitus and the Stoics already had their theory of the Logos.¹ Philo stressed the Logos as Creator, Justin the Logos as Revealer. Justin refers his Logos ideas to Platonic and Stoic authorities. To Athenagoras, God Himself was "spirit, force, logos," and the universe is brought into being "through the agency of His own Logos." One of the Logos statements most marked by the influence of philosophical speculation was that of Hippolytus, a disciple of Irenæus. The whole race was viewed as partaker of the Logos. In Christ the whole Logos was taken to be manifest. Hence, not without reason has it been said that "it was the Logos theology that converted the intellect of Europe to Christianity." The Logos doctrine was significantly a metaphysical and speculative affair, not an historical matter. The central import of the Hebrew development, and the essential view and vision of the Greek mind and spirit, with its constructive genius, had, however, each need of the other. The latter helped Hebrew monotheism, with its theistic fervour and its outlook on Nature, to a more reasoned view or basis. The influence of Greek speculation was seen in Origen, of whom Porphyry's criticism, that in his notions about God he was Greek, was not without basis. Origen put the Logos doctrine on firmer metaphysical basis. Origen's cosmogonic system is really a theodicy, and a great one, with a basis of philosophical theism.² Emanative theory of

¹ See J. Adam, 'Vitality of Platonism,' ch. iii.; E. V. Arnold, 'Roman Stoicism,' p. 161, and elsewhere.

² Cf. my 'Studies in European Philosophy,' ch. viii., on Origen's philosophy.

the Son, as in Justin Martyr, he replaced by the doctrine of eternal generation. Augustine was a philosophical rationalist, holding reason to be the fundamental source of knowledge, and he held reasoned views on the problem of faith and reason. He perceived the need of reason "anterior to faith," and held that such reason can never be "wholly lacking to faith, because it belongs to it to consider to whom faith should be given." But, these reasonable grounds established, he perceived the sense in which faith might then become precedent—namely, that it need not wait on comprehension that should be perfect. Thus to him all faith presupposed reason, and the act of faith could never be irrational. Whether Professor J. M. Baldwin's¹ pronounced ascription of Voluntarism to Augustine takes adequate account of the considerations now advanced appears to me very doubtful, even though Augustine carried Neo-Platonist intellectualistic influence to more deeply ethical issues. Augustine did, no doubt, hold our religious knowledge to be conditioned by our ethical state, but already our rational nature plays, to his mind, its part in the process. It is, too, our whole voluntary nature, rather than the will in any narrow sense, he has mainly in view. The first point of all certitude he found in self-consciousness, and this position he reached by his own genius, not by any guidance from Plotinus. The deep influence of the Neo-Platonic philosophy on Augustine, however, goes without saying, and in that philosophy the problem, which Christianity then had to solve, reached its most acute stage. But that philosophy could not solve it, having made the chasm between the Infinite

¹ 'History of Psychology,' vol. i. p. 80.

and the finite all too complete. That gave the revelation of God in Christ its opportunity to overcome the dualism of Greek thought. Whether the thought of that time made the most of its opportunity is another matter. There was still some tendency to leave the nature of God all too transcendent and inscrutable. Of course the Greek dualism must not be too starkly stated, or too blankly conceived, in forgetfulness of the Platonic idea of a Demiurge, which blossomed later into the Philonic and the Neo-Platonic conceptions of Divine Powers intermediary between God and man.

It should be observed that, in the Anselmic and Abelardian discussions as to the relative priority of reason and faith, there was agreement, amid all differences, as to their ultimate harmony. This was never in doubt, for it was understood that otherwise the demands of neither reason nor faith would have been satisfied. This is not at all surprising, when it is remembered that Scotus Erigena had already, in the ninth century, held that it was the same essential spirit that was manifested, in twofold form, in religion and in philosophy. It should also be noted that "faith" was, to Aquinas, "an act of the intellect which assents to Divine truth, &c.," a too intellectualistic definition of it. But the rationalistic leaven was not without survival even in Calvin and in Locke. When, in the development of Scholasticism, we come to the views of Duns Scotus, we do not indeed find reason and faith antagonistic, but he is critical of reason's place in religion. In the stalwart Occam, there is a well-defined tendency to hold some doctrines as not merely beyond, but contrary to

reason.¹ The separation between reason and faith becomes complete. This assertion of irrational—and not merely super-rational—elements in dogma was a self-destructive one, on the part of Scholasticism. However, having said all these things by way of correcting misapprehensions, and of shewing the need there was to get beyond the “*consuetudo credendi*,” I resume our discussion of the modern aspects.

In England, Coleridge more than any other writer set matters of reason and of faith in a true light. Not only so, but, under the influence of Kant, the distinctions between Reason and Understanding, and between Nature and Spirit. Coleridge wrote,—“Whatever we do or know that in kind is different from the brute creation, has its origin in a determination of the reason to have faith and trust in itself. This is the first act of faith, is scarcely less than identical with its own being.” Coleridge’s idea of reason had in it elements taken over from Kant and Jacobi, including Kant’s distinction of theoretic and practical reason, the latter of which Coleridge strongly stressed. Reason was to him the mind’s eye, with realities as its objects. It was to him organ of the supersensuous, so that truths were apprehended which neither the understanding nor the senses could offer. As to his idea of faith, its first and fundamental sense was fealty, or fidelity. From this, however, he went on to more concrete religious senses of faith. Faith was to Coleridge a synthesis of reason and will: it was an energy and a light. He recognised the highest truths of reason to have need of a will element as

¹ Cf. my Article on “The Logic and Metaphysics of Occam” in ‘The Monist,’ Oct. 1920, pp. 536-538.

well as of the understanding. Faith was no distinct faculty, but a blending of the higher faculties in one. But we must pass into our own time without further prelude. Dr Bradley is certainly no faith-philosopher, but in an article ¹ on "Faith" he has essayed to inquire "how philosophy and faith are connected" (p. 165). But he treats the subject, which does not appear a particularly congenial one to him, in a rather clipped, unclear, and incomplete manner, and at the close remarks that "whether we are to assert or deny that philosophy in the end rests on faith, is to my mind of no consequence" (p. 171). He had already said that "so far as philosophy is condemned to act on an unverified principle, it continues to rest upon faith" (p. 171), which is obvious enough and general enough to be little of an elucidation. I shall deal with this presently. What most concerns us now is the fact that philosophy proceeds along the lines of reason, faith along the lines of revelation. But that does not mean that philosophy has nothing to do with faith, or that reason has nothing to do with revelation, and just as little does it mean that faith has nothing to do with reason. It only means that these are the distinctive methodological features of philosophy and faith. Philosophy finds reason to be the highest form and power of intelligence in man; it finds principles, norms, and laws of reason within him. Philosophy finds this power of reason in man able to interpret the universe in terms of reason—as the expression of rational thought, or the revelation of reason. And so philosophy comes at length to find in God, as the Absolute Reason, the funda-

¹ 'The Philosophical Review,' March 1911.

mental reality of the universe. Reason is not faith, but there is nothing in all this working of reason that is not congruous with faith, with which it is near of kin. Faith means openness to light—a mark of reason itself. In faith there is fine intellectual candour, conjoined with equally fine moral simplicity of spirit. Faith's appeal is to truth itself, not to authority. If the principle of reason, by which philosophy works, were to be considered, in Bradley's phrase, "an unverified principle," philosophy would be immediately landed in a false position. For, reason being the highest principle in man, it cannot rise above itself to criticise or verify itself. Reason shines by its own light, and has no need of lower forms or methods of verification, which have, in fact, no applicability. Philosophy has faith—the faith of reason in itself. Only pure unreason would ask for the reason of reason. It is its own reason; and it is eternal reason. It is *ratio sui*, as grounded in the Universal Reason. There is deep truth underlying the words of Jodl, that "a world, in which a realm of conscious reason is possible, must count amongst its ultimate constituents, reason itself." The rationality and intelligibility of the universe is a necessary pre-supposition of all knowledge and all thought. All scientific thought acts upon it. Reason is so found by man in the universe, as objective there. Knowledge gained through reason is self-certified.

Another English philosopher, Green, has given us a paper on "Faith," in which he goes more sympathetically and deeply into the subject than Bradley. I am only concerned with it so far as it refers to the relations between Reason and Faith. Green sets up

a claim for faith like that which I am here setting up for reason—namely, that “in its true nature faith can be justified by nothing but itself.” Now, it is, no doubt, true that faith has certainty of its own, but that does not dispense faith from being able to give a reason for itself. A living faith feels a certain impulse towards its own verification, and that involves a great deal more than Green realised. Faith cannot be wrapped up in itself, but must be concerned with the active knowledge of God and His acts. It need not cling to the historic merely as something past, but find in it present and eternal revealings of Divine thought and will. And the God-affirmation, “in all its width, is a virile affirmation; it is the strength by which the strong man lives.”¹ Green says faith is “a primary formative principle, which cannot be deduced or derived from anything else.” But he overlooks that reason is involuntary, whereas it is of the nature of the essential faith of Christianity that it must be voluntary. He also overlooks that faith is derivative in that it depends upon Another in whom its trust is placed. Green’s faith is still too intellectual in character, he does not give the ethical element due place. He says reason is the “source of faith”—a very incomplete account of it. To make faith but a part of reason is only to introduce needless confusion, and keep faith from being adequately defined. I do not forget, in saying this, that even John Henry Newman said that “Faith is a process of the Reason, &c.,” when he showed how largely faith was implicit reason, but not so successfully as he might have done, what genuine reason—

¹ S. S. Laurie, ‘Synthetica,’ vol. ii. p. 21.

or even reasoning—underlies all faith. But in the whole present connection, the obvious need is to distinguish faith from reason, not to confound or identify it with reason. It is not a happy treatment when Green, speaking of our rational self-consciousness, says “it is an element of identity between us and a perfect Being,” and goes on to speak of the sense in which “Reason issues in the life of Faith.” But if Green got “identity” between God and man, there would be no religion. The religious relation presupposes both difference and unity. If there were only difference—and no relation—there would again be no religion. That union which men call religion is a synthesis of the two factors, God and man, as we shall see in our next chapter.

Being is the object of knowledge, which is mainly concerned with materials given. For philosophy, the fundamental concept of the world, in its unity, is the absolute—the Absolute Being or Spirit, at once the Absolute Reason and the Absolute Will. Between such philosophical thought or knowledge and faith-experiences—I mean, of course, religious experience—there need be no rupture or disunion, if the faith-experiences or *Erlebnisse* do not rest on illusion, but on grounds of objective truth. For faith, even religious faith, should always be rational, and carry with it the activity of the ontological consciousness, whose grasp is upon all truth of being or reality. But faith is of man’s whole soul, and in the God Who is the object of such faith is summed the soul’s highest Ideals—intellectual, ethical, and æsthetical. Although there may be much in the involved faith-experiences, with their will and feeling values, which is not easily

presented in perfect or adequate manner in terms of reason, yet reason's scrutiny extends to all, takes account of all, and nothing supervenes of the nature of conflict or opposition between philosophy and faith. The soul of man—his rational and spiritual nature—is big enough to have need of both, and they can dwell in perfect harmony within the soul's dynamic unity. Just as we have seen that faith is of man's entire soul, so is reason the power of man's whole mind. The life of the mind, at its fullest compass, finds its most complete expression in the life of reason. For reason is no abstract, independent, separate faculty, in the narrow sense often taken, but is expressive of the whole mind—of mind as the most universal principle or capacity in man. This is not to say that reason is the whole essence of man, as though he had not will and sentiment, but it is to affirm reason as chief condition of all that is highest in our powers and activities. Such reason is neither outside, nor above, experience, as traditional rationalism often supposed. Reason is reason, and faith is faith, yet do they so interlace and imperceptibly shade off into each other, that you cannot say that, in the upper reaches of the spirit, "never the twain shall meet." And yet reason, which is eternal, has not become dissolved, however it may seem to be so. Faith, too, for that matter, must endure so long as does God's infinitude.

I have been dealing hitherto with matters of method, but must now touch more on matters of content. But first let it be said that there have been few more hopeful signs in recent thought than the drawing together of philosophy and her elder

sister, religion. Asperities have been softened, antagonisms removed. There have been harmonies of aim and result, while retaining divergence of process and method. Philosophy has ennobled the spirit of religion; religion has reinforced the strength of philosophy. Each has been seen to be necessary to the other; each has, at times, mistakenly tried to absorb the other. Philosophy has no deeper problems than that craving for absolute values in the sphere of truth, and that demand for ultimate spirituality, which religion carries with it. For the philosopher, no less than for the religionist, the fundamental reality of the universe can only be spirit: its highest energy can be no other than that of spirit. Philosophy finds God to be the *prius* of the universe—its Ultimate Ground and the Fundamental Reality. But it knows Him not only as He reveals Himself in the universe, but also as He reveals Himself in man's self-consciousness, and in his religious consciousness. The Absolute Being, it is assured, can be no less than personal spirit: the personal and self-conscious alone can love. For philosophy and religion alike, the acme of personality is in God; and, for both, personality is the highest blossoming of man's conscious spiritual life.

The presupposition of any religious grounding on the inner side of religion clearly lies in the spiritual nature, affinities, and possibilities of man—a nature to which the spiritual world is the great reality, a reality that is being built up by his creative energies and activities in their part and measure. The reality, inwardness, and depth of the spiritual life itself, or in its essence, is that which this spiritually

creative religion must maintain. But, while religion solves, in its own practical way, the difference between the Deity and man, philosophy has its own call to explain this very problem. As Hegel (in one of his letters) remarks, "Philosophy seeks to apprehend by means of thought, the same truth which the religious mind has by faith." Religion has no more urgent need than to be lifted above the workings of the merely subjective and individual, narrowly human, affective, and practical self, into the lofty sphere of the universal. There the broadest culture is realised, and the vast whole of life and reality—or of human possibility—is apprehended.

These are services in which philosophy stands always ready to render her invaluable help. Philosophy and religion coalesce in their aim—each to produce in its own way, a new world out of the warring elements that go to make up the world that is. For philosophy does not merely, as is so often said, interpret the world of reality, but, in so doing, also lays open a new world—a world of thought—hidden from the senses. No notion is more mistaken than that which supposes that metaphysical inquiry—which can do so much to explicate and illuminate the real bases of religion—is inimical to the interests of faith. The new world of religion is that of spiritual creation, in which the new-creating power of love is supremely seen in ever-brightening, ever-developing forms of spiritual personality. Religion seeks the truth: the truth which for it stands above all other truth, is love. Lange, the historian of materialism, proposed a "religion without faith"—a religion of ideals to which there need correspond no objective

actualities—no objective truth, in which we must believe. But this sceptical attitude towards objective truth must speedily end—not in anything that can be called religion, but in pure illusionism. Faith, on the other hand, carries within itself the conviction that its objects exist—objectively, that is to say. Philosophy too seeks the truth: it finds it in that thought or reason which is able to survey all religious feeling, to probe the contents of our deepest experience, and to reduce all to harmony.

What does philosophy imply? A survey of reality of the most universal sort, in which the great verities and transactions of religion take their necessary place. And what does religion import? A fact world-wide in its manifestations; it means the reality of the supersensible world, the kingdom of God's infinite love and grace set up amongst men here and now. On the historic field, the supreme certainty and incomparable excellence of this new world are brought near to us in the personality of the man Christ Jesus. Religion finds it new, and philosophy proves it true.

Related philosophy and faith most closely are, as we have seen, in their aims and ends; but each retains a spirit, and pursues a path of its own. The harmonies of religion and philosophy arise only as faith is rational, and as reason is believing. Kant had a clear perception that, in this rational element, religion had its closest approximation to philosophy, even though many things may yet exist beyond the ken of reason pure and simple. Religion concerns itself with the whole man—mind, heart, and will—and is, from the psychological standpoint, wider and richer than philosophy, which, strictly regarded, is

confined to the working of intellect. Not that philosophy does not take cognisance of the things of feeling and will, but that it does so in broadly theoretic fashion, even as to values. Jacobi made it impossible to treat feeling, as Schopenhauer made it impossible to treat will, with stupid neglect ; while Hegelian idealism had the merit of teaching how better to express feeling in terms of thought. Religion, too, may in its own measure become philosophic, and inquire into the laws, limits, and processes of our thinking, as philosophy teaches us to do. But while philosophy maintains a theoretic attitude and rational relation, religion is distinguished by its more practical relation of spiritual obedience to higher principle or personality. So, then, philosophy shows us the truth ; religion gives us life.

But, again, they are not so sundered as they look ; for truth is for life, and life is for truth. So at least we choose to put the case. Indeed, the religious demand of obedience is nowhere more finely realised than in loyal surrender to the truth, in accordance with philosophic emphasis. Man is not less bound to know than he is to love ; but, however his knowledge may have worth in itself, truth and love, religiously, must always in him co-exist. For the whole possibilities of his nature must be realised, and there is no real dualism between knowledge and life. Philosophy and religion are both concerned with one vast inquiry, that of ultimates or first principles ; such ultimates, respectively, as the Primal Ground, and the person of the Christ. Does philosophy, then, differ from religion, by finding that our increased sense of the vitality of the universe, and our deepened

hold on the immanence of the life of Deity, have weakened faith in the Personality of God? By no means, for true philosophy disclaims impersonality no less decidedly than does faith or religion. The scientific habit of mind is called to deal with aspects of the cosmos that may not make faith in the Absolute Personality easy, but a higher rationality will transcend that habit of mind. For it will perceive that, though science may have no need of our spiritual hypotheses, there are deeper reasons for holding them.

Philosophy, no less than religion, decisively rejects the sufficiency of certain belauded forms of immanence in our time. Because God is *in* the world, the world is absurdly deified, and really set above Him. The world-idea is taken as the highest religious idea, with which the God-idea is made identical, and so a pantheistic religious content is offered us. As if, the universe being, so to speak, His environment, He were not free to transcend it! Whatever worlds there may be, they all fall within the scope of God's agency and activity. But they are not commensurate with Him. They do not exhaust the possibilities of Absolute Being. Immanent within them He is as their sustaining principle, but He is not measured by them, is still transcendent of them. For He exceeds all that finite mind can conceive, however expansive and progressive that mind may be. Hence the utter inadequacy of such theories as a complete explanation of the universe. This pre-eminence of immanence is claimed so strongly in some extreme idealistic presentations, that God is reduced to complete subservience to a conception of His relation to the universe, in which He—supposedly the Absolute

Personality—is denied such power of free initiative, as men should deem it monstrous to deny to personality in ourselves. The fundamental lack in such cases is grasp of the implicates of a real conception of God. Neither religious faith nor true philosophy must for a moment falter in claiming for God all the possibilities so involved in Absolute Personality, working in perfect freedom. Philosophy and faith are both fatuous and blind, if they do not see that just upon the basis of such divine possibilities must rest the whole religious superstructure of fact, doctrine, and ideal.

Philosophy, for all that has now been said, joins with faith in maintaining that no mere Being of transcendent order is sufficient to set up religion for us. Such a Being has not yet worth or value for us. So comes it that, by His ethical being and working, He must enter into real relation with us. A higher world He sets up within the world we see, and, above all, within the life of man. Immanence and transcendence are correlative terms; neither is to be held in isolation from, or independence of, the other. Both deism and pantheism have fallen into this mistake. It is not spatial separation that is suggested by the terms immanence and transcendence, nor anything quantitative. But if we hold them together—as a unity—it is a unity in difference, and the difference is not to be overlooked in the unity. But then, it is said, such transcendence as there is is only an inference from immanence, and so is a “secondary” consideration. Now, no doubt, God pervades the universe as we know it. But, by what right shall we make immanence, rather than tran-

scendence, the real note of the Divine relationship? By what right shall we make events of one order—an order “deriving from Divine necessity?” Because God is in the world, and all things are through Him and to Him, are we therefore to deny that He is before and above all things, for that He was before them? And is the order of events so necessitated that His volitional working no more raises Him above and beyond the world? For our relative finite experience, the transcendence remains so real, and, in view of the just demands of thought, so necessary, that we must claim for it the primacy, and refuse to make it only a “secondary” consideration. For what is the immanence? It is the immanence of the Transcendent. No reason is there, however, why the Divine Life should be a segregated thing, as in some deistic sort, instead of the Divine Personality being for us renewed or rejuvenated in the life universal. For He is not transcendent in any sense that keeps Him from being the One in Whom our being is grounded.

Certain forms of idealism have held that a world without God is irrational, and that a God without the world would be equally irrational. It is perhaps enough that we do not know the one without the other; but we can, and must, think of God as having a life of His own, and existing in and for Himself. Working in freedom, He works *in*, but also *upon*, the world. Not from the *outside* only does He work, for He is ever *within* the universe. But He is free to work upon it, as also *above* it, in His transcendent love and power. These things make His self-revealings possible. And the possibilities must be infinitely

great, as He is infinitely free so to work. Hence arise spiritual facts, events, transactions, in the historic field. The presence of God in the universe, then, does not keep us from distinguishing Him from the universe, and maintaining for Him, as supra-mundane and self-existing Subject, an existence in and for Himself. Till then, He is not God.

The religious consciousness renders here, in my view, the highest service towards the clarifying of philosophical thought, when it shows how much the religious interest owes to this very transcendence of Deity; since it is in the ceaseless interaction of immanence and transcendence that our spiritual life becomes filled with its deepest and richest contents. And, indeed, I ask,—Must we cast the religious consciousness into the abyss, as the price we pay for immanence? Such a procedure is not in the line of true philosophy. The truth is, a supplementing or completing of one-sidedness is here the real need. Time was when, in Oriental thought, transcendence assumed overbalancing proportions, and the world side receded; while the same result happened to Occidental thought, but in less theoretic and more practical form.

But now we see immanence overbalancing, alike on the sides of man and of the world; while the Divine is shunted always more. Yet the transcendence can never be one-sided, so long as man maintains the community with God which belongs to him. What is really needful and perfectly practicable is, to do justice to both these moments, or to seek out some higher conscious unity which shall mean the harmony or agreement of both. So shall we have advanced

far forward in the solving of the mystery. For then, out of the very manifoldness of the question will have sprung a deeper answer, as each phase is allowed to exercise a properly modifying influence on the other. The self-existent and Infinite Being is not to be thought under spatial and mechanical categories, but under conceptions vital, dynamic, spiritual. His immanence in man is no mere natural immanence, but ethical and spiritual. Man knows his unity with God, but distinguishes his own activity from God's in this unity. Truth must ever be kept before us as a unity. Philosophy, in one sense, is no more than a part of that whole of truth in which we believe. Whether it be truth of religion or truth of philosophy, it is one truth in which we believe—truth self-consistent and all-embracing. It is the eternal reality and infinite objectivity of truth in which, whether in the religious or in the philosophical aspect, we believe. So we come to know the depth of the saying, *Veritas fortior omnibus*. And Goethe said, "The greatest blessing that can befall a thinking man is to fathom what can be fathomed, and silently to adore the unfathomable." But that unfathomed world, which lies beyond reality, as we know it, and try to exhaust it, is a world which calls for faith, for truth, and for reverence, for its philosophical investigation also. For the philosopher reads the highest phases of his own being into the Divine or transcendent essence, and will reflect therein his own truth-seeking and ethically-formed personality. The feeling of awe and reverence in presence of the Infinite falls upon religionist and philosopher alike, only the feeling objectifies itself in the conceptual products

of the philosopher's mind. These philosophical formulations are yet but transient and accidental features of religion. The truth is, philosophy and religion must neither of them be dependent on the other; yet just as little can they be separated from each other.

Deep laid in human nature is the necessity for each of them. Man's religious instincts crave that he shall have eternal life in the midst of time—shall find something really and permanently valuable persisting through every change and transformation. Philosophy is a necessity of man's mental life, which otherwise should remain lacking in clearness, depth, and vision. Our religious beliefs are no products of philosophy, for faith springs out of life. But philosophy may judge of our beliefs—of their psychological possibility, ethical significance, and epistemological validity. And, indeed, the subjective necessity which our understanding feels before the truth, as evidenced to us, is often a more helpful and more easily available criterion for us than the objective evidence itself.

Philosophy, it has been said, can bake no bread, but she can give us God, freedom, and immortality. Well, the bread will be found without her; and it is not by bread alone—or even chiefly—that man lives the higher life of the spirit. But if philosophy should be thought able to give us in any manner these three, they are at least guaranteed to us by religion. It is because religion puts us in possession of a real and reasonable freedom of the will, that philosophy must still find a place for the realities of indeterministic experience. I have dealt with this so fully elsewhere that I shall say but little now.¹

¹ In my 'Philosophical System of Theistic Idealism,' ch. ix.

One is compelled to differ here from so able and interesting an ethical philosopher as the late Prof. Paulsen. His procedure is a curious one, though not by any means peculiar to him among modern philosophers. He will have nothing to do with the freedom of the will in a metaphysical sense, which, by the way, he, like many others, does not very fairly or correctly represent. "Ethics should not permit," he tells us, "the whimsical attempts of a few metaphysicians" to foist such a sense of free-will upon us. And, after finely endeavouring to show the freedom of the will to mean "the faculty to determine one's life, independently of sensuous impulses and inclinations, by reason and conscience, according to purposes and laws," he goes on to say, that "no one has ever doubted" that man "has such a faculty," and that "this really constitutes the very essence of man." But did it not occur to him that those "metaphysicians" also might be among those who "never doubted" this aspect of the subject, so far as it goes? Did he not see that he really begs the whole question? The question is,—Are the facts and phenomena, on which they rely, real, and sufficient to warrant the postulation of the metaphysical view? Or, to put it otherwise,—Are there facts and phenomena of experience for which Paulsen's views are an insufficient and inadequate explanation? If so, the whimsicality lies in not allowing them due weight and place, and the appeal to number is a worthless criterion in matters of the truth. Training, discipline, habit, heredity, resolution, environment, character, deliberation,—who does not lay as real a stress on these as did Paulsen? But they do not exhaust the case for

freedom of the will ; and, if philosophy cannot bring her teaching into accord with the conspicuous and ever-recurring phenomena presented by religion, then so much the worse will it be for philosophy. My conscious life has unity as it fulfils my purpose. That purpose is not "I"—as is sometimes said—but belongs to me, in the working out or realising my self-determination, which is freedom. But in this sphere of "purpose," freely realised, we are in the metaphysical region, Paulsen's dogmatism notwithstanding. Nor have we got rid of metaphysical conception when we talk of "character" in this connection.

No doubt our freedom is a conditioned one, bounded by the developments of our original individuality, and by our being in Nature, while transcending it. But what we are concerned to see is that the aspects of solidarity do not swamp individual life and freedom in an unjust determinism. We can just as well as determinism lay full stress on psychological exercises and conditions. But, only as person is man free and responsible. And freedom is the only adequate form of the realisation of the ethical. What one most of all complains of in many theorisings is the way in which the no doubt relative but real, incalculable, element in man's self or character is neglected ; so that room is not left for those free, unexpected moves of will upward, to which all religious history and experience, trumpet-tongued, testify. This incalculable element has no right to be treated as though it were a mere chance element, for the result is reached along the highest lines of reason, amid the contingency involved. Only in deadening philosophies is the universe a closed system, instead of an

open one, with room for real possibilities. Free beings, in virtue of these possibilities, represent an infinite value, a fact which determinists fail to realise. Freedom is man's inalienable ideal; and every theory mocks at man which denies him the power to realise this ideal.

Our deterministic philosophers have missed their way; they merely tell us, As is the tree, so will be the fruits. But they have lost the real point, which is, Make the tree good, and the fruit will be good. By which it must be remembered, that it belongs to man to say which kind of tree he will be. He is lord of his life, of his will, and may choose what the result of his planting will be—a unique privilege. In the strength of this freedom, metaphysical and ethical, man can think and act as he will. It should in every case be true of him, that he is a new thought of God. It is of our own default that “we are born originals, and die copies.” Yet freedom is achievement, not merely gift. On his originative power does man's responsibility rest. His is a free, but not unmotivated, willing: will and motive are active together, and must not be disjoined. What I contend is, that before every act of will there is a primary cause—the self that may and should be free. The will enjoys lordship over the motive, and must not be thought to give way to some unavoidable compulsion before it. Practice makes perfection, and the morally ripe or perfect man is one who has the mastery over his own will.

It ought to be now evident how absurd and unfair it is to speak of the Libertarian view as holding by the causelessness of the will or volition, as if an

absolute beginning were postulated in its notion of the originative power of will. It is a beginning in no such absolute sense; that were a manifest absurdity; there are limitations, both objective and subjective, to our freedom; we are creative, but not the Creator, on Whose power we are dependent. No one supposes the will to be completely independent of all antecedents. What the indeterminist view maintains is just this, that, in presence of all necessary conditions, the will can determine itself quite otherwise than as of necessity, or can hold itself in suspense. With what clearness I am conscious of my own thought, with the same clear consciousness do I know my own freedom of will. Thinking and willing have consciousness of their own free action through all the world's history, so that freedom has become a universally recognised fact.

Paulsen is therefore mistaken in taking free will to be merely a fruit of Scholasticism. The Scholastics took the doctrine from the hands of the universal consciousness of humanity and of the individual; to them it was sometimes freedom of choice, sometimes that very freedom from impulses not consonant with reason, which Paulsen enforces. Why should we not distinctly own that our inner experience shows to us that, between motives and the resolutions of our wills, there is no such constant connection as outward observation finds existing between causes and their effects? The only necessity here lies in what is for reason a necessity. If the connection were the same as that which obtains in physical necessity, we should be the subjects of a grinding fatalism. But in moral necessity and physical neces-

sity, not only are the terms different, but the nature of the connection itself is different in character. Stirling even says, "Physical necessity is the only necessity, and moral necessity is freedom."

We have no right to allow the most evident facts of our inner experience to be flatly contradicted by deterministic hypotheses. Determinism is no more true philosophically than it is religiously, nor is it stimulative of moral progress. The subject demands emphasis; for the free-will problem, say what men will, retains a fundamental significance for ethical philosophy, as it does for religion, seeing such freedom contradicts both present-day pantheism and materialism. Emerson, in his essay on 'Experience,' memorably showed how impossible it is "that the creative power should exclude itself" from access to the mind and heart of man, by reason of any chains of physical necessity, the supposed enchainment of the will, a mere "nightmare." Our theory of freedom must be of no mere Pelagian sort, but such as will so meet the amazing assertiveness of man's free-will in every phase and type of human experience, that even those manifold and ever-recurring instances, where tremendous moral conflict and deepest self-discovery have obtained, shall be truly and adequately represented in it.

Then there is the question of immortality, which also I have dealt with elsewhere.¹ Religion has asserted the necessity of this belief always more confidently in our time, spite of loud proclamations of the loss of personal immortality from the extreme evolutionary side. This truth has for religion been

¹ *Op. cit.*, ch. xi.

no mere product of authoritative revelation, but also an outcome of man's natural growth and reasonable development, when these have come to their highest. In the heart of man, the world over, has been an innate drawing towards a higher form of existence.

“ Here sits he, shaping wings to fly ;
His heart forebodes a mystery ;
He names the name Eternity.”

Faith has felt the deep unalterable necessity that progress run on beyond the gulf of the grave, until perfection be reached by the race in the unity which is in the World-Redeemer. For it grows always more certain that here on earth perfection is not to be attained. Our religious consciousness cannot escape the belief in the persistence and permanence of the soul or self. It has an inexpugnable conviction that here we are tending to that vast city of God, whose scale is infinite beyond compare. The Absolute is the Absolute, and I do not at any rate know any reason why we should grow faint in heart or stagger in unbelief before His eternal and illimitable purposes. But philosophy, though sometimes halting and recalcitrant, when not loudly denying the fact of the future life, is often enough a real ally of religion in proclaiming and expounding the truth of human immortality. And only personal immortality has moral value. But even the undeveloped soul is the seat of potential value. The prime urgency of the soul is to win value—to develop soul. For what would be the worth of continued and unending existence apart from value? All worthy thought of immortality connects it with God, not our own souls merely.

We are sometimes told in these days that we may

discard personal immortality, and rest ourselves on evolution of Darwinian or Bergsonian type. I speak not of the immeasurable loss we should sustain by doing anything of the kind, but I declare my firm belief that, where the spiritual personality and the ethical individuality of the man are satisfactorily developed, he will be content with no evolutionary development which does not fully admit or provide for that form of spiritual expansion which is known as personal immortality. For such a developed soul knows that God in His prevenient grace is both before and above such evolution.

Philosophy here plants its feet on the primal certainties of our being, and the elemental conditions and implications of spirit, and of value. How should our ethical philosophy feel otherwise than that a moral universe by its very nature demands a moral end, even the survival and perfection of the human spirit? Philosophy finds such a belief not strictly demonstrable—since it lies, objectively, beyond actual human experience—but yet rationally necessary and necessarily rational. Not all philosophy, however, rises to such heights—not the philosophy that lives in argument on the level of the logical understanding alone—but—

“Philosophy baptised
In the pure fountain of eternal love
Has eyes indeed.”

Such a philosophy is inexorably driven to believe in immortality: the inherent ethical necessities of the case compel its belief, and there is, besides, a metaphysical value of conviction, overlooked by most writers, to whose significance I have elsewhere drawn attention.

Philosophies may remain which treat the belief as a chimera, or so much meaningless jargon ; but that weakens none of the grounds of the belief. It only argues a certain defect of vision or lack of moral profundity in the philosophies that know it not. It is religion which has made the task of philosophy doubly difficult in cases where this latter would make man merely mortal, and rob his individual and self-conscious personality of all hope of permanence. Our forecastings or foreshadowings of immortality are, in depth, strength, and volume, just what the whole variegated facts of life and experience have, in their cumulative force, made them. The belief in immortality is always a fruit of the finest experience and the greatest purity and nobility of life.

The theoretic moulds of language never can be made to contain, in any adequate form, the vaticinations and convictions inwrought in such life-experience. And who, seeing more than he can give grounds for, has yet seen the whole ? It is not now a question of where, and with what environment, that future life will be ; but it is, that living faith and true philosophy both point to the need and certainty of such life, alike as necessary completion of the present, and as necessary aim of the universe. The future or eternal life is not absolutely other than the life that now is ; here and now eternal life is ours, in the midst of time. In and through the life that is, we know the life that is to come. It is thus much more sure and real to us than its mere revelation to us from without would have made it. Never shall those problems of God, freedom, and immortality, towards which religion continually runs out, be solved by the highest

thought or culture without the aid of philosophy. The idea and essence of religion, its relation to other domains, its theory of the universe and of reality, its conception and ideal of life,—these all require the aid of philosophy, if religion is to be thoroughly justified at the bar of scientific reason and conscience.

Religion sets before faith the highest type and example, bidding us follow in spirit, not merely in letter. But philosophy helps faith realise the great idea of end—end supreme—whose unifying and vitalising conception binds into living oneness the manifold activities of life. Religion, in the scientific view and treatment of it, must embrace the whole of experience, both inner and outer, in which universal character philosophy will be found its fast ally and firm confédérate. For it, too, will be found striving mightily against the materialism and religious indifference of the time, and laying the foundations of an idealism, in which faith will be able to thrive and prosper. Together, they will thus encompass the harmonious blending of faith and modern knowledge, and set the basal thoughts of religion and of true philosophy before men as living things—things of to-day. Enough has surely been said in justification of the thesis with which I set out—namely, the distinctness of philosophy and faith, and yet their entire compatibility and complete harmony. For, to the positions of rational and well-grounded faith, philosophy is in no sense inimical. Faith, for all its truth-contents, is characteristically inwardness; and with these truth-contents, in relation to all other truths, philosophy has to do, placing and relating and harmonising all in a final unity or whole of truth.

CHAPTER VII.

THE UNITY OF GOD AND MAN.

IN treating this subject as a problem from the philosophical standpoint, I shall make that free use of religious elements or factors which is necessary to the elucidation of the subject. The basis of such union of man with God, and of God with man, as is possible, must be found in the nature of God—in what He is, and what He requires. The nature of that union may be described as the life of God in the soul of man. That is a mystical union, it will be said. But I neither court nor shun all mysticism; a philosopher's business is with truth; I only aver what the open-minded cannot deny, that the inner life and vigour of true religion have always been, more or less, of the nature of mysticism. Even Bossuet acknowledged a "safe" mysticism, as he termed it. The study of such unity of God and man has, as has long been known, its own requirements; it requires the soul to form an idea of Him, whom it seeks to know; it requires it to frame some adequate conception of that Divine greatness and moral splendour to which it seeks to unite itself; and it demands of it a profound persuasion that supreme blessedness is

only to be found in such union. Nor is that all indeed that is to be said, but it may for the moment suffice. In the religious view of the world, man and all things are from God and of Him. Man can therefore live the true life only as he lives in God. He is perfect only when he has reached unity with God. It thus becomes, as Schlegel, in dealing with the philosophy of history, said, "the most important subject, and the first problem of philosophy," to consider "the restoration in man of the lost image of God." But men are spiritually so hyper-sensitive to-day that we hear less of this lost image being traced in us again; still, if there is union of man with God, it is that of a God-united consciousness, which is achieved only from a state in which it was disunited. Lord Haldane has lately expressed himself in a manner far too pantheistic and unguarded, confounding man's consciousness with God's, and identifying God and man as "not numerically distinct subjects in knowledge." If they are not "distinct subjects," then communion with God is done away. But not in this mode are God and man identical.¹ There is no privilege so great as free and voluntary union, ethical and spiritual, with God, and many are the aspects and considerations which have been overlooked in connection with its development in the course of the ages. It is with some of these the present paper would deal.

This great conception of God, as the need of the soul, which finds consciousness and value grounded in Him, has been an imposing historic magnitude

¹ See what I have said on Green, *supra*, chap. vi., as to the overdone principle of identity.

in religious life and thought. It involves the conception of the Oversoul, or the Over-Individual, to which we may ascend, and with which, as soul of the soul, we may become bound, in conscious spirituality. Creative spirituality is the result. That man is to be one with God through the supersensible Deity dwelling within him, is certainly the teaching of the Christian religion, wherein not only the individual, but humanity, with its pains and travail, is regarded as meant to fall within the compass of the Divine Life. Of this Divine thought or intention of our spiritual union it has been eminently true that,—

“One accent of the Holy Ghost
The heedless world hath never lost.”

I shall not now dwell on the utterances on the joining in communion God and man, say, by Irenæus and Athanasius, but refer to Augustine, whose work was significantly germinal for our theme. Nor do I dwell on Clement and Origen, both of whom claimed communion with God through the life of contemplation. Augustine is content with no knowledge of God short of His self-revelation to the soul, with the soul's resultant consciousness of communion with God. But this he conceives as no mere fruit of his own search, rather is it God who has found him—*percussisti cor meum*. “Where, then, did I find Thee, and so learn to know Thee, unless it were in Thine own self above and beyond me?” But such knowledge is life, and eternal life. It is Augustine, too, who, in a great saying, declares that God has made us for Himself, and that restless are our hearts until they rest in Him. The blessedness of communion

with God Augustine had definitely reached, not without the strong help of Neo-Platonism on the way. The intimate character of this union of the human soul with God he emphasises in his work 'On the Trinity.' He exemplifies a mighty subjectivity in this passionate longing for the possession of God, and union with Him through grace. The experience is one which signifies an agreement of reverence and love on the human side. On the Divine side, God dwells in the man, is one with him. The mystic element of Godinwardness appears in Augustine in immediate unity with knowledge, will, and love. He is, in this respect, a precursor of Eckhart, and an influence for all time.

Tolstoi once wrote in his journal, "he whose goal is God is a great man." To no one, perhaps, has that greatness belonged more than to Augustine. Transcendence of God there was to Augustine, as there had been to some others, but there was a Divine immanence in his spiritual consciousness of God, and that immanence had better be conceived, I think, as a form or mode of Divine omnipresence which is free, ethical, and intensive. To it may be applied Luther's great saying, *finitum capax infiniti*, the creature, as the habitation of God, receiving the infinite in virtue of God's ethical nature, and that, too, without any cancellation of the personality of the finite subject. Indeed, this immanence of God in man may very well be regarded as the metaphysical moment or factor in fundamental experience of the Christian religion. But it waits upon transcendence. I have spoken of Neo-Platonism, and it must be said that Plotinus here compares, religiously and philosophic-

ally, unfavourably with Augustine. In the latter, the metaphysical nimbus of the One of Plotinus has fallen away: the One of Plotinus had neither being nor life, but was beyond existence; his One consisted abstractly in itself, and was a relationless unity—in other words, it was not a One for a consciousness, nor in a consciousness. But though this One may not be known, He knows Himself by direct self-intuition, which, however, does not take away the separability, rather than union, which has been created. Turn, by contrast, to these more satisfying words of Gregory Nazianzen on the possibilities of union with God: “No man knows, or will ever know, what God is in His own essence and nature; but to my thinking we shall know what is like to God in ourselves; our mind and reason will be united with Him whose likeness we are, and the image of God will be raised into the presence of the Original, with whose desire our soul is touched, and then we shall know even as we are known.”¹

Now, the important point is, that in such experiences we have not a mere subjective experience, but in some sort an inward becoming of the reality of God, to which not even metaphysical significance can be wholly denied. For it implies the unity of consciousness with the real God, who is in the human spirit. The metaphysical timidity of most theological thinking on such matters has nothing praiseworthy about it. The purport of not a little of the Patristic teaching is just the clasping of humanity in hypostatic union with the Eternal God. Even in the philosophic system of Proclus, no idea is more strikingly enforced

¹ *Or.* xxxiv.

than that of "participation" in the Divine and eternal, but this same idea of participation in the Divine creative power forms, in higher mode, the essence of Christianity itself. The subject of Divine Union received specific treatment at the hands of pseudo-Dionysius (not in his work on the Divine Names only, but in that on Mystical Theology), and, later, from Albertus Magnus, in his striking opusculum on the subject (*De Adhaerendo Deo*).¹ In his Mystical theology, Dionysius made the Divine essence the source of all being and perception, and set out a scheme for rising to perfect union with God Himself. In his work on the Divine Names, this union is declared to be by the soul being carried away above intelligence. He was largely influenced by Plotinus and Proclus, especially the latter, and became, in his turn, a potent force for the thought of the Middle Ages. Albertus strongly stood for man's union with God in this life, a union effected through knowledge, as was the prevailing tendency of all antiquity. Albertus even thinks it possible to touch or reach God with the understanding ("attingere Deum intellectu"), even though it is not thereby possible to comprehend Him. His aim is perfection by oneness of the soul with God ("unus fiat spiritus cum eo"). Between these two came Scotus Erigena, who taught men, not very helpfully, that God did not even know Himself, and therefore could not be known by us. On the other hand, the possibilities of soul-

¹ Cf. my Article on "Albertus Magnus as Philosopher" in the 'Hibbert Journal,' July 1918, especially pp. 627-629. But Albertus, who is also a great religious thinker, speaks in the "De Virtutibus" of "this blessed union with God" as consisting "in collecting the forces and affections of the soul upon God with a unanimous recollection."

union with God were set forth by Gregory the Great, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Bonaventura.

If I do not dwell on the great Aquinas, that is not because he does not recognise any intimate relation between God, who is "man's beatitude," and man, who "naturally knows" Him. But it is because I account his teaching on this subject far behind what he has given us on many other topics.¹ Eckhart, in his inner concentration, maintained the spiritual union of God and man, as effected in the act of our perceiving Him. His eye and God's eye, he said, were one eye. To Eckhart, God is the sole, universal, and necessary Being; God and Being are one; everything exists only in Him. The creature is not separated from God; but the knowledge of God's nearness is that which gives blessedness; by the Son, who is one with God, all things are, he holds, in God—in fact, are God, according to his tinge or type of pantheistic mysticism. All creatures, in his view, bear the stamp of the Divine nature; hence he maintains that they have a deep and painful yearning after union with God, and rest in Him. But the crushing out of will and desire is carried by Eckhart at times to lengths which are extreme. Clearly what is called for is, that such immediate knowledge of God be ethically justified, but it is only in part that the ethical teaching of Eckhart is faulty or defective. He is, in general, too abstract and monistic, and lacks the historic sense, in his perhaps too great impatience of Time.

¹ Aquinas places love of God higher—*altior* or *eminentior*—than knowledge of Him, but for an explication of his view of knowledge—*visio Dei*—see Dr Wicksteed's 'Reactions between Dogma and Philosophy,' pp. 613-619.

Without touching on Tauler, who was influenced by Aquinas, Teresa, and others, I pass to speak of the sounder more theistical thought of Ruysbroeck. He thinks man, as having come from God, must return to union with Him. But we shall never cease to be ourselves, never be lost in God, according to his better insistences. Nor will God ever be anything but God, so that while we may be consciously one with Him, it is as retaining our distinctness from Him. In a precise and tiny work on Christian Faith, Ruysbroeck says: "We shall understand by love and we shall be understood by love, and God shall possess us and we Him in unity. We shall enjoy God, and, united to Him, we shall rest in blessedness. And this measureless delight, in that super-essential rest, is the ultimate source of blessedness." In another work, he says of the life of contemplation and self-renunciation: "There he sees the eternal light revealed, and in that light he feels an eternal craving for union with God. And he himself feels a constant fire of love which desires above all things to be one with God." And he proceeds to say that the unity in the whole experience is that of love and nothing but love, which carries us to a more complete absorption in God than is always found in Ruysbroeck, who has thus the note of the genuine mystic. I would remark, however, that the Divine Love, on which Ruysbroeck dwells strongly, is the expression of God's oneness with us.

The danger of such experiences is, I think, that they assume a character too purely individual, subjective, and accidental, whereas experience based on close contact with truth and knowledge retains a

universally valid cast, as is desirable and even essential. This also helps preserve from the danger of absorption in God, which in the main Ruysbroeck seems wishful to avoid, although I do not think he succeeds so completely as some theological writers have supposed. He says, for example, we ought "to plunge ourselves beyond ourselves into its unsounded depths," to "rise and go beyond ourselves into its inconceivable height," so that there shall be "an eternal fusion and transfusion, absorption, and perabsorption, of ourselves in the glory of God," and more of the like. But the communing soul should, I think, still distinguish itself from God: it should keep the actuality of its spiritual experience free from arbitrariness, and let it wear an inwardly necessary, universally valid character; it should know itself as this particular person, distinguished from God; it should find its freedom in unity with ethical Deity, Who makes it free. For the duality is not dualism, since it is bridged in the spiritual union of God and man. Spiritualistic monism ensues.

It is absurd to say that the soul of the mystic has no need of revelation; if he himself thinks so, he may be taken as merely self-deceived; it is patent that, but for revelation, his blissful experience of union with God could neither be, nor be assured, at least in any satisfactory sense. I do not mean this, however, to be taken in any sense that would impair the integrity of his living, present experience, with its independent and inward certitude, to which historic revelation may be viewed, for the nonce, rather in the light of a corroborative adjunct. But that is not all, as we shall see later, and certain it is that

not for long could the individual spiritual consciousness be isolated from collective Christian experience and historical connection. There is no reason why he should not have an immediate knowledge of God, should not know himself as in God, and God as working efficaciously within him, without failing to realise that he is still organ or instrument of God, with place and purpose in His advancing kingdom. Still, one cannot but feel, in what are one's best moments, that it is perhaps all too easy for us to blame an Eckhart or a Ruysbroeck for too great absorption in mystic union with God, forgetting the while that the world, with its time-stresses and tensions, is so much with us men of to-day, that we err by terrible defect.

Now, I think it would be a great mistake to exclude all notice of the Reformation from our purview, since it was, on one side, a retrogression to the mystical conception of immediate knowledge. The freedom of a Christian man was Luther's last principle. But wherein free? In the fact that he had the immediate witness of the Spirit to Divine Grace. Luther denounced the mystical theology of pseudo-Dionysius. The Reformational principle of the priesthood of all believers—the right of direct access to God—bears strongly upon our subject and its open possibilities. For it made the actuality of the community of God with man no longer an essentially historical and past affair, but a present and living concern.¹ Of Descartes I will only quote the follow-

¹ See, for fuller treatment, my Article, "Protestantism and Catholicism" (a methodological inquiry), in 'The Constructive Quarterly,' Dec. 1913.

ing sentence as a curious outcome of Cartesian rationalism: "The very idea of union with God suffices to rouse within us that heat around our hearts which causes a most violent passion to arise." Certainly not until an immediate unity with God is reached is religion fully realised.

When it comes to Kant, he is seen to cut no illustrious or inspiring figure in the sphere of religion, immense as his services have been to speculative thought. Yet, strange to say, a new tendency, all too little perceived, beginning with Kant, runs on through Fichte, Schleiermacher, Schelling, and Hegel, a tendency towards the unifying of God and man. For they concern themselves, more or less, with the religious life itself—with the essence of Christianity or its inmost principle. As for Kant, we have the testimonies of Kuno Fischer and of Zeller as to his belief in the reality of God. But Kant himself says "it is indeed necessary to be *convinced* of the existence of God, but it is not equally necessary to demonstrate it." I do not propose to deal with his 'Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason,' save to note his Deistic setting, and his utter lack of feeling—the foreignness to him of the mystical side of religion. Still, there does fall a crumb from his table when he uses a phrase about "uprearing and upbuilding a new man—a *temple of God*." But he is in marked contrast with religion when he allows his moralism to centre so much in himself. Our practical faith is pretty much the reverse of that defined by Kant, whereby the man is so conscious of a moral disposition that he can repose in confidence in himself. Our faith, in the religious sphere, is rather in One not

ourselves, Who is able to uphold us and keep us from falling. Amazing is his lack of room for the consciousness of God within the soul of man, whereby the individual can be raised far above himself. Indeed, Kant has a gift of thinning out religion, so that little of the specific characteristics of the vital religious life is left. So-called "means of grace" he empties likewise of ethical significance. He is not unwilling to admit that there may be a sphere of the supernatural, but he is himself without that fine sense of contact or communion with the Divine which has been a distinguishing feature of great religious personalities in all ages. It has been accounted a merit in Kant that he retains "a pure religious faith," which every man can make his own, over against a faith which is historically begotten, but the merit is much less, religiously, than some theological thinkers have supposed, on a careful examination of the whole context or setting. Kant's appeal, in spite of his rationalism, was an appeal to the heart—to faith in the moral law. But his will to believe was intelligibly due to the fact that he still believed in a rational universe. The significant thing, for my purpose, is that he emphasised, in connection with the Christian idea of the supreme good, the moral will, in which is found the point of union with God, though, as I have shown, in a way significantly other than that of Kantian moralism.

Fichte, in his later stage, got beyond his unsatisfactory, mere exclusive moralism, so that in the *Anweisung*, he can even speak of the individual "who vividly recognises his unity with God, and who truly and actually abandons his entire individual

life to the Divine Life." And elsewhere, he finds God to be the Absolute Life, which binds all spirits in one, and expresses itself through individuals. He comes to think, indeed, that every one should know that God urges on his work within him, and that every one can become a citizen of the Kingdom of Heaven.

Schelling pursued the unity of God and man in a manner characteristic of his system. There is, for him, an identity of the human mind and the Essence of all Being. The first principle of the moral life is, to Schelling, the knowledge of God, who has revealed Himself, but, it would appear, as from necessity. The essence of the moral life he finds in the soul's tendency to unite itself to God as the centre of all things. But he identifies, in his pantheistic tendencies, the Deity too much with Nature, and even renders certain laws superior to Him. The evolution of the God-idea in history is traced by him so as to show a passing from pantheism or monotheism to polytheism, and thence to the triune God of revelation. But for him the world's history is just God coming to Himself, and our longing for the actual God constitutes, for him, religion. He has an idea of man as divine, that he may know God. His philosophy of religion, indeed, holds to a personal God, to freedom, and to individual immortality, but it yet remains of very negative value. Clearly, the disposition of ethical and spiritual elements required for a satisfactory unity of God and man is not to be found here.

Hegel made religion "a relation of the spirit to absolute Spirit." He placed God within, not without,

religious experience. He made much of our idea of God. "Religion," said Hegel, "is not a discovery of man, but a work of divine operation and creation in him." He did not fail to ascribe metaphysical content and value to the religious consciousness. To get a consciousness of the unity of Divine and human nature, we need this unity embodied in a definite individual—who is the Divine Idea—such as we have in the God-Man. The unity or oneness of God and man is, with Hegel, a great insistence, on which I am hardly now concerned to make critical reflections. What I am concerned with is the fact of his presentation of the unity of God and man. "Christ has appeared; a Man who is God; God who is Man; and thereby peace and reconciliation have accrued to the world." This is Hegel's great and richly wrought out message to the world, whether one agrees with it at all points, or not, in the out-working.

Schleiermacher, like Hegel, centres in the historic Christ, unique Mediator between God and Man, and makes religion an integral element in human life. In Schleiermacher, as in Hegel, are elements that call for criticism, but I am not now concerned with these, but with what there positively is in his presentation relative to God and man. For him, the feeling of unconditional dependence and the consciousness of one's relatedness to God, are one; and consciousness of God and self-consciousness are inseparable. Of course, there is a savour of natural connection in much of his thought due to its Spinozan tinge; but still, he has a mystical comprehension of religion, and thinks we can win a powerful consciousness of God,

corresponding to the true idea of religion. "The true nature of religion," he says, "is not in any 'idea,' but is 'immediate consciousness of the Deity as He is found in ourselves and in the world.' " Christ, for Schleiermacher, mediates all being of God in the world, and is the source of such religion.

Now, even such a brief historic survey serves to show that the excellence of the Christian religion lies in the fact that in it, as nowhere else, is realised the unity of God and man—wherein all separation is transcended. It also serves to show the stream of spiritual idealism ever breaking out afresh in the demand for God Himself, independently of all insecure mediations. No historicity need blind us to a just appreciation of this fact, in its significance for living piety, and in this generation there is not the least danger of our sense of mystic Divine Union becoming so great as to lead to any undervaluation of historic magnitudes and values. Kant's phrase about man as "a temple of God" is here fulfilled in grander form than his hard and halting religiosity ever knew, for man has won a concentrated and independent personality in free ethical union with the Deity who dwells in him. His freedom as a Christian man is seen in his free knowledge of the truth and essence of the Christian religion. For only in a free way can the truth be known as truth. His very search for truth is an implication, nay, affirmation of absolute truth. But his knowledge is not merely of the intellect, albeit his communion of spirit with God is always mediated by thought. Thought is the universal medium of all life of the spirit, but the peculiar value of the spiritual does not depend on

thought in isolation from co-operant will and feeling. Hence not through knowledge of the intellect alone, but through obedience to Divine Will, does he know God and His teaching. In his unity with God, his immediate knowledge of God, he casts off, as an unworthy slough, every thought or idea of self-redemption. Personality becomes immeasurably heightened in value through this indwelling of an immanent Deity who is yet an Over-I, but the man's spiritual and ontologic sense deepens the while that *Humilibus dat gratiam*. It is no life of feeling fluxes, for spiritualised reason holds the rein. It is of the essence of such a life of freedom that it makes an advancing development, a deepening of knowledge, possible, and even certain.

I have not spoken of thinkers like Fénelon,¹ who held a strong theory—derived from Neo-Platonic sources—of the absolute unity of God, but who yet believed we were born for the love of God; nor of Pascal,² who made God the soul's only good, its only rest, its only joy, albeit in terms often sombre; nor of many others who have stood in this current of unified spiritual thought. But in all of them have been presupposed movement of God to man and of man to God, with resultant indwelling of God in man, and unifying of man with God. It cannot be too plainly stated that it is no mere oneness of being or nature that is meant—as by mere natural immanence—but an active, voluntary, and ethically realised

¹ Cf. my Article on "Fénelon as Philosopher" in the 'Holborn Review,' April 1918.

² Cf. my Article on "The Religious Philosophy of Pascal" in the 'Bibliotheca Sacra,' 1918.

union. It is in this realised personal relationship of man to God—God in us, we in God—that any adequate conception of religion can alone be found. Most meagre and unsatisfactory are the definitions of religion which, in psychological terms of our purely subjective and emotional attitudes, still sometimes appear in current philosophies of religion. They are half definitions, and poor at that, passing not beyond presumptive probability. When Höffding, in his ‘Problems of Philosophy,’ says that “the core of religion is an interest of feeling and will” (p. 179), one thinks of the quaint saying of Whichcote, the Cambridge Platonist, that “it ill becomes us to make our intellectual faculties Gibeonites”—drudges to the will and the feelings. Reason is still first in rank. All our apprehensions, apart from God, are partial and incomplete, for we have not yet reached the keystone of the arch of truth. Clearly, the consciousness of the “otherness” of God ought not to be so excluded from religious experience. That experience includes a non-self, or transcendent reality, which is, in this case, God, more real than all other reality. Religion is not constituted merely by our own emotionalism or subjective aspirations, but by the presence of God at the inmost centre of our life—His creative and sustaining presence in respect of those spiritual ideals which are quite the most precious thing in or about us. Our participation in that Divine Life constitutes for us that consummate union, the sense of whose realised possibility the world has never lost since Athanasius greatly conceived it in his crowning thought that God Himself had entered humanity. No narrow conception was his: “The Logos, while

present in the human body and Himself quickening it, was, without inconsistency, quickening the universe as well, and was in every process of nature." But it is with the Divine immanence in man we are here concerned, in which connection it is worth while to remember that Spinoza was able, too pantheistically, to say that our highest love of God is but a portion of God's infinite love for Himself. But the distinction of subject and object does not so disappear in religion, even where it is most perfect. The man who has found his home and dwelling place in God finds himself, nevertheless, supported and sustained by God's own activity within him. This to him is not mere theory; it is life—basic, organic, ontologic, and spiritual being. Mediated by Christ it may be, if, with F. D. Maurice, we take Christ to be the essential ground of all human life; but Christ is the way to God, and it is the spiritual unity of God and man that we aim to realise. Paul declared he knew not Christ after the flesh, and he centred, not on the historic Jesus in His temporal conditionedness, but upon Christ in His eternal aspect. The wise course for us also, in these days of historico-critical inquiry. And there must be neither Neo-Platonic nor mystical absorption in the One in our union with God. Religious thought has so much concerned itself with what man is to be saved from, that it has had too little vision and hold of what he is saved unto, even the rich potentialities of the life in perfect or harmonious union with God. No numerical oneness with God, but a Christianly theistic fusion of the life with the infinitely rich and full Divine Life. Whence but from such life, Spirit-filled and God-

inspired—whose thought is the divine thought, whose life the divine life—are to spring the inspirations and spiritual impulsions to world-service of thought and life? Where but in the multiform realisations of such life shall we find the ever-increasing union of men in God? Hence the peerless importance of this God-united life being maintained in fulness and vigour, with its increasing knowledge of the *What* of the Divine Nature in all its illuminating influence on the mind, and its irradiating effects on character. Its path is that of spiritual reason or insight, and in its knowledge of God as its Divine complement or Other, it leaves far behind every form of merely pantheistic immanence. God works in our consciousness and in our reason, but so that our reason remains self-active. Can we find any higher path to the harmony of thought with truth—truth as in God—and of feeling with thought? Reason is God-given, we say; but why, for its full strength and height, should it not be also God-directed? But this without any lessening of that activism in man's use of all his powers, on which one must strenuously insist. But what I have urged is in keeping with the great truth of God and humanity, that man is meant to live, not only in, but from God. Do we realise so fully as we might, that God is present in the ideal-building activity of our self-active reason? Can we doubt that we should think more profoundly and efficaciously in Him? Surely we may well ask ourselves, with George Macdonald in his poem "A Hidden Life":—

"Have I aimed proudly, therefore aimed too low,
Striving for something visible in my thought,
And not the unseen thing hid far in Thine?"

There is a whole world of spiritual knowledge, experience, and conquest, beyond that *anima naturaliter Christiana* on which we in this time have too idly rested; and the masters of the God-united life have shown us, "whose spirits live in awful singleness, each in his self-formed sphere of light or gloom," the rich result, in power and elevation, of learning the incommunicable secret of God's presence. This recalls the saying of Augustine that "we can mount still higher, if we carry our thoughts towards the inner side of our being. We thereby reach our souls, and, passing beyond them, we penetrate to the region of unfailing fertility." That is precisely the region to which our thoughts have now been directed, a region of "unfailing fertility," not mere static felicity, as is often said, in God. Our union with God is not union with One who is will and love alone, but a union with Him who is the source of all knowledge and of all truth, in knowing Whom we come, in a correct use of Malebranche's phrase, to "see all things in God." For our religion is pre-eminently spiritual knowledge, and its foundations are laid deep in Eternal Reason. But that does not mean that our religion is merely one of ideas, and has nothing to do with historic fact and revelation. We know how Lessing contended that no historical truth could be demonstrated, and that nothing could therefore be demonstrated through historical truths. That is, he held that accidental truths of history could not be the evidence of necessary truths of reason. Undoubtedly a very suggestive pronouncement, but not therefore worthy of complete or final acceptance. For there may be a Diviner way of

preserving the idea in Christianity than any known to philosophic rationalism. Said a reflective novelist : " Ideas are often poor ghosts ; our sun-filled eyes cannot discern them ; they pass athwart us in their vapour, and cannot make themselves felt." And the religion of the philosopher, if it is one of ideas only, is apt to be ghostly enough at times, as most people will admit. The Christian ideas have had their importance emphasised by Royce,¹ but not even his treatment can by any possibility be regarded as satisfactory. Christianity is fact—Christ-fact—as well as idea—Christ-idea ; and the idea wins, for us men, security and enrichment from the fact. Lessing's view is right enough so far that a thing is not necessarily true because it appears, or is asserted, in history, but it overlooked that metaphysical truth is contained in history. Man can therefore see his ideal of the community of God and man realised in principle in the historic God-Man. Lessing's view also overlooked the way in which Divine fact is, so to speak, renewed and immediately evidenced in the Christian consciousness. That consciousness—as in the God-united life of which I have been speaking—is so complete in its inward certitude as to wear a quasi-independence of historic fact or revelation ; but it is much more correctly viewed as a continuance in the believing consciousness of the Divine and factual working of Christianity in the world. Spiritual continuity and development are in such ways preserved, as is obviously needful. Revelation in its record is not something complete in itself ; it is but

¹ Cf. my Article on " Royce's Philosophy of Religion " in the ' Holborn Review,' April 1917.

the vehicle of the self-revelation of God in Christ to our spiritual consciousness, which has a faculty for recognising God and truth. It is thus far more than any question of the external authority of revelation : it is the profound enlistment of our whole rational and spiritual being in the service of the freely recognised claims of truth. The rich and strong Christian consciousness may, in its developed inwardness, feel always less conscious dependence on historic revelation, but without its being thereby transcended. It is precisely through contact of a vital sort with historic Christianity that mind and soul are raised to new ideas and enlarged conceptions of God, in the realised union with Him which is our present concern. Only in this way is the fullest determination of man reached. It were unwise to forget that all the great ideas, in virtue of which we sit with a certain looseness to historical revelation, have come to us on historic wing ; and that the great facts of Christianity are wrongly conceived as mere dead facts, rather than as living powers or present historic forces. Mere hard historicism makes nobody Christian. The aim of real historic interest is to get beyond mere historicity. We here know the truth only as we will the truth, the facts only as we live them, that is, experience the power they are meant to exercise. Then do they wear for us a less "accidental" character, as they are seen to be necessary to the explanation of history, in its causal connections and developments. But in discussions on this subject, the first and most fundamental thing is invariably overlooked, that man stands in immediate metaphysical relation to God. On this the religious rela-

tion rests. To such a religio-metaphysical being, the historical can make stimulating, legitimate, and carefully-defined appeal.

We have now seen the nature, possibilities, and fruitful results of the spiritual unity of God and man. It is an unification, rather than an identification. It is not simply, as Spinoza says, a case of "unum et idem." But the unification is most real, vital, immediate, in character: in result, it means strength, power, elevation, insight, tranquillity, and peace. A goodly reward of man's quest surely, albeit it is entirely of the spiritual order. Such beatitude is its own reward; it craves no other. But it involves the soul's severe self-dedication and inner concentration on the supreme—the religious—end, in order to the personality's rich becoming. It is, as Boutroux put it, the Beyond that is Within; it is communion between man and God, a communion effected through communicated life. Such life is eternal; and eternal life is spiritual knowledge—"This is life eternal, that they should know Thee, the only true God, and Him whom Thou didst send, even Jesus Christ." Religious experience, said Boutroux, "cannot guarantee that Beyond as true." But when, I ask, did Life ever ask for guarantees? It is, and will ever be, its own sponsor, and its own witness. Truth is for, and in, and through, and by Life; and religious experience enfolds in its embrace trans-subjective spiritual reality, wherever it has the energy that should properly belong to it. In the metaphysics of religion, what is known and explicated is the real—and metaphysical—relation subsisting between God and man; this can be realised only in consciousness; but it

involves an immediate and efficacious working of God in the consciousness. What metaphysical knowledge or inquiry does is only to bring such immediate knowledge to greater conceptual clearness. In this way is the true essence—the metaphysical kernel—of religion brought into light. This not even the psychology of religion can so well effect, for its concern is only with psychological experiences and actualities—things by no means identical with truth. And truth—spiritual truth, and metaphysical truth—is the deepest need of man's spirit. In our grasp of such truth is freedom alone to be found.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ETHICS OF SOME MODERN WORLD-THEORIES.

IN the History of Philosophy, world-theories may, on a broad view, be resolved into two main types, namely, Idealism and Materialism. Idealism takes a twofold direction, Theism and Pantheism. Theism is properly a form of religious philosophy, not of theology. Theism holds the world to be made and governed by a Supreme Intelligence which, as the Ultimate Reality, stands out as distinct from the world. Pantheism views all finite things as parts of a Whole, within which as a unity they have no substantial independence. The original opposition between theism and pantheism, however, was on religious rather than on philosophical grounds. Materialism centres on those tangible facts of experience with which science is concerned. Historic materialism has assumed a threefold form: that in which the psychic is something physical—the spiritual is a stuff; that in which the psychic is a product or effect of moved matter; and that in which the psychic is an accompaniment of physical processes, and here the materialistic trend is not so pronounced. It is, however, no part of my present purpose to pursue the

classification of world-theories, but merely to select some of these, which have proved of great interest to the thought of our time, for consideration on their ethical sides or aspects, the problem being to fix the most tenable or satisfying one.

There is the best-possible world-theory of Leibniz, which I shall briefly notice. Leibniz admitted his system to be a "mingle-mangle" of Democritus, Plato, Aristotle, and the Scholastics. But this does not mean a mechanical laying down of the ideas of his precursors, since they are organically bound in his thought with one another. He was the renewer of the vitalistic-teleological mode of thought. Men's perfections he derived (in his 'Monadology') from God; their imperfections he ascribes to their own imperfect nature. To the imperfection inherent in finite things, not to Divine Will, he attributes (in his 'Theodicy') the evil in the world. But he would commit philosophical theism to a strange position, when he is prepared to deny that the world would have been a better one without sin and without suffering. And the Divine intellection, it must be said, he describes in a very human and gratuitous fashion, ascribing to the Divine Mind a plurality of acts which are the merest postulations of the philosopher himself. There has been, to his pre-established harmony, divine foresight and regulation of all things beforehand; everything is necessary, nothing can be changed; if the least evil in the world were wanting, it would not be this world; besides, an evil often causes a good. An optimism absurdly frigid and fatalistic, it must be said, for if the world is already the best possible, ethical incentives to hope are not

in that case much in evidence. Nor, on a strict view, does his system stand in any particular need of the God of theism, for Whom not much seems left to do. Some of the recently edited texts of Leibniz tend, however, to soften, and render more natural, his rather arbitrary and artificial pre-established harmony. They show harmony as the law of being, a law of intelligibility, and the notion of harmony as a rich and complex one. The ethical task, in his view, was the perfection of human spirits, which must be freed always more of their finite relations. For the source of error, and with that of moral evil, lies in their limitation and finitude. The more comprehensive and free their development away from limited knowledge, the greater their approach to an harmonious world-view. The unethical is, with him, too much the result of mere error and confused ideas; and the ethical is too much in need of harmonisation with the metaphysically necessary in his system. After much meaningless talk of "possible" worlds, however, he leaves us with just the actual world, with whose moral evil he should have more closely concerned himself. But, because of his absorption in the metaphysical ground of evil—which he failed correctly to apprehend—he almost wholly missed the philosophy of moral evil. To him it was mere defect of good; he never faced it as enemy and opposite of the good. In his ethics, it was therefore not real; it was indeed but the unreal—a mere appearance which made the rosiest optimism possible. God had merely allowed evil as necessary. Rosmini (in his great 'Theodicy') has been largely influenced by Leibniz, in his emphasis on the privative or negative aspects of evil.

Notwithstanding his individualist position, Leibniz passes in his ethics to a sharply altruistic position, in which love to one's fellow-men becomes the chief moment in morality. This stress on harmonious social life is an echo of his metaphysic, with its emphasis on world-harmony.¹ But the independence postulated for the individual in his metaphysical system had a restraining influence on him here, the more so as he made all virtue rest on individual knowledge. Extreme altruism would have been untenable, morally, and his theory of self-perfection saved him from it. His emphasis on ethical ideal and moral perfection was indeed one of the finest and most fruitful things in the thought of Leibniz, albeit it concerned the moral subject, not world-development, as in Hegel.

Then there is the World-Will theory of Schopenhauer. To him, as to Schelling, the world is will; but to him also, as to Fichte, the world is idea; and it is because the given world is mere idea, and mere idea conducts to negating the will, that the attitude of Schopenhauer is so unsatisfactory. Everything objective is mere idea; to seek to know it objectively is contradictory. He combats pantheism, but all the marks of pantheism are yet characteristic of his own world-theory. That theory is not a genetic metaphysic, such as Hegel and Schelling attempted; it is but an intuitive view of what he took to be the essence of the world. For him the world-essence is that unity known as Blind Will, ever pressing on to self-manifestation as its single aim. But, as such

¹ The metaphysics of Leibniz are dealt with in my Article on "Leibniz on Truth and Being" in 'The Monist,' October 1921.

self-manifestation can never, for an Infinite, be complete, there must be sense of defeat, and pain of perpetual craving. The world is for him an appearance-world—a veil of *Māyā*. Individuality is banned, since the World-Will is in essence one. Individual existence is illusory—mere appearance. Our own bodies, and the bodies of animals, are to him will-appearances. The world itself is Will. Such, in a word, was the result of the metaphysics derived by Schopenhauer from Brahmanism. And the ethical result which he enjoined was the mortification of personal will, the obliteration of individuality, the crushing of egoism in its very source. His philosophy is essentially negative in character. To remove the unhappiness that rules in the world, one must needs deny the will to live. For the individual deludes himself that he is furthering his own happiness, while, as matter of fact, he is but serving the race, as the only thing that endures. Schopenhauer does not perceive that this uselessness of all volition, this deadness of the will to live, is a mere negating or cancellation of the ethical problem, not a solving it. He stressed the metaphysic of ethics, and there was, without doubt, something of value in that, but then he failed to do justice to the facts of the ethical consciousness as such. An atmosphere of acrid disillusionment and contradiction is all that Schopenhauer supplies. Such, but not without a curious contradictoriness, was the issue of the ethics which Schopenhauer drew from Buddhism. Schopenhauer's World-Will is a clear indication of the universalistic tendency of his ethics; but it is non-rational in its inmost core, and never out of it can you bring Science,

Law, and Order. For it has not reason as its base and bottom, as obtains in a sound philosophical theism; its reason is but a by-product or an after-thought. But the conception of World-Will, wherein everything is jumbled together as equally and alike will, defeats itself and becomes unmeaning, since there is no means of differentiating will from anything else. The mere negation of the will to live, he expressly declares, is the end of his doctrine. "No will, no idea, no world." Such is his declared aim, and what an irrational aim and end! The objectivity of will, as thing-in-itself of every individual, he asserts, but he always fails to realise that man's character is that of a unity which, as such, is capable of development. His is will that has no object which it reaches after, and can represent as other than itself. His World-Will is not deliberative will, only blind inclination to life. Hence the immense difference of his meaning from that of a theistic thinker like Martineau when the latter said, "All cosmic power is Will." This irrationality of the world, as a metaphysical theory, becomes, when carried over into the ethical sphere, the ground-principle of Schopenhauer's pessimism. And indeed it is not remarkable that the world, as the appearance of blind will, should be to him the worst thinkable. It is the irrationality of the world's root, or the disjunction of will from intelligence, that is the fundamental source of Schopenhauer's error. And the prime rectification is the substitution of a World-Will that is, before all things, rational. His grave ethical blunder is to identify being and evil, for it is physical evil or suffering—not moral evil—that he

inveighs against. But even in the transcendental ethics of Brahmanism and of Buddhism, to both of which he owed much, suffering held a place of unique importance. And it has been said that "all noblest things are born in agony."

No ethical world can arise as fruit of unreason, chaos, caprice, and non-intelligent instinct, which are the prime conditions of his world-theory. Though Schopenhauer imagined that he ran the meaning of the world up into the ethical, yet he resolved it into will as inclusive of every form of cosmic and psychic energy: it was in contempt of reason or intellect, and in glorification of mere blind activity, that he made man will, and will inexplicable—*velle non discitur*. Yet, as Hartmann remarks, this "maimed and blind Will nevertheless altogether comports itself as if it had a notional or ideal content." True, he denounces it as one of the most pernicious of errors to say that the world has only a physical, not a moral significance. Yet so illusive is the moral to him that "we can scarcely ever pass a correct moral judgment on the actions of others, and seldom on our own." Our acts are, in his view, related to what we are, in our unalterable being or character, rather than deeds to be considered by themselves. For the actions, he holds, we are not responsible, but only for what we are. But the ethical significance of the world, for him, is of unsatisfactory character, when the world-principle of it, will, is seen to be so little worthy of the ethical halo with which it has often been invested. Yet will is his postulation, as "the one thing that is known to us immediately"; will is "the one strait gate to the truth." He arbitrarily

asserts will to be the inner essence of things, but its nature, he declares, we cannot know. And when he comes to relate idea to a material brain, he lands himself in palpable contradiction, as Zeller shewed. Reason and idea are no necessary and essential conditions of the activity of the will, with him ; nothing could be more unsatisfactory than his lack of care that will be directed by reason. We may, of course, abstract will from reason in our thinking, but in reality will is inseparable from reason, is, in fact, energising reason. Will is, as Kant said, nothing but the practical reason, reason being required for action under law. The holder of such a theory of will had small title to speak of Kant's "apotheosis of lovelessness" ; there is in it, in my view, nothing ethically admirable. Every philosophy of will reckons ill that leaves out reason, and makes will the sole substance or energy of the universe. For reason is that omnipresent and unescapable thing which antedates and bases everything that truly goes by the name of will. Schopenhauer was himself not devoid of a glimmering of the truth that man's life is often at its highest when reason or intellect is most in evidence, and will most in abeyance. Hence for the will to live and its insatiable desires, he offers the æsthetic view of the world—as the highest form of existence—to raise us above the vanity of the world. So, in his inconsequence, he offers us, in pure will-less æsthetic contemplation, a positive good in the world after all. But he has no strong, clear, correct, and consistent view of the relation of reason or intellect to will. Obsessed by the priority of automatism and instinct, he absurdly subsumes such

process under the term "will," and fails to realise that rationality is of its essence. Nothing could be more mischievous than so to treat will as mere power. Chalybäus did much better in insisting on the importance, for ethics, of the will and the judgment being in harmony and accord; else will may assert what judgment repudiates, or will may neglect what judgment prescribes.¹ But Schopenhauer patently subordinates the dictates of reason to sheer will. Again, the altruism of Schopenhauer is absolute, and consequently absurd. He was himself a living contradiction of the theory, which is as false as the theory of pure egoism would be. But if life carries so little value for our pessimistic philosopher, a more neutral attitude to both theories would obviously have been more consistent. The egoistic and the altruistic impulses are both necessary, on a true view, and must be harmonised, as shewn in an earlier chapter.²

I turn now to Hartmann's world-theory of the Unconscious, which is not well understood in this country. His world-theory is a manifold eclecticism. He himself says it is a synthesis of Schopenhauer and Hegel, with a decided preponderance of the former; executed under the guidance of the principles of the teachings of Schelling's positive philosophy, and of the concept of the Unconscious in Schelling's first system; the abstract result is then closely united to Leibnizian individualism and modern natural-science realism so as to form concrete monism. But, as we saw in the case of Leibniz, so in that of Hartmann, there is organic connection, not mere

¹ 'Historical Development of Speculative Philosophy,' p. 168.

² Chapter ii.

juxtaposition, of the derivative ideas or elements. In respect of method, Hartmann made the curious error of supposing that we can solve metaphysical problems out of immediate experience, that induction assumes tasks which it can by no means solve. Thus he tends to form his conception of ethical end by induction from the empirical tendency of the world—a perfectly fallacious procedure. His untenable use of inductive method marks a grave defect of his system.

Beginning with the absolute substance, that is, the Unconscious as the Absolute, and its two attributes, the logical and the alogical, Hartmann gives us the world from this absolute substance through the alogical, the unconscious, changing from the original condition of rest. The effect of this is, that the manifoldness of the ideas which the logical eternally contains but does not of its own initiative unfold, becomes thereby realised. The logical, that is to say, seeks to repair or make good what, in this compulsion, the unreasonable had done, so that rest or not-willing may be restored. The logical brings the unconscious to consciousness in this way, teaching it to know the misery and illusion of its activity. Will is startled or supervenes on this procedure, and this surprise is consciousness, according to Hartmann. And always knowledge brings it more about that willing leads to unblestness and renunciation to painlessness. But the absurdity of Hartmann's endeavour to make out empirical preponderance of pain over pleasure, as a matter of calculation, has been clearly exposed by O. Pfeiderer and others. The whole principle was wrong-headed. But to him all

willing, even the Divine, is folly ; his good consists in unmaking what the will has made.

In Hartmann's "concrete monism" the plurality of phenomenal being is supposed to be reduced to the unity of the unconscious, but the freeing from dualism is not really explained. Matter also is reduced to the combined will and intellect of the unconscious. More exactly, there is a combination of will-atoms, with logical ideas, which accompany the combinations of the will-atoms. Hartmann's treatment is more unified and methodical than Schopenhauer's. Hartmann represents a dynamic rather than a mechanical view of nature, and finds room for teleological conception. But he treats ethics only as a condition to the satisfaction of real needs or human well-being—as mere means to religion, æsthetics, and knowledge—in short, as phenomenal means to supra-ethical ends in the three spheres just named. That is to say, he does not allow the ethical to have value in itself. Not a very exalted *rôle* for the ethical, it must be said. And he is not quite free of the Schopenhauerian tendency towards the complete negation of the will. Indeed he makes non-being an universal end, not one for the individual, like Schopenhauer. Yet the moral consciousness begins with the egoistic pseudo-morality, and the highest unified connection of the Nature-processes is found in the "I" consciousness. But ethical culture is to pass into the ethics of the moral world-order, which includes both the subjective and the objective moral principles. There, subjective motives are to advance objective ends. He seeks to base the ethical on the consciousness of the identity of the ground of all appear-

ances ; he thinks the moral must be based upon the Absolute ; but he does not give morality itself an absolute character, treating it as merely relative. Ethics must yet be grounded, he holds, in the absolute Being or Essence, if the full unity of the moral life is to be attained, but this, he thinks, is mainly of an abstract character. Whereas the highest ethics is first found in concrete monism, the Kingdom of God consists not of an aggregate of substantially separate creatures, but of an organism constituted of essentially identical God-men ; God is the absolute subject of the moral world-order, its immanent essence, not merely a transcendental lawgiver ; and the developmental stages of the moral consciousness lead, with Hartmann, up to religion. No development is for him, however, without beginning, or without end, and this being true of the created world, its evil is, in his peculiar sense, reparable, as Weber has remarked. The suffering and redemption of the Absolute form, for Hartmann, the world-process ; and man's moral task is to make the quasi-purposes of the Unconscious his own, and strive after their fulfilment. In all which there is not wanting something of the fantastic.

Religion, for him, goes beyond ethics, and has redemption from evil as its last purpose. But this means a quiescence of the will, or a freeing from positive will, in his pessimistic tendency. To know one's self as of divine nature is, he says, to do away with " all undivine, that is, merely natural, conduct." For him, the world is self-redeeming, not through any species of self-mortification, but by universal insight into the vanity of human endeavour, consequent

upon the highest development of intelligence. In all which there seems to be a strange slipping away of spiritual content and ethical value. What boots it to talk of concrete monism and the moral world-order, if the negation of life and the worthlessness of action are the only results? When the soul, though he calls it reasonable will, is only an individual function of the Absolute Will—an unconscious Deity—what is there left of concrete monism, when it has given itself to fulfil this function? Hartmann's ethical position cannot even give real ethical value-judgments, for these are valid only as they have reality behind them, only as the spirit really exists, and posits ethical ends with reason-necessity. His ethic lacks proper metaphysical grounding and support; the ethical reason is hampered, and comes not to its fullest for lack of adequate guarantee in the metaphysics of spirit. The stages of the moral development are, in his view, threefold: the nature stage, or infra-moral; the moral stage; and the super-moral. The good, in Hartmann's view, always has its source, mediately or immediately, in the super-moral sphere. The moral is, to him, not only end in itself for man, but also highest end for the universe. But the end is only relatively good: it is the reduction of the evil wrought by the Unconscious in bringing into being consciousness and the world. His pessimism is no more consequent than we saw Schopenhauer's to be, for to his eudæmonistic pessimism he unites evolutionistic optimism, the world having for him a relatively reasonable and purposive development. Still, the non-existence of the world were better, in his view, than its existence. But if one found more pleasure

than pain in the world, there would be no need to condemn it. For him there is no absolute purpose in the world, but only the negative absolute purpose, to bring this world to a finish—the extinction of consciousness. The end of all is illusion, which it is the task, not only of the individual, but of all humanity, to recognise as such. Curious is the joining of this ethics of annihilation to teleology. Curious, also, his notion that an Unconscious Absolute would suffice to explain the teleology.

Hartmann conditions morality on insight into the fruitlessness of all striving after pleasure, and into the oneness of individuals with one another and with the universal spirit. He holds to the objectivity of moral obligation since without the former there would really be, in his view, no ethics. And it is only with ethical aspects of his system, not with his system in whole, that I am now concerned. His pessimism has a social cast while Schopenhauer's bore an individual character. Eudæmonistic ethic oscillates between the individual and the social in one-sided fashion, and remains only relative in character; eudæmonism is incomplete as a theory, and is not a true and sufficient *rationale* of life. The culture process is required so long as humanity has not seen through the misery and vanity of the world, and the need for quiescence of the will. The preparation for this must be found in æsthetic culture, wherein man frees himself from the world, while standing above it. But in this the pessimistic world-view has already broken down. The world has received a certain rehabilitation; in it the many are to experience the pleasure of participating in this culture process. Hartmann's world-view provides

in its way for the determination of humanity as a whole as well as for the individual—in fact, posits a redemptive, supra-temporal end. Only, in Hartmann's world-process, things are inverted; God is the subject to be redeemed, and man is the means of His redemption—His coming to Himself for Himself! This aberration constitutes for him the "absolute tragedy of the religious consciousness," which is, for him, pessimistic, no less than is the moral consciousness. The world-pain has become an infinite God-pain, calling for the redemption which I have just described. How absurd is his conception of an unconscious Absolute, all-wise, all-knowing, yet without consciousness of Itself! An unconscious Deity could not be free, since He could not know Himself to be active in the world. It may be safely added that no ethical difficulties of theism can compare with the unethical conceptions involved in Hartmann's working out his ideas of Deity—his Eternal and Absolute. The pessimistic ethic has only a negative albeit an absolute character, namely, the complete negation of will. But it lacks positive end, and will not be adopted save by him who is convinced by suffering; the question as to its universal validity cannot receive an affirmative answer. To invest life with activity and value, under a teleological conception of the world, and yet to insist on nothingness as end or ideal, is clearly absurd and unsatisfactory. Hartmann is found, however, in his later work, less favourable to eudæmonism and quiescence of the will, and more inclined to striving and combat with evil. To which may be added the general reflection, to which M. Sorel has given

expression, that "pessimism is the unfailing source of ceaseless religious renovation," in hope that it is true.

I turn next to the world-theory of modern Naturalism. This takes many forms, which I do not now propose separately to follow. I prefer to deal in broad outline with naturalistic theory in its ethical standpoints and bearings. It concerns itself with the rise of ethical phenomena, but too often absorbs itself in the merely negative contention that these are natural, as opposed to supernatural. Whether they are the one or the other, is not the real question of ethics of scientific character, which is concerned with accounting, in a disinterested manner, for the place and persistence of moral consciousness in the economy of man's rational life. Naturalistic ethics is content to derive moral principles from the adjustments or balancings of nature-impulses or affections. It has no perception of the senses in which man is morally good only by resisting nature. It too easily subordinates the higher in man to that which is lower. It regards ethical reason as the synoptic view or connection of determinate rules derived in a merely adjusted way. Ethics becomes a sort of technique for securing as great a good of the whole as possible. It becomes eudæmonistic, but may take the form of individual weal, or the good of the whole, or both. Its eudæmonistic character may lead naturalistic ethics to lay emphasis on individualism, or to put stress on the social principle; it leaves an unstable equilibrium between egoism and altruism, and does not treat the ethical as an independent spiritual magnitude. Ethics thus does not assume an unconditional character, or yield absolute norms; it is only

a means. It never transcends the phenomenal. It is fluctuating and relative in character, the practical reason being a mere sum of rules, due to the abstracting power of the understanding. Naturalism may profess to emancipate us from illusion and superstition, but it is not adequate to explain life, still less to ennoble it. For the thought and experience of man transcend nature, and cannot be bound by her limits. That is why, as Schopenhauer remarked, no being, man alone excepted, *wonders* at its own existence and surroundings. I am of those who think our times still suffer from the primitivism and naturalism—or, if you prefer, pseudo-religion—of Rousseau and his followers. A shrewd French critic said that Rousseau “looked with more complacency on the evil that was his own than on the good he possessed in common with other people.” Such a complacency as to moral evil is a hateful thing, for it is the deadly enemy of all moral progress. Man does not regard himself as merely a natural object among other natural objects, as naturalism is prone to do. In naturalistic ethics there is no fine putting of the self to proof, for it is made dependent on surroundings or environment, as set in the universal order of nature. As Aquinas says,—“*Necessitas naturalis non aufert libertatem voluntatis.*”

The eudæmonistic impulse is set by naturalistic ethic in constant dependence on outer environment. The self-activity of the individual is significantly limited by the ethical life being set in relation to nature impulses, in the manner of this theory. Moral mistakes are the consequences of miserable conditions. Morality is raised with the raising of happiness.

There is no other worthy end in the theory than the impulse to happiness, for which the subject is dependent on the outer world. Of course, social sentiment may be stimulated towards the happiness or welfare of the whole, and the individual merged in the task of shaping outer circumstances to this end. For on this whole he depends ; he is supposed to be product of his *milieu*. Or his eudæmonism, dissatisfied with such vague and doubtful collectivism as sole end, may take more individualistic form. Naturalism took—an extreme example—such an individualistic colouring in Stirner, egoism being for him genuine liberty. But he had not Nietzsche's lust of power. His philosophy consisted of sheer, vertiginous heights of individualism, consequently it was of the most unethical character, with no proper recognition of other human beings. His measureless egoism was the only measure, his naturalism, of course, rejecting all supernaturalism. He held in enmity every form of community. But revolt against unethical repression of individuality and against Socialist dreary, deadening monotony has no need of, and no justification for, such extreme forms.

Ethical individuality and ethical self-culture must always go beyond a naturalistic individualism, and cannot rest in themselves as end ; they are what they are, that they may freely and voluntarily serve the whole. Their enrichment comes of this reciprocity. Against the levelling of society stood Nietzsche also, who sought "the restoration of the egoism of humanity," in glaring opposition to Schopenhauer's absolute altruism. Nietzsche is an excellent tonic and stimulant, rather than guide or teacher, even

when expounded in Salter's fine, live work. But his stale and borrowed Voluntarism wrought much mischief and many glaring inconsistencies in his thinking, although his originality remains. What Nietzsche called his ethical naturalism was but a stripping of the moral values, till we should be brought back to immoralism, to "nature itself and to naturalness." But he forgot that the transvaluation of values is always going on. He is but critic of existing moral values, violent and extreme at that. He lacked any proper and reasonable measure for determining judgments of value.¹ His self-styled Ethical Naturalism judges life's worth by whether it can be perfected in accordance with the morals of the masters. He does not realise the absurdity of exalting, on occasion, a pure nature principle into a principle of value. His standard of valuation is merely his own. He turns to the happiness principle in the form of "human prosperity" at least. But his "moralistic naturalism" is really averted from value, treating everything as physiologically necessary. As if you could ever in that way reach or explain what is most distinctive of man as a person! Even truth has significance for him only as it is serviceable to the will for power, not as having an objective value. Again, we have in him the rule of the irrational. Vital fitness, under the biological standard, is the thing of supreme moment. But no ethical valuation can accept this as standard of unconditional worth. Naturalism cannot, in fact, be considered a comprehensive world-theory, and grows always more

¹ Cf. my Article "A Critical Estimate of Nietzsche's Philosophy" in the 'Bibliotheca Sacra,' January 1915.

cramped and limited as a world-view, the more it is scrutinised. Its inability to explain the facts of moral obligation—of the Ought—remains stark and unrelieved. This Guyau forcibly shewed. Where there is consciousness of an ideal—and a naturalism without ideals would be beneath discussion—there is obligation. Even Nietzsche cannot escape the ideal and the transcendent.¹ From obligation there is, I hold, no escape, for the ideal out of which it springs is our own—rooted in our self-hood. The consciousness of the ideal carries with it a sense of the “ought” which bids us realise it—an “ought” of end, not of means. For Nietzsche, however, there is no “ought” transcending life: life is his ultimate standard. The moral ideal, which is of the essence of the individual, when pursued in bitter earnest to the end, yields its source, I maintain, not in the social world alone, nor in the physical world alone, but in the underlying principle alike of the social and the cosmic universe, and it is in the failure severely to track it to this lair that lies the root-defect of Naturalism. It fails in thoroughness, and does not get beyond the visible system, is purely geocentric. It is morality without wings—nothing heliocentric about it.

I do not care to class Hartmann with such Naturalism, though this has sometimes been done. Hartmann seems to have reached, in some sort, the independence of spirit, which, he says, is not a product of nature. Nature is, he maintains, on the contrary, only a product of spirit, which is its immanent ground. Spirit is not eternal, but has posited nature, and man

¹ Cf. W. M. Salter, ‘Nietzsche the Thinker,’ pp. 338-342.

knows himself to be of the Creator-Spirit, and as standing far nearer to it than is nature. Hartmann, indeed, is not without a clear kinship to idealistic thought. I am not now concerned to consider how far this logical flight of the thought has been justified in his system. But there is the fact that he holds the ethical norm to be a product of reason—an ideal. And there are many excellent points and criticisms in his ethical work, albeit his theory in whole is nowise satisfactory. The difficulties of an absolute cosmic end, in his system, are not disposed of. Naturalism derives spirit from nature rather than nature from spirit, and thereby does hopeless injustice to man as a thinking and ethical being. It is not surprising that Lotze should have said that, of all errors of the human mind, it was to him the strangest that it “could come to doubt its own existence, of which alone it has direct experience, or to take it at second-hand as the product of an external nature, which we know only indirectly, or by means of the knowledge of the very mind to which we would fain deny existence.” What I am concerned with is, that wherever, on the broadest possible historic survey, man comes to consciousness of the difference of his own spiritual force from mere nature-force, he feels himself raised above all, and views the world as a cosmos or well-ordered Whole, in which the consciousness of ethical law and of relative freedom is developed. And the naturalistic issue is whether spirit is to lose itself in the world, or is to develop its powers in and by the world, conceived as a realm of moral ends. On this latter alternative, he comes to view nature—for it is a matter of insight—as substratum and instrument for

the realisation of moral ideas and purposes. Nature, in short, exists for the sake of spirit. For the world-concept has already for him ethical content; the world is for him the means for the realisation of the good will. This is not to say that the world, in the actual mechanism of its nature-connection, does not present difficulties to the realisation of moral demands and ideals, but, for all that, the moral—and especially the human world as an integrating constituent—is, in the last analysis, that which holds the world together. As the true, the ethical, self is developed, it cannot be holden of pure naturalism, conscious as it increasingly becomes of its membership in what must needs be a spiritual universe. It grows always more sensitive to the lack of standards and discipline in naturalism. It spurns its alternatives of Stoic despair or refined Epicureanism. Its outreaching desires aspire after truth and goodness, justice and love—things above, not things on earth. Its increasing conviction is of the hopelessness and helplessness of naturalism to deal with ultimate problems. “It is,” as Hegel said, “only by means of being elevated above nature that man arrives at a consciousness of what is higher, and at a knowledge of the universal.”¹

The only other world-theory which I shall now notice is the Theistic world-view in its modern ethical aspects. Theism is not a mere ontology; its Deity is the aboriginally perfect ethical Being, albeit many philosophers have not grasped or admitted this fact. Ethical theism has an idea of Deity quite distinctive from that deduced in purely speculative systems. There can, for theistic world-theory, no more be

¹ ‘History of Philosophy,’ vol. iii. p. 421.

immoralism or unethicism at the heart of things than there can be irrationality. That is to say, its Deity is active and perfect Moral Reason, no less than it is Supreme Mind or Intellect. It is this which gives to theistic world-view its tremendous moral strength. But theistic world-view does not simply say that moral law is ultimate fact for human mind, and that it represents ultimate fact for Divine Mind, for that would leave too many questions as to moral law unsettled. Its Deity is Himself moral law, and the Seat of ethical truth, and law is not to be conceived as a power above Him or as superior to Him. But even if we thus admit God to be the source of all the moralities, we have still the much more difficult task on hand of framing a thoroughly ethicised conception of the Deity Himself. The endeavour after this marks the highest advance made by modern thought, the most far-reaching in its effects. But theistic conception must be not only ethical, but vital and effectual. Such a view as I have been describing need have no particular concern with theological ethics, nor base itself exclusively on revelational authority. Its sole concern is with the background of ethical law and unity in the cosmos, with its call for corresponding ethical force and character in man. This gives theistic world-view a sense of community with the universe, in which God, or the absolute cosmic Self, is not only manifested in, but truly related to, our individual ethical self. The world has need of an objective, all-determining end: it has need of objective moral values. Mere immanentism can never suffice: it lacks horizon and outlook on the Eternal. Man's freedom is conditioned in

many ways, and it is the man, not purely his will, that is endowed with self-determining power. Thus, on theistic world-view, our power of real self-determination is ethically conserved and promoted or developed. On this view, then, the world-order is in the last result a moral order. How should it be otherwise, when on the religious or theistic world-view, the prevenient God has ever been source, ground, and support of Nature, no less than of the moral life of Man? But that does not mean that we can be content with a purely immanent ethic, for that would be a too aimless and unsatisfying affair. For God is the end, no less than He is the ground, of the world; and for that reason a transcendental ethic, with its doctrine of end, is required. A world without First Cause and Final End were no world for a rational-moral being. The world has, however, a real, though relative, independence of its own, which must be carefully recognised; yet is the world by, in, and for, God, and it cannot, therefore, rest in mere this-world ends. Mere this-world ends, no doubt, figure or appear as ends in themselves, but they are never really ultimate and satisfying. In the Christian ethic they become transfigured. The problem for man is to unify the plurality of moral ends which he finds on his hands, and this the Christian ethic enables him to do. Yet, on the religious or Christianly theistic world-view, there is no turning away from, or indifference to, the world; rather, a total reconsecration of the world to God, in and through all human action. All this must be of great consequence for our ethical ideals and our moral conduct. It is calculated to invest life—and all history

—with the most varied, lofty, and permanent values, so that, in fact, the world itself is indefinitely heightened and intensified in value. The ethical world-principle involved in a thoroughgoing theistic world-view thus carries in it, in my judgment, an immense and impressive superiority over any other form of world-view.

CHAPTER IX.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF PAIN.

THE problem of pain, the mystery of suffering, is one which has always held the world's attention, and still holds it. More than any other consideration, it has made the belief in Omnipotent Goodness difficult, and interposed an obstacle to theistic view. This, less as the result of any reasoned conviction, than of an instinctive feeling. I am therefore unable to accept Dr D'Arcy's position, that pain is "not a difficulty in the way of belief, but exactly the opposite." It is a distinct challenge to theism.

Pain is a universal fact; no degree of virtue, no grade of intellect, no height of fortune, nor any fortunate combination of these can bring exemption from its dread sway. It has been said that "the study of mystery in all its forms is the noblest to which the mind of man can devote itself"; and it is therefore not surprising that the mystery of suffering should have evoked many attempts to deal with it on the part of writers, philosophical and religious. But can we say that these attempts to set out the uses of pain and its beneficent aspects have really gone very far to still the hate of the human heart for this ugly monster that rends and devastates the

lives of so many of the fairest, noblest, most heroic, and most worthy human souls? It may be true enough to say that "painful sensations are only watchful vedettes upon the outposts of our organism, to warn us of approaching danger. Without these, the citadel of our life would be quickly surprised and taken." It may also be true enough to say that pain is a stimulant to exertion, and that suffering and pain have done their part in training man's nature to its highest reaches of development, so that in a sense his pains are the measure of his greatness. But, granting in full the prophylactic uses of pain, how flimsy and trivial all such considerations appear when the man is confronted with a dire delirium, or a malignant trouble, or a long-drawn-out anguish, or a deadly wasting, in lives that are to him dearer almost than his own. Beneficent aspects of *some* pain are easy enough of discernment; that of the surgeon's knife, for example, though not of the malady itself; but the pain that is undeserved, unavailing, unrewarded, unendurable, that seems only sent and void of meaning; *that* is the pain which the uprising noblest instincts of man would pluck from the world's heart, and hurl into the abyss. This is no pain that carries in its bosom its own reward, like that of the mother who, for the pain, the weariness, the wakefulness, the tearing anxiety, over her babe, finds an over-payment of delight. As William James remarks, there is "the remarkable fact that sufferings and hardships do not as a rule abate the love of life; they seem, on the contrary, to give it a keener zest." All the same, the dogma that pain is no evil may very well be left to

the Cynic and Stoic schools, for pride were a poor substitute for love and the suffering it brings. It is the meaningless, the apparently purposeless and overwhelming, aspects of suffering and pain, co-extensive with humanity itself, that call for deeper explanation, or at least deeper consideration, than the "apologias" for pain of philosophers and theologians offer us. Pain is evil, but the evil is a phenomenon; it is real enough, God knows, but that does not keep it from being evidence and sign of some deeper reality behind it. The more real the phenomenon of pain is—and it is agonisingly real—the deeper and more real is the reason, cause, or reality that underlies it, and is represented in it. It is when we forget this, and centre on the pain and suffering as isolated phenomena, that these become to us the alone real, and we lose sense of the unutterable reality and significance behind them.

It may be asked,—What evidence can be adduced in support of the view now put forward? Well, there is the consideration that pain and suffering must be regarded, not as isolated phenomena, but as having their place and relation in the whole system of things; not as they appeal to our sensibilities or feelings only, but as they appear to a calm and reasoned view or conviction of the system of the universe, as one designed for the higher ends of being and blessedness. Our outlook, both in fact and in imagination, must thus be upon the Whole in experience. The fulfilment of the eternal order can alone be realised through our pain and tribulation. There is an immanence of Ethical Deity in the world which ensures that pain and suffering are never inflicted or imposed

for their own sakes, but to subserve higher ends or issues, whether these are always discernible by us or not. And we must discriminate the pain which is of our own making, which springs from our wilfulness, self-centredness, and self-contraction, from seeking objects which, realised, turn to dust and ashes in our hands—all this lower type of pain we must distinguish from the pain that attends on the growth and expansion of the soul, the pain of its unsatisfied longings and aspirations. Then there is the consideration that these perplexing features or sorrowful phenomena are implied or involved in a created system which is limited and finite. They belong to the conditions of finite existence. The imperfections due to our relative being were, in this connection, so centred upon by Leibniz as metaphysical evil, that he failed to come to grips with the more pressing question of moral evil. The finitude of the finite is, properly understood, a necessary finitude. Natural evil—such as pain and disease—is undoubtedly an evil, but is wholly distinct from moral evil, as being part of Divine plan for a moral world ; such physical evil is in idea teleological. Natural evils are not wrongs in the sense that moral evils are. It is not enough to say, as is sometimes done, that pain is the incident of our incompleteness ; there may be some departure from the law of the normal type. The organism may fail to adapt itself to its conditions. Or some functional failure may take place in the life-process. Lewes viewed pain broadly as a special mode of Sensibility, dependent on particular neural combinations. Pain, says Bergson, in what is a more definite, but perhaps not a complete account

of the case, is our consciousness of the persistent but unsuccessful efforts of the tissues to respond, in purposeful manner, to a constantly renewed stimulus. Pain, unlike cognition, is not a relation between the organic subject and an outer object: the relations are here between processes within the organic subject, where their disagreement or disharmony means pain. Natural evils, such as pain, disease, and decay, are, to Christian ethic, not outside Divine Knowledge and regard; nor do they fail, in some way, to subserve Divine and reasonable purpose, "from seeming evil still educing good" for humankind, pitiless as the logic of the universe often seems to be. How pitiless its logic is, Schopenhauer, Mill, and Huxley have shown; but they did not see, nor do many after them, that they were dealing only with one aspect of Cosmic reality. Nature or the universe is not unresponsive to man's needs and purposes. If man as organism had had no answering environment, but only one of hostility, neither his improving moral life, nor the civilisation which is the outcome of his moral efforts, would have been. It is just possible, if we may judge from the history of strenuously moral races and empires, that there is less cosmic indifference to morality than men often suppose. But it is, of course, in the moral experience of man that the ethical ideal distinctively appears. And it is the man who has found God in his own moral life, who will best see whatever divine meaning there is in human suffering, pain, and sorrow. There are, in truth, no sorrows of finitude that ethical Deity does not in some way make His own. That, however, without the crude and literal identification suggested

by some philosophers. This, then, is the shining Reality behind the sad phenomenon. It lightens, though it does not wholly lift, for us "the weary and the heavy weight of all this unintelligible world"; and if it does not wholly solve the problem for us, that is because here we see but "in part." Our knowledge is *Stückwerk*—"piece-work," as the German Testament interestingly renders it. Pain, as men have always felt, calls to be explained, and it can be largely explained, both in its psychology, and in its spiritual purpose. But it is extreme, and without any proper warrant, to hold, with Royce, that our suffering is for the fulfilment or perfecting of God's life, for His perfection knows no such dependence. But it is true that Almighty Love is too ethical ever to have chosen pain—suffering—for its final word; and it is the moral world which has the right to the last word here. Pain cannot be the last word of pain. That is why I have called pain a phenomenon, real, oftentimes awful, as it is. It is but phenomenon, even if all earth "groans in pain together until now." For this bespeaks deliverance, to wit, "the redemption of our body." Meantime we are not required to endorse the view of the Danish philosopher, Sören Kierkegaard, that there is no religion without suffering, that suffering is of the essence of religion—a quite extreme, and very overstrained view indeed.

If all pain had been abstracted, however, from the world, it is impossible to estimate what loss had been sustained to body and to mind in the loss of stimulation to reasoning power, to imaginative effort, to character-building, to enriching sympathy, to nobility of soul. Pain, though evil, has revealing virtue.

But the heart of man is not easily satisfied, and the evil aspects of the phenomenon of pain will rise at recurring moments, and tempt us to feel righteous by cursing its general maleficence. But that achieves nothing, and is no result of an illuminated view; it merely shows that the phenomenon has aspects which persist in showing an evil side to us. Pain, in its acutest forms, pins down our consciousness to its own event; it enchains our personality when it would be free. It fastens upon our soul fetters of fear, and calls for the perfect love which casts out fear. For love achieves what no mere reasoning or knowledge can do. That is where many phenomenologies of pain fail, and the Buddhist phenomenology of pain is one of them. It occupied a large and striking place in Buddhistic thought. Birth, disease, decay, and death were each and all declared "painful" by Buddha; and Buddhism would give men increased sense of the pain of life. To Buddha, the whole world is constituted by suffering, and nothing but suffering. Life is taken to mean suffering, because it is desire; and the cause of the suffering is nothing but "thirst." That "thirst" may be a craving for passional gratification. Or it may be a craving for success in the present life. Or it may be the craving for a future life. The root and primal cause of all this suffering is, to Buddha, ignorance; and ignorance, in the Buddhistic sense, means taking true for false, or false for true. Thus it was a "not knowing." And Buddhism was "perfect knowledge" or Enlightenment. Buddhist salvation is in and for this life—it is salvation from misery. It is salvation, according to the most recent expositions of Buddhism,

by losing our individuality in an All wherein is no ego, no attachment to objective things, no discrimination of "I" and "Not I." The man himself is supposed to be the cause of his suffering; so by himself he is to be liberated. It is not the world he needs to be liberated from; he needs liberation from his selfish attitude towards the world. Deliverance from personal suffering is the great thing; and it is by a passing into nothingness. But there is no explication of the problem of pain or suffering in the Buddhistic system. For man to escape from his own misery is a wholly different thing from interpreting it, or seeing higher ends realised through suffering. As everything in Buddhism centred round the seeking self—rather than God—Buddhism is ultimately philosophy rather than religion. But the extinction of desire, and the attempted abolition of all personality, could only be, after all is said, a meagre, negative, and unsatisfying contribution to the study of the phenomenology of pain. To the positive might of the spirit it does no manner of justice. It was the result of treating the matter as still too exclusively an affair of the intellect, or of knowledge, not of positive, spiritual values.

Must not one say something of the same kind of the statement of Descartes, that "even in the saddest accidents and the most excruciating sufferings, man can always be contented, if only he knows how to use reason"? I should be the last to minimise the place and power of reason, but is it possible to claim such a power and potency for the "reason" that obtained in the rationalism of Descartes? I trow not. Reason—the fine faculty of perceiving, analysing,

synthesising—lacks force in itself before the pain and suffering of life ; it is but the eye of the soul, not the soul itself. Long before Descartes, men had learned the need for constancy in man's temper and strength in his will, for any such triumph—the need of a courage that dwells not in the cold storage of reason, but in the heart aflame. The possession of a fine, clear, cold Cartesian reason is not such a mother of all the virtues as to render needless such pain—in ourselves or in others—as will “stab” our spirits “broad awake.” The phenomenology of pain is difficult to follow up to full heights of explanation, but not a little in that direction may be done. It is when we pass from the limited and definite area or circle, to the ampler range of the nation or of mankind, that the difficulty increases. Within the narrow spheres of experience we can more readily observe or trace the functionings of pain or suffering as a creative force—its power to perfect the soul's nobility, and to wake or educe in other human hearts diviner capacity for love and sympathy. We suffer with the suffering—especially with those we have loved—and their moral force and patient heroic virtue enter into us and achieve this effect of deeper pity and new reverence. And we are left without title to assume that what seems to us perfectly needless and excessive pain is not subserving greater purpose in making perfect the sufferer, and those whose love enfolds him, than we think or know. In the wider spheres, or on the grand scale, of race and country, the *overplus*, as it seems to us, of pain and suffering cannot be held needless or vain. There is a vicarious principle—a great law of life—at work in such pain, suffering, sacrifice, the

reach and depth and potency of whose influence none can measure. The phenomenon is here terribly real, profoundly moving, impressive beyond words; but the reality behind and underlying that which gives rise to those "*abîmes de douleur*," is unutterably deeper and more significant, could we but discern it. What is the worth of life if we are not to allow these larger visions of the hidden ethical purposes of its pain, sorrow, anguish, to inspire and exalt it? The difficulty is, that, in interpreting the phenomenon, we have to rise to deal with—

. . . "the measures and the forms
Which an abstract Intelligence supplies
Whose Kingdom is where Time and Space are not."

Nevertheless, we cannot admit that we are put to permanent intellectual confusion, here or anywhere else. Our moral conception of the universe must, in some real degree, rise to meet the case—or perish.

There is, to begin with, the pain and suffering of the animal world, whose cruelty, rapacity, bitterness, and conflict have shocked the sensitive nature of man. Yet much which he has imagined, say the masters in science, has been "the reverse of the truth." For what really obtains is related to "the maximum of life and the enjoyment of life with the minimum of pain." What we know—or rather, what we think—about pain or suffering in the animal world is so largely imaginative and conjectural, and so little capable of verification, that its value is not great. We are continually guilty of anthropopathism in such matters. But even if we accept a residuum of truth in the dramatic indictments of Nature's war-

fare, it is to be remembered that, in the animal kingdom, we are in a sphere where the rational modes of development, characteristic of man, do not, and cannot, obtain; and that these lower and more violent modes, prefiguring the warfare of man, and of the soul of man, at least leave the world more congruous with man, in that it travails in pain, together with him. Grotesque enough, as things are, are the maladjustments and disharmonies of man, but at least they are not so unspeakably grotesque as they would have been in a world with no darkened background in Nature. An æsthetic consideration, it may be said, but an ethical one as well. The actual conditions are serious enough. But science has done little for us if we still cannot see the wood for the trees—cannot transfer attention from some incidental harsh features to the broad significant divisions, and the extended lines of orderly development, in the whole animal world. Whatever propensities, variations, and abnormalities may be found in Nature, we surely need not think of Nature only in terms of chaos and of strife; science may surely provide thought with materials for reflection in terms of order, harmony, and law. For you really do not know the world of organisms and functions until you know and appreciate them in whole, and in relation to the entire nature-system. Hence it does not seem to me that scientific view in such matters is to be placed behind less-informed, more sentimental notions, and it is the latter which have come most into view. This sphere is less one of abstract justice than of sympathetic human impulse, it should also be remembered. For it is part of man's duty, in proper and

legitimate ways, to mitigate the cruelty of Nature in respect of the suffering animal world. The lower is to be interpreted in terms of the higher, and we should need to know more of the whole economy of the universe before we allowed the grim things of the animal world to be any final obstacle to faith or higher view. This, although Nature with her fierceness—her *bellum omnium*—is a troublesome enough problem, on which limiting, abating, and relieving, but scarcely final, words can be said. For no *couleur de rose* view of Nature is possible, when all is said, before the destruction, waste, and suffering of the world, as it appears to us at any rate. But this appearance is so heavily discounted from the side of scientific considerations, that it must be subordinated to larger view and more certain aspects of the case.

When we pass from animal suffering up to human suffering the atmosphere grows clearer; for here we have “inside” knowledge—are experiencers, and not merely observers. We are dealing with *egos*—that feel, that “look before and after,” in which fact lies so much of the sting of pain. That, of course, is not to say that the mystery of suffering is cleared up, or a speculative solution of it found, but it does mean that a flood of light falls upon the problem, and fills it with meaning. We shall still find much made of pain by Pessimism, for what are really disappointed hedonistic reasons. Pessimism has its varieties, “reasoned” or merely temperamental, or catching, from its influences of wider character or import. But it refuses to make pleasure other than an empty negation, or to regard it as no less positive than pain, from which it is qualitatively different.

Pessimism does not assume a very courageous or virile attitude, nor an entirely just one either, when it makes so much of man's natural shrinking from pain, and surrenders to weakness, without proper allowance for all the benefits to character and progress which accrue from pain. It loses sight of the question of value, in the pure view of painfulness. It always fails to idealise. But still, there is always much in the world-conditions around us that ministers to pessimism, and beyond the sad fact of human suffering, there is what is supposed to be pessimism's crowning support in the awful fact of death, whose dark shadow ever lies athwart the universe. For if death be taken as a finality, and not as mere phenomenon, then is the destruction of human values and of the moral worth of man's highest efforts, so complete, the sacrifice of his most sacred and tender affections, so utter and unrelieved, that the crushing sense of vanity and nothingness seems a natural result. But this paralysis of man's spirit, consequent on the view of death as a finality, is so intolerable to normally-developed man as to make that view unbelievable and absurd. It is a view which stresses death rather than life, or, in the words of a German proverb, "Zu viel zum Sterben, und nicht genug zum Leben." For life shall on and upward go—such life as knows itself. Goodness is not so banished from the universe: through the ages runs one increasing purpose—a purpose which is not phenomenal, but is Noumenal Reality—a purpose of eternal and redemptive love for humanity, in whose outworking death is discounted—nay, "abolished"—and the highest ideals of humanity are realised in the Eternal.

Death is a freeing from mortal hindrances ; it means the final fulfilment and utter supremacy of the soul. But pessimism, in its almost diseased introspection—its insistence that life is will, and will is egoism—thrusts its monstrously exaggerated image of the self between the individual and the universe, and drags in its train disillusion, world-weariness, and self-contempt. It is a false philosophy of human nature to begin with, since will is meant for love, not for egoism, and love is destined for joy. Life is not mere will, but power of rational self-determination. Even Nietzsche holds that the great—and to him the philosophers are the greatest—are happy in their lot, are thankful for existence. Able and interesting as are the analyses of pain and pleasure given us by Schopenhauer and Hartmann, the latter of whom regards all willing as involving a surplus of pain and consequent misery of existence, they are, in both instances, marked by very glaring oversights. What is more serious is, that pessimism is radically weak on the moral side, I mean, in its grasp of man as a moral personality, and indeed thorough-going pessimism is possible only on an atheistical basis. It entirely fails to understand that no soul ever comes to its own which has not passed through the cleansing fires of tragic sorrow. Pessimism, as carried through even by a Hartmann, is a philosophy of despair. It is scarcely a satisfactory procedure to say, with Professor Sully, that its answer must be sought within the limits of experience, if experience is to be narrowed to a mere observing of facts, and without recognising, for example, that the knowledge of God belongs to experience—in which it begins, and on which it rests.

If pessimism is deficient in higher experience, that is, in my view, a defect to be charged against it, not an accommodation to be made to it. It is difficult to see how, in a universe which should be a moral system, the education, discipline, and development of man could be carried out without his susceptibility to pain, sorrow, suffering. At any rate, it never has been shown. We are not here, be it remembered, as mere instruments of the Divinity, we are reasonable, free, and independent agents. The suffering and conflict of the world have been the accompaniments of the whole economic, intellectual, and social evolution of the race. The whole problem of pain, which is a portentous fact calling for explanation, can therefore only be dealt with by comprehensive conception and solution—a fact too often overlooked. If life is merely, as the pessimist suggests, something floated on the swollen waters of desire, then must experience be empty and unsatisfactory enough. Life, at the level of the desires, calls for a new and deeper centre ; for there it is not grounded in righteousness. “ He that loseth his life for My sake shall find it ” is a saying to whose meaning the pessimist has never pierced. But, as said Goethe—

“Till this truth thou knowest,
 ‘ Die to live again ’—
 Stranger-like thou goest
 In a world of pain.”

A certain modified pessimism, however, has its measure of truth, and is more in place than an unbridled or unchastened optimism. Such was the pessimism of Paul and of Pascal, of Augustine and of Kant, and of many another who, in our time, felt the needs of man's

suffering soul to be far too deep for cure by any political panacea or any mere æsthetical satisfaction. But yet I think our pessimistic moods or phases belong to the doldrums of thought: in the day of clear vision, when mind and soul, according well, lay hold on the vast objective interests of life, intellectual and moral, on its abiding satisfactions amid its unquenchable cognitive and spiritual aspirations and possibilities, our pessimisms shrink to their native and normal insignificance. Immense possibilities of pain and suffering, no doubt, are, on the assurance of science, securely planted in the constitution and history of the world in which we live. Pain and suffering are the inescapable price of all its higher evolution and its cultural development. Christianity itself recognises the need and the reality of suffering; if it did not, it would heavily discount its own remedial power and efficacy. But suffering is essentially subjective, and cannot be objectively measured in any satisfactory fashion. The problem is too varied, subtle, relative, and complex to come within the statistical realm at all.¹ Far more pertinent is the sadly unequal, often apparently unjust, way in which suffering is distributed. This can only be related to the higher values developed in the suffering individual through pain. The sublimest attributes of personality are thereby awakened. Christianity's reminder is that He, Who is by pre-eminence termed the Man of Sorrows, was Himself perfected only through suffering, and has sanctified all sufferings by His own. Hence a great mystic said: "The swiftest steed that bears

¹ How hard it were to "measure" pain is finely brought out in the 'Heracles' of Euripides, l. 1251.

you to perfection is suffering." But not the suffering that is merely pessimistically borne. For, as a philosopher of our time has said: "It is a step of momentous importance for the world's history that Christianity should for the first time have appreciated suffering as a whole, attacked it as a whole, undertaken to subdue it as a whole. For its concern with suffering does not imply any intention of surrendering to it, or lingering over it in weak sentimentality. The object is rather to rise by means of it to a higher level, and to confront it with a world of love and faith." For life, as Wordsworth said, "is energy of love"; it is the redemption of him—

"Wer immer strebend sich bemüht."

I have already spoken of the psychology of pain, but its analysis, when regarded simply as a feeling, has proved very baffling to psychologists. Many of its other aspects are much more easily analysed. But what I am now mainly concerned to think of is pain as belonging to the man—to his sensitive suffering spirit—rather than to his body, or to that part of it which feels pain. For his body is but the organisation of a spirit. That is why pain is so real, though phenomenal. And it is a fact so universal that Shelley could say: "Ocean of life, whose waters of deep woe," for waters of deep woe they often enough are. You may suffer in your friend's suffering, says Epictetus, even to the extent of groaning aloud. But you must not "groan," he enjoins, "in the centre of your being." Excellent counsel for a Stoic philosopher, but lacking in sufficient reason or motive force. What nobility can there conceivably

be in blinding the soul to the reality of pain, and in steeling the heart in inhuman self-suppression and self-sufficingness? But the Christian attitude is a truly virile and more rational one, having behind its new and unexampled insight into the tremendous range and variety of the world's pain, a recognition that the spirit of man is greater than the spirit of fear—the fear of pain, and a recognition, further, that, behind all suffering and pain, an overshadowing Noumenal Reality abides, and transmutes pain to power and value, suffering to strength and wisdom. “Fear of pain,” said a thinking physician, “is the source of all temptation.” It is not pain, but the bearing or behaviour towards pain, which makes the personality real and great. The true philosophy of human nature demands a triumphant attitude over the fear of pain, if character is to be strong and great. As Emily Brontë has it, where “faith shines equal, arming me from fear.” If the sensational in experience—pain in consciousness—may not be despised, it must at least be transcended. Consciousness must be swallowed up in the love that casts out fear. If Christianity begins its work in us by deepening the pain of pessimism, it also gives it more ethical character, and finally overcomes it by calling out our forces of faith and love, will and courage. But Christianity is a spiritual magnitude, and holds no physical remedy for the anguished sufferings that fall on those we hold most dear; it can but assure us, in our tragic sense of powerlessness, that, through these, is their true destiny fulfilled. This world is process, not product, and life in it is a drama, with its tragic suffering illumined only by progressive

revelation of the Divine Purpose behind its pain. But the truly telic characters of pain belong to the spiritual sphere, where we have passed beyond the lower conditions of the physical order, a fact not always carefully remembered. And of that sphere we may say, as is done in 'Macbeth'—

"Therein the patient must minister to himself."

I mean that as moral beings our independence is rooted in our self-activity, which ever has the power to raise itself above the facts and phenomena of pain to the ideal ends or purposes subserved by them. But that is no reason why we should exclude from our study those pain-laden forces or conditions which often form the context of such higher experience. Science has brought us no great comfort by merely showing that pain is but a special kind of psychic experience. There must be no scientific complacency, for the limits of scientific power and resource are, in respect of pain, reached very soon indeed. There are still hosts of insidious foes to be warded off, and troops of invisible germs, now running riot in the tissues of the human body, to be outwitted, overcome, or defeated. Yet withal science has a cheering tone compared with that of pessimism, for science does not share the gloomy notions of the latter, that pain is a necessary factor of all conscious life, and is no temporary condition or phenomenal feature, but an increasingly large factor in the development of life's higher forms. But pain is still with us, a piercing and killing fact, inexplicable and beyond appeal to argument for the experient—the sufferer. Pain is a hydra-headed monster, which is no sooner overcome

in existing forms than it reappears in new and appalling guises. Beyond all its individual manifestations or appearances, pain partakes of the solidarity of the race and the world. It is this vast penetrative power and influence that makes pain such a serious phenomenon. In this comprehensive aspect of things it would be vain and superficial to forget how profoundly the order of the world, as intentioned by God, has been disturbed by the sin of man as a free moral agent ; for, although pain has no proper place in the world at all, it has, in consequence, become inwrought with the whole texture of the life of the human race. All that we can do for the suffering individual is to point out how pain can be turned into the highest good—transcendent spiritual value. It is not meant, in what has just been said, that Divine plan for the world has been frustrated by evil, for Divine wisdom has so much the more brought out the triumphant power of the good, and its ultimate vanquishment of the phenomena of evil and pain.

I have been speaking of the phenomenology of pain, but this phenomenological aspect is bound to the noumenal aspect, which latter forms its underlying essence. I have broadly suggested this underlying and supporting Reality, the two aspects being most closely correlated. The phenomenon is only an appearance of this noumenal reality. The reality of Divine presence and purpose behind all our pain—which, on the religious view of the world, is sent for the purifying and perfecting of our character—belongs to the noumenal aspect, the abiding reality of things, which change and suffering cannot touch.

Pain calls for reasons which will nerve the soul to endurance; and not by centring in himself alone, nor by a stoical apathy, will he gain what he needs, but by the "Power" that is "perfected amid weakness." The consciousness is then his, that his life is bound to the highest Power, the Divinest Love, and this grounds his very being and existence, and is deeper than all pain.

"'Tis the weakness in strength, that I cry for!

My flesh, that I seek

In the Godhead! I seek and I find it."

Schopenhauer says: "If we are in great bodily pain, or the pain lasts a long time, we become indifferent to other troubles; all we think about is to get well. In the same way great mental suffering makes us insensible to bodily pain; we despise it; nay, if it should outweigh the other, it distracts our thoughts, and we welcome it as a pause in mental suffering." This is expressive of the phenomenology of pain, in one of its relative characters or aspects, and it is true that physical pain, as more definitely localised, can, for a time at least, act thus as a remedy for mental pain. Hence the Russian novelist, Gogol, speaks of his hero in 'Dead Souls' as "enjoying the pain by which he strove to deaden the unquenchable torture of his heart." On occasion Nietzsche, too, goes so far as to say that, "in itself there is no pain," while William James says, "no one pretends that pain as such only appears like pain, but in itself is different." But though Schopenhauer can, on occasion, so give expression to the phenomenological

aspects of pain, yet no philosopher of modern times has, so much as he—and that is his merit—compelled the world to realise what real and serious factors are its pains, its sufferings, and physical evils. But he, in his pessimistic reaction against the sardonic optimism of Hegel, neither explains the phenomena, nor suggests any mode of viewing them that may mean alleviation of them. How could he, when, in his own system, such reason and order, as are in the world, appear only as stragglers late for the fair, to find unreason, caprice, chaos, and mal-adaptation, already throned in state? Of no one could it be more truly said that his “reason rooted in unreason stood.” Not content with the folly of disjoining Primal Will—which he identified with non-intelligent instinct—from Intelligence, he went on, as we saw in our last chapter,¹ to the glaring confusion involved in identifying being and evil. To him, pain, suffering, sorrow, are real and positive; what is negative is, happiness—the absence of pain. The relativity of pain he does, no doubt, assert, but it is to the will. To him the volitions of life—in serial form—are expressive of want, privation, unsatisfied desire, and mean a constant sense of suffering and sorrow. But what an inversion of the true phenomenology of pain his presentation offers. Pain is left as the last word of pain: it is being and end, not means. But it may not be an unsuitable correlative to his grim view of the Primal Will, as without moral purpose, and indifferent to man and human reason. The view is, in whole, blind to the tremendous moral values wrapped up in pain. Even though Schopenhauer

¹ Chapter viii.

makes a passing admission that "all suffering, since it is a mortification and a call to resignation, has potentially a sanctifying power." Yet Schopenhauer had a fine redeeming sense of admiration for true saintliness. Pain may be the gateway to the realisation of the very highest values. But how seldom do we realise the terrific cost of value. Value, it is said, is aristocratic and individual,¹ yet let us not forget that it can be so levelling that the humblest sufferer may realise a higher value than the most brilliant scholar or the most superb statesman. Considerations these which are fitted to induce an overpowering sense of humility.

The true phenomenology of pain is far enough from the view of its being a mere by-product of the cosmic process, of no particular bearing beyond the sinister significance it carries for the sufferer himself. On the contrary, pain as a fact of organic life is so inwoven with the very tissue and teleological ends of life—with the nature of our will and consciousness—as to form part of the Divine world-plan in upbuilding the spiritual universe. But it is there as a phenomenon—as means, not end itself. Even when the human pathway that leads to the City of God becomes one of torture and of tears, an agony and bloody sweat, it is still phenomenon we are beholding, behind whose tragic setting or dread appearance is the Noumenal Reality of the Absolute Moral Purpose, as the real thing, that shall know no end. For it is in no purposeless Omnipresence that we live and move and have our being, but in One of Whose ethical and redemptive purpose pain and suffering form at present

¹ Cf. B. Bosanquet, 'Some Suggestions in Ethics,' p. 69.

an essential and somehow beneficent part. In fine, the religious man, however undeserved his pain, finds the Noumenal Reality of the universe in the *Voluntas Dei*, in Whose begetting and sustaining and perfecting of all things is light, and no final shadow of pain at all.

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